



**NIST Internal Report
NIST IR 8432**

Cybersecurity of Genomic Data

Ron Pulivarti
Natalia Martin
Fred Byers
Justin Wagner
Justin Zook
Samantha Maragh
Jennifer McDaniel
Kevin Wilson
Martin Wojtyniak
Brett Kreider
Ann-Marie France
Sallie Edwards
Tommy Morris
Jared Sheldon
Scott Ross
Phillip Whitlow

This publication is available free of charge from:
<https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.IR.8432>

**NIST Internal Report
NIST IR 8432**

Cybersecurity of Genomic Data

Ron Pulivarti
Natalia Martin
Fred Byers
*National Cybersecurity
Center of Excellence
Information Technology
Laboratory*

Justin Wagner
Justin Zook
Samantha Maragh
Jennifer McDaniel
*Material Measurement
Laboratory*

Kevin Wilson
Martin Wojtyniak
Brett Kreider
Ann-Marie France
Sallie Edwards
MITRE

Tommy Morris
Jared Sheldon
University of Alabama in Huntsville

Scott Ross
Phillip Whitlow
HudsonAlpha

This publication is available free of charge from:
<https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.IR.8432>

December 2023



U.S. Department of Commerce
Gina M. Raimondo, Secretary

National Institute of Standards and Technology
Laurie E. Locascio, NIST Director and Under Secretary of Commerce for Standards and Technology

Certain commercial entities, equipment, or materials may be identified in this document in order to describe an experimental procedure or concept adequately. Such identification is not intended to imply recommendation or endorsement by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), nor is it intended to imply that the entities, materials, or equipment are necessarily the best available for the purpose.

There may be references in this publication to other publications currently under development by NIST in accordance with its assigned statutory responsibilities. The information in this publication, including concepts and methodologies, may be used by federal agencies even before the completion of such companion publications. Thus, until each publication is completed, current requirements, guidelines, and procedures, where they exist, remain operative. For planning and transition purposes, federal agencies may wish to closely follow the development of these new publications by NIST.

Organizations are encouraged to review all draft publications during public comment periods and provide feedback to NIST. Many NIST cybersecurity publications, other than the ones noted above, are available at <https://csrc.nist.gov/publications>.

NIST Technical Series Policies

[Copyright, Use, and Licensing Statements](#)

[NIST Technical Series Publication Identifier Syntax](#)

How to Cite this NIST Technical Series Publication:

Pulivarti R, Martin N, Byers F, Wagner J, Maragh S, Wilson K, Wojtyniak M, Kreider B, Frances A, Edwards S, Morris T, Sheldon J, Ross S, Whitlow P (2023) Cybersecurity of Genomic Data. (National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD), NIST Interagency or Internal Report (IR) NIST IR 8432.

<https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.IR.8432>

Author ORCID iDs

Ron Pulivarti: 0000-0002-8330-3474

Natalia Martin: 0000-0003-0531-7114

Fred Byers: 0009-0005-7865-2628

Justin Wagner: 0009-0003-8903-0504

Justin Zook: 0000-0003-2309-8402

Samantha Maragh: 0000-0003-2564-9589

Jennifer McDaniel: 0000-0003-1987-0914

National Institute of Standards and Technology
Attn: Applied Cybersecurity Division, Information Technology Laboratory
100 Bureau Drive (Mail Stop 2002) Gaithersburg, MD 20899-8930

Abstract

Genomic data has enabled the rapid growth of the U.S. bioeconomy and is valuable to the individual, industry, and government because it has multiple intrinsic properties that in combination make it different from other types of data that possess only a subset of these properties. The characteristics of genomic data compared to other datasets raise some correspondingly unique cybersecurity and privacy concerns that are inadequately addressed with current policies, guidance documents, and technical controls.

This report describes current practices in cybersecurity and privacy risk management for protecting genomic data, along with relevant challenges and concerns identified during 2022 NCCoE-hosted workshops with bioeconomy stakeholders and subsequent related research. Gaps that were identified by stakeholders include: practices across the lifecycle concerning genomic data generation; safe and responsible sharing of genomic data; monitoring the systems processing genomic data; lack of specific guidance documents addressing the unique needs of genomic data processors; and regulatory/policy gaps with respect to national security and privacy threats in the collection, storage, sharing, and aggregation of human genomic data.

The report proposes a set of solution ideas that address real-life use cases occurring at various stages of the genomic data lifecycle along with candidate mitigation strategies and the expected benefits of the solutions. The solutions recorded in this report reflect the bioeconomy workshop stakeholders' proposed actions and activities.

Keywords

Cyberbiosecurity; cybersecurity; genomic data; genomics; human genome; privacy.

Reports on Computer Systems Technology

The Information Technology Laboratory (ITL) at the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) promotes the U.S. economy and public welfare by providing technical leadership for the nation's measurement and standards infrastructure. ITL develops tests, test methods, reference data, proof of concept implementations, and technical analyses to advance the development and productive use of information technology. ITL's responsibilities include development of management, administrative, technical, and physical standards and guidelines for the cost-effective security and privacy of other than national security-related information in federal information systems.

Additional Information

For additional information on this NIST Internal Report and the National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence (NCCoE) Genomics Cybersecurity project, visit [our project page](#). Information on other efforts at [NIST](#), the [Information Technology Laboratory](#) and [NCCoE](#) is also available.

Patent Disclosure Notice

NOTICE: ITL has requested that holders of patent claims whose use may be required for compliance with the guidance or requirements of this publication disclose such patent claims to ITL. However, holders of patents are not obligated to respond to ITL calls for patents and ITL has not undertaken a patent search in order to identify which, if any, patents may apply to this publication.

As of the date of publication and following call(s) for the identification of patent claims whose use may be required for compliance with the guidance or requirements of this publication, no such patent claims have been identified to ITL.

No representation is made or implied by ITL that licenses are not required to avoid patent infringement in the use of this publication.

Table of Contents

1. Introduction	1
1.1. Cybersecurity and Privacy Concerns	1
1.2. Document Scope and Goals	2
2. Background	3
2.1. Genomic Information Lifecycle	3
2.2. Next Generation Sequencing	4
2.3. Variant Calling	4
2.4. Genome Editing	5
2.5. Direct-to-Consumer Testing	5
2.6. The Characteristics of Genomic Data	6
2.7. Balance Between Benefits and Risks for Uses of Genomic Information	7
3. Challenges and Concerns Associated with Handling Genomic Information	9
3.1. Potential National Security Concerns	9
3.2. Potential Privacy Problems	9
3.3. Discrimination and Reputational Concerns	10
3.4. Economic Concerns	11
3.5. Health Outcome Concerns	11
3.6. Other Potential Future Concerns	11
3.7. Summary of Challenges and Concerns with Genomic Data	12
4. Current State of Practices	13
4.1. Risk Management Practices	13
4.1.1. U.S. Government Resources	13
4.1.2. U.S. Government Initiatives	15
4.1.3. International Resources and Regulations	16
4.2. Cybersecurity Best Practices	16
4.2.1. U.S. Government Resources	17
4.2.2. International Resources	17
4.2.3. Industry Resources	18
4.3. Privacy Best Practices	18
4.3.1. U.S. Government Resources	18
4.3.2. International Resources	19
4.3.3. Industry Resources	19
4.4. Summary of Gaps in the Protection of Genomic Data	20
4.4.1. Guidance Gaps	20

4.4.2. Technical Solution Gaps	20
4.4.3. Policy/Regulatory Landscape	22
5. Available Solutions to Address Current Needs	23
5.1. NIST Cybersecurity Framework Profile for Genomic Data	23
5.1.1. Use Case Description	23
5.1.2. Solution Idea	23
5.1.3. Expected Benefits	24
5.2. NIST Privacy Framework Profile for Genomic Data	24
5.2.1. Use Case Description	24
5.2.2. Solution Idea	25
5.2.3. Expected Benefits	25
5.3. Automatic Network Micro-Segmentation of Sequencers with MUD	25
5.3.1. Use Case Description	25
5.3.2. Solution Idea	25
5.3.3. Expected Benefits	26
5.4. Security Guidelines for Data Analysis Pipelines	27
5.4.1. Use Case Description	27
5.4.2. Solution Idea	27
5.4.3. Expected Benefits	27
5.5. Demonstration Project for Genomic Data Risk Management	28
5.5.1. Use Case Description	28
5.5.2. Solution Idea	28
5.5.3. Expected Benefits	28
5.6. Demonstration Project for Analysis of Genomic Data Using Privacy Preserving and Enhancing Technologies	29
5.6.1. Use Case Description	30
5.6.2. Solution Idea	30
5.6.3. Expected Benefits	31
6. Areas for Further Research	32
7. Conclusion	33
References	34
Appendix A. List of Symbols, Abbreviations, and Acronyms	42
Appendix B. Workshop Resources	45

List of Tables

Table 1. NIST Risk Management Framework Discussion for Genomic Data	14
Table 2. January 26, 2022 Workshop Agenda, Topics, and Presenters	45
Table 3. May 18, 2022 Workshop Agenda and Presenters	46
Table 4. May 19, 2022 Workshop Agenda and Presenters	46

List of Figures

Fig. 1. Genomic Data Lifecycle; Adapted from Naveed et.al. [7]	3
Fig. 2. Characteristics of DNA (Adapted from Figure 1 of Naveed et al. [7])	7
Fig. 3. Notional MUD architecture for a sequencer	26

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank the speakers, panelists, and contributors to the NCCoE Virtual Workshop on the Cybersecurity of Genomic Data held Wednesday, January 26, 2022, and the NCCoE Virtual Workshop on Exploring Solutions for the Cybersecurity of Genomic Data held Wednesday, May 18, 2022, and Thursday, May 19, 2022, for their inputs that helped inform the contents of this paper. The list of presenters is available on the NCCoE Cybersecurity of Genomic Data website (<https://www.nccoe.nist.gov/projects/cybersecurity-genomic-data>) and has been included in **Appendix B** for easy reference in this document.

1. Introduction

Genomic data are generated from studying the structure and function of an organism's genome, which consists of genes and other elements that control the activity of genes. Examples of genomic data can include information on deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) sequences, variants, and gene activity.

The world has entered an era of accelerated biological innovation built primarily upon the many uses of genomic data that include vaccine development and manufacturing, pharmaceutical development and manufacturing, disease diagnosis, and agricultural innovations that enable increased food production, biofuel development, basic and translational scientific research, consumer testing, genealogy, and law enforcement, among others. More uses continue to be discovered.

Genetic sequencing technology has advanced such that sequencing entire genomes is feasible and affordable. Whole or partial genome sequences for many microbial, plant, and animal species reside in open access, controlled access, or private databases within the National Institutes of Health (NIH), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and direct-to-consumer (DTC) genetic testing providers, to name a few. As this era unfolds, there is a new awareness of risks to U.S. national security, its economy, its biotechnology industry, and its citizens due to cybersecurity attacks targeting genomic data as highlighted in the Executive Order (EO) on Advancing Biotechnology and Biomanufacturing Innovation for a Sustainable, Safe, and Secure American Bioeconomy [1]. Additionally, human genetic information requires compliance with policies, laws, and ethics surrounding privacy. Nevertheless, the inherent value of some genomic data lies in the ability to share information with the broader community, creating the need to balance access restrictions with data sharing capabilities.

1.1. Cybersecurity and Privacy Concerns¹

Cyber attacks targeted at genomic data include attacks against the confidentiality of the data, its integrity, and its availability. Cyber attacks against the confidentiality of the data can threaten our economy through theft of the intellectual property owned by the U.S. biotechnology industry, allowing competitors to gain an unfair economic advantage by accessing U.S. held genomic data. Attacks against the integrity of the data can disrupt biopharmaceutical output, agricultural food production, and bio-manufacturing activity. Attacks against the availability of the data include encrypting for ransom, deletion of data, and disabling critical automated equipment used in research, development, and manufacturing. The potential harms of cyber attacks on genomic data threaten our national security as well, including enabling development of biological weapons and

¹ Cybersecurity and privacy objectives provide a useful construct for describing concerns. The cybersecurity objectives are confidentiality, integrity, and availability. The definitions of each originate from 44 U.S.C., Sec. 3542 and they are used throughout multiple NIST publications. The privacy engineering objectives are predictability, manageability, and disassociability. They were initially described in NISTIR 8062 and are also used throughout multiple NIST publications. Definitions for all six terms, as well as a sample of documents in which they are discussed, appear in the NIST Glossary (available at: <https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary>).

surveillance, oppression, and extortion of our citizens, military, and intelligence personnel based on their genomic data.

Cyber attacks targeted at genomic data can also harm individuals by enabling intimidation for financial gain, discrimination based on disease risk, and privacy loss from revealing hidden consanguinity or phenotypes including health, emotional stability, mental capacity, appearance, and physical abilities. In addition to the privacy risks that can arise because of a cyber attack, privacy risks unrelated to cybersecurity can arise when processing genomic data. These risks can arise when there is insufficient predictability, manageability, and disassociability in the genomic data processing. Insufficient predictability in data processing can result in privacy problems if individuals are not aware of what is happening with their genomic data. Insufficient manageability in data processing can arise when the capabilities are not in place to allow for appropriately granular administration of genomic data. For example, individuals may need to be able to have some or all their genomic data deleted from a dataset. Permitting access to raw genomic data, instead of using appropriate privacy-enhancing technologies to extract only the necessary insights (without revealing the raw data), introduces privacy risks from insufficient disassociability in data processing. Each of these areas of privacy risks can disrupt the ability to realize the benefits of processing genomic data [1].

NIST is exploring genomic data uses to better understand common and pressing cybersecurity and privacy concerns specific to these data to identify and provide cybersecurity and privacy practice guidance and protections. To inform this effort, NIST, through its National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence (NCCoE), conducted two public workshops [2]–[3]—one concentrating on the challenges already faced or anticipated by the community, followed by another workshop focusing on solutions to help address those challenges. These workshops along with additional research provided the basis for the information presented in this paper. The topics and list of presenters are available on the NCCoE Cybersecurity of Genomic Data webpage [4], and have been included in **Appendix B** for easy reference in this document.

1.2. Document Scope and Goals

This paper identifies characteristics of genomic data compared to other types of data and provides an introductory overview of cybersecurity and privacy risk management resources and classifications of the risks during the genomic data lifecycle. It also identifies the most common challenges to securing genomic data, the current state-of-the-art cybersecurity and privacy practices for genomic data, and gaps associated with these practices. Finally, use cases are presented that simulate real-life challenges with candidate mitigation strategies to address each challenge, along with the expected benefits provided by the proposed solutions.

2. Background

A genome contains hereditary material comprised of nucleic acids, mostly in the form of DNA. Genomes contain the full set of instructions to form an organism and are largely unchanged from conception to death. Instructions are encoded in the sequence of the four nucleotide subunits (also called bases) that comprise the backbone of the DNA or ribonucleic acid (RNA) molecule. In DNA, these are adenine (A), cytosine (C), guanine (G), and thymine (T). A segment of bases containing the instructions for making a product, such as a protein or an RNA molecule, is called a gene. Variations in the number and kinds of genes, as well as differences across genes, underpin the diversity of life on earth.

Some genes give rise to observable traits, termed phenotypes, like hair or eye color, blood type, and facial features. Other phenotypes may include the presence of or susceptibility to certain medical conditions, such as sickle cell anemia, cystic fibrosis, Huntington’s disease, forms of muscular dystrophy, or certain cancers. Importantly, the genome reveals a great deal of information about an organism as well as its relatives.

Genomic data are generated from studying the structure and function of an organism's genome. Examples of genomic data can include information on DNA sequences, variants, and gene activity. Genomic data are largely immutable, associative, and convey important health, phenotype, and personal information about individuals and their kin (past and future). In some cases, small fragments of genomic data stripped of identifiers can be used to re-identify persons, though the vast majority of the genome is shared among individuals [\[2\]\[8\]](#).

2.1. Genomic Information Lifecycle

Fig. 1 summarizes the genomic lifecycle and contrasts those areas that are out of scope for this report—Sample Collection and Sample Preparation—with what is considered in scope—Data Generation and Data Analysis. Additionally, organizations processing genomic data should also consider proper data retention and disposal.



Fig. 1. Genomic Data Lifecycle; Adapted from Naveed et.al. [\[6\]](#)

The genomic data lifecycle begins with sample collection and preparation performed in the laboratory or clinic. Safeguarding sample collection procedures require applying appropriate physical security as opposed to cybersecurity controls and is deemed mostly out of scope for this report. One exception is collection of human DNA in the context of clinical care or study. In

those instances, human DNA sample collection and downstream steps may be subject to additional privacy considerations and informed consent.

Raw data generated in the next step are typically stored in a computer on-premise or in the cloud for processing and analysis. Data processing and analysis can be performed by open-source or commercially developed software or algorithms. The steps performed vary based on the intended use of the data. Data may be made accessible to other researchers or uploaded to public or controlled access databases.

In healthcare, genomic data can be medically relevant at any time in a patient's life, thus integration with an electronic health record (EHR) is essential. However, the nature and size of the data can present a challenge if incorporating it into EHR workflows. Whole genome sequence data files can exceed 100 gigabytes in size. Additionally, as research advances, genomic sequence data may need to be re-analyzed to provide the most up-to-date information for a patient's current medical condition. Thus, portability, privacy, chain-of-custody, interoperability, consent management, and re-interpretation of genomic data are all key points for its effective use in healthcare.

Like other sensitive data, at each stage in the genomic data lifecycle, from creation to storage and analysis to dissemination, the data can be at risk of being intercepted, corrupted, overwritten, or deleted.

2.2. Next Generation Sequencing

Since the introduction of automated sequencers in 1986 [9], sequencing costs have dropped by several orders of magnitude [10]. Both the number and types of DNA sequencers have proliferated for clinical and research applications. The first sequencing platforms used Sanger-based chemistries, relying on the chain termination method, and were limited in the numbers of sequences that could be read simultaneously. Advances in sequencing approaches and chemistries have led to second- and third-generation sequencing platforms, often called next-generation sequencing (NGS). NGS systems have been developed by several manufacturers with varying read lengths and accuracy for different applications. Compared to automated Sanger sequencing, which reads a single DNA molecule many times, NGS systems read many molecules simultaneously, greatly increasing throughput and efficiency while reducing costs.

2.3. Variant Calling

Variant calling, the primary form of genomic analysis, is the identification of differences in the genetic sequence between a sample and a reference genome. Variants can range from changes to a single base at a given position in the genome to larger structural alterations, such as deletions, insertions, duplications, inversions, and translocations. Variant identification is particularly important in clinical medicine and molecular biology as alterations elucidate the role of genetic elements in various diseases and facilitate our understanding of cellular processes.

Characterizing cancers is one area that employs variant identification. For instance, analyses of somatic and germline genetic alterations—germline mutations are inherited by germ cells (sperm and egg) during conception whereas somatic mutations occur after conception in non-germ

cells—yield insights to clinical outcomes and tumor origins. Somatic variants can be used to target drugs that are more likely to be effective against the individual’s tumor.

As NGS technologies have progressed, so too have the computational pipelines for identifying variants. Multiple software tools and workflows have been developed for different NGS technologies and various variant-calling applications. Precise variant calling requires having complete and accurate reference genomes, as well as appropriate sequencing depth, accuracy, read length, and analysis methods. Efforts including but not limited to the NIH Genome Reference Consortium, Telomere-to-Telomere Consortium, and the NIST Genome in a Bottle have significantly advanced the technical infrastructure, accuracy, and completeness of human reference genomes and authoritatively characterize genomes to assess accuracy of variants [11]–[12]. Recent systematic evaluations of germline and somatic variant-calling pipelines showcased the capabilities and limitations of several sequencing platforms and variant-calling software and workflows [13]–[14]. As sequencing systems continue to advance, variant-calling pipelines are likely to follow suit.

2.4. Genome Editing

New advances in DNA editing techniques, like clustered regularly interspaced short palindromic repeats (CRISPR) and CRISPR-associated protein (CRISPR-Cas), promise precise, efficient, and affordable ways to edit the genome through removing, adding, or altering DNA segments. As next-generation sequencing is helping scientists better understand the genomes of various organisms, CRISPR-Cas systems are enabling researchers to modify genes more easily and affordably than ever possible. When using genome editing in clinical applications to treat diseases, NGS technologies are used to confirm the correct edit was made and identify any unintended off-target edits. Although the net benefit of these technological advances is positive, there exists an opportunity for misuse.

2.5. Direct-to-Consumer Testing

An alternative approach to measure DNA does not use sequencing but instead uses microarrays of DNA probes to measure common variants at millions of specific genomic positions. Microarrays are commonly used by DTC genetics companies for ancestry analysis and screening for whether individuals may be carriers for particular disease-related variants. DTC genetic tests are marketed to individuals without the involvement of a healthcare provider. These tests, available from multiple companies, enable consumers to gain personalized insights into their health and ancestry by examining their genetic profile. Results from consumers’ genetic tests can be accumulated in research databases to identify genetic sequence associations with certain conditions. Moreover, third-party online genetic genealogy services allow consumers to upload their genetic sequence information and identify related individuals.

Advancements in microarray technology have allowed these companies to provide tests at relatively affordable price points. The costs of DTC tests vary from company to company but typically start at \$99. The DTC genetic testing market is estimated to be worth over \$1.3 billion and is projected to grow to approximately \$3.5 billion by the end of 2026 [15].

2.6. The Characteristics of Genomic Data

Genomic data share attributes with other sensitive types of information, and as such, mirrors their need for secure storage and transfer. Beyond these aspects, there are several intrinsic characteristics of genomic data. These concepts were discussed during the first NCCoE public workshop held on May 18 and 19, 2022, and have been posited by some in the research community [2]. Fig. 2 identifies seven features of genomic information that distinguish it from other types of data. It is not any single characteristic, but instead, the combination of these intrinsic properties that highlight its value and sensitivity.

- **Phenotype.** Phenotype refers to the observable characteristics imparted by the genome, such as size, appearance, blood type, and color. DNA can reveal a great deal of information about an individual or their relatives, including phenotype or health information.
- **Health.** Health means that DNA contains information about an organism's disease presence, disease risk, vigor, and longevity. Clinical genetic testing can identify variants within one's genome that may contribute to certain health outcomes.
- **Immutable.** Immutable means that an organism's DNA does not change significantly during the organism's life. An individual's genome is practically immutable, with a negligible lifetime mutation rate for most applications, which increases the long-term consequences of a data breach.
- **Unique.** Unique means that individuals of species with sexual reproduction can be identified. Except in the case of identical siblings, a person's genome is unique to them.
- **Mystique.** Mystique refers to the public perception about the mystery of DNA and its possible future uses.
- **Value.** Value refers to the importance of the information content of DNA. The value of genomic information is predicted to grow as we learn more about the genomes of humans and other organisms. Value also grows as technology advances, and we are able to query the genome in novel ways.
- **Kinship.** Kinship means that common ancestors and descendants of the organism can be identified from DNA samples. Consumer genetic testing services provide information about one's ancestral lineage, including the potential to identify relatives.




Fig. 2. Characteristics of DNA (Adapted from Figure 1 of Naveed et al. [6])

2.7. Balance Between Benefits and Risks for Uses of Genomic Information

The U.S. research community, government, and private industry require genomic data sharing to advance scientific and medical research and to maintain the country's competitive advantage in biotechnology. The transfer and sharing of genomic data are essential for understanding human health, improving wellbeing, and accelerating scientific inquiry and advancements. For example, in 2021 the NIH processed almost 40,000 requests for data access and has about three million genotype microarray datasets and over 500,000 whole genome sequences [3][15]. Genomic data enable precision medicine for rare diseases and cancer and is an enabler for CRISPR technology. DTC genomic testing allows people to benefit from ancestry tracing, relative matching, and health insights. In 2022, DTC companies reported more than 40 million consumers have used their services [16]. Genomic data can be useful for forensics to solve crimes [17]. Future uses of genomic data have further potential to advance the bioeconomy.

The genomic data transferred and shared represent tens of millions of individuals who provide their information. In aggregate across all types of measurements, these data are touched by thousands of entities (e.g., domestic, international, nonprofit, for-profit) that store, access, manage, and use genomic and health-related data. These data sharing activities need adequate technological and policy controls that allow research and enable commerce, as well as respect the informed consent and privacy of the data subjects who expect protections from re-identification [18].

Loss of control of genomic data can cause risks to privacy, personal security, and national security, as adversaries can use genomic data for nefarious reasons such as surveillance,

oppression, and extortion. Genomic database breaches or other losses of data may result in thefts of intellectual property and put the U.S. at a competitive disadvantage in biotechnology. As reported by national security experts, security threats may arise through the creation of bioweapons or compromised identities of national security agents [\[2\]\[19\]–\[21\]](#). Cyber attacks have occurred on genomic databases, commercial entities storing genomic data, DNA sequencing instruments, and genomic software tools [\[2\]\[22\]–\[23\]](#). Other potential attack scenarios and exploits targeting hardware, firmware, software, the local network, cloud infrastructure, and physical security have also been proposed as sources of risk [\[24\]](#).

3. Challenges and Concerns Associated with Handling Genomic Information

This section summarizes challenges and concerns for protecting genomic data in national security, personal security and privacy, discrimination and reputational, economic, health outcomes, and other potential future concerns. NIST aggregated these challenges and concerns from discussions and presentations at the workshops and subsequent literature review.

3.1. Potential National Security Concerns

As genomics research evolves, threats to national security continue to emerge. This section lists potential national security concerns that were identified by workshop stakeholders. The likelihood for these threats was not evaluated as part of the workshop.

The national security concerns identified include:

- **Infringement:** Genomic data can be used for population surveillance and oppression as well as extortion of our citizens, military, and intelligence personnel [22].
- **Synthetic Biology:** Synthetic biology applies engineering principles to biology to develop or redesign living systems or organisms. A concern is that databases or instruments could be misused for malicious purposes. Also, synthetic DNA manufacturers, who impose procurement controls, could be the subject of cyber attacks.
 - **Biological weapons:** Potential risks related to developing bioweapons have been raised by some in the national security community [20][22][25]. Some stakeholders suggested the need to balance genomic information security risks with the needs of those in the research community to share information [2].
 - **Benchtop synthesis:** Benchtop DNA synthesizers enable users to generate custom DNA sequences. As speed, efficiency, and adoption of these tools increases, their potential for misuse does as well. Current capability limitations pose challenges for users in synthesizing chromosome-length products, which impedes generating more complex products, like whole organisms, using genomic data [26].
- **Production of toxic products or infectious agents:** Researchers have speculated that due to the lack of integrity and tampering controls that typically exist, genomic data could be corrupted by altering sequences or annotations and that, “These changes could delay research programs or result in the uncontrolled production of toxic products or infectious agents” [27]. This could result in significant loss of life as well as economic consequences.

3.2. Potential Privacy Problems

Privacy problems resulting from the use of human genomic data include problems for individuals such as enabling intimidation for financial gain, discrimination based on disease risk, and revelation of hidden consanguinity or phenotypes including health, emotional stability, mental capacity, appearance, and physical abilities. Also, genomic data have the unique attribute of correlation among an individual's relatives. Data exposure can introduce class harms, where

related persons (who may or may not have consented to the use of that data) are potentially violated regardless of the individual's intent.

The U.S. intelligence community highlighted [2][22] concerns with sparse regulation of the genomic data collected and stored by DTC companies, along with lack of recognition of U.S. genomic data as an asset that needs export controls. Some researchers and consumer groups suggested that due to the high reidentification risk, human genomic data should be consistently classified as personally identifiable information (PII), while other researchers argued that this would hinder research and the benefit to society [2]. It should be noted that regardless of how human genomic data are classified or whether specific organizations fall under the purview of privacy regulations, the privacy risks arising from processing genomic data remain.

Potential privacy problems identified include:

- **Re-identification using disassociated genome fragments:** Each individual's genome is unique, with the exception of identical twins, indicating that a whole genome sequence can never be truly anonymized [28]. Even portions of a person's genome can be used to re-identify that individual, especially when combined with other datasets, such as genealogical data, surname inference, age, etc. [6][8][29].
- **Unanticipated revelation of individuals' blood-relatives can lead to dignity loss when those relationships are identified:** Consanguineal ties may be revealed that may be embarrassing or incriminating, resulting in psychological or reputational harm.
- **Appropriation of genomic data that exceeds consent given:** Genomic data are provided by a person under a set of expectations and authorized consent based on their understanding of those expectations. Failing to adhere to consent agreements during data processing can lead to privacy problems for individuals, such as loss of trust, and economic impacts for organizations (see [Section 3.4](#)). During the workshops, organizations noted challenges with effectively handling revoked consent and having consent properties follow the data as well as implementing effective access controls. Additionally, the inability of relatives to participate in the consent process introduces further complexities.

3.3. Discrimination and Reputational Concerns

The discrimination and reputational concerns identified include:

- **False identification:** Sample mishandling, crime lab procedure deviations, or intentional modification of the digital genomic data produce a risk to individuals being framed for crimes they did not commit or extorted with the falsified genomic information.
- **Discrimination based on disease risk identified by an individual's genomic data:** While some forms of discrimination in the U.S. are prohibited by law, the federal laws are narrowly written and do not prohibit discrimination based on an individual's genomic data for things such as life insurance, acceptance into the military, or senior residential communities (e.g., based on Alzheimer's risk) [6][22][30].
- **Unintended consequences from sample bias:** Artificial Intelligence (AI) and statistical analysis techniques analyze large sets of genomic data to find diseases, risk factors for diseases, make treatment decisions, and predict patient prognosis. Large datasets from DTC and other samples of convenience in the U.S. are from predominantly those of

European descent. Minority communities are typically underrepresented. This bias of the sample data can be amplified, particularly in AI techniques, and impact the results of these analysis and prediction techniques that can result in discrimination [30]–[32], resulting in potential harms to those whose genomic data are not represented in the sample set. This bias of AI algorithms has been studied by NIST in the field of facial recognition [33].

3.4. Economic Concerns

Economic concerns identified include:

- **Intellectual property infringement:** Exfiltration of genomic data can result in loss of intellectual property for institutions, resulting in economic losses in the future.
- **Operational disruption:** Disruptions to the generation, storage, or use of genomic data can negatively affect production operations, impacting agricultural food production, biopharmaceutical output, and biomanufacturing.
- **Extortion:** Bad actors or nation states may extort individuals based on their genomic data, threatening to reveal sensitive health or kin information encoded in the individual's genome [22], resulting in financial, psychological harm, and reputational loss to the individual.
- **Penalties and liabilities:** Negligence in the cybersecurity controls of genomic data by the company or institution could violate their regulatory obligations, jeopardize their access to data in the future, and result in significant financial loss through imposed penalties.
- **Revoke data access:** Negligence in adequate security or privacy protection can cause individuals to no longer consent to have their genomic data used in scientific studies, which could reduce the effectiveness of research and threaten the bioeconomy.

3.5. Health Outcome Concerns

A patient's genomic data need to be effectively incorporated into their EHR to allow for effective clinical care. Concerns in healthcare include portability, chain-of-custody, re-interpretation of genomic data, and consent management. An individual's genomic data also have implications for personalized or precision medicine, which tailors treatments or prevention based on individual characteristics, such as genetics, lifestyle, and environmental considerations. Theft or sabotage of genomic information or analytical processes and systems could harm genetic and precision medicine capabilities as NGS plays an outsized role in guiding diagnoses and delivering individualized treatments.

3.6. Other Potential Future Concerns

Other potential future concerns identified include:

- **Misuse of de-extinction techniques:** De-extinction has been described by the International Union for Conservation of Nature as “any attempt to create some proxy of an extinct species or subspecies through any technique, including methods such as selective back-breeding, somatic cell nuclear transfer, and genome engineering” [34].

While cloning with somatic cell nuclear transfer requires an individual's cellular material and is outside of the scope of this document, applying de-extinction techniques to human genomic information could theoretically be accomplished, though not at present or in the near future. Significant limits have been encountered with de-extinction based on genomic information alone [35], but in the distant future applying these techniques to humans could result in psychological or financial harm.

- **Human engineering:** Genomic information could be used for eugenics, more finely targeting kinship or other human traits [36]. This could result in societal harm or psychological harm to the individual.

3.7. Summary of Challenges and Concerns with Genomic Data

The U.S. research community, government, healthcare, and private industries handle genomic data and require genomic data sharing to advance scientific and medical research, improve health outcomes, and maintain the country's competitive advantage in biotechnology. While there is a common understanding across stakeholders that participant privacy is important, stakeholders in the research community tend to view data sharing as vital to advancing the genomics field. Those focusing on national security acknowledge that information sharing is essential to maintaining our competitive advantage but also recognize that data security plays a central role in national security matters. Thus, the need to share data must be balanced with security and privacy needs.

Genomic data often need to be aggregated from multiple studies to address pressing research questions, but challenges such as the differing subject consents used in the different studies can present difficulties that need adequate technological and policy controls that respect the informed consent and privacy of the data subjects [2]. Though it can be time-intensive and difficult, responsible data sharing and analytics facilitates commerce, research, and healthcare outcomes while protecting subject privacy against re-identification and respecting subject informed consent. Further, additional guidance is needed to promote safe and secure sharing of genomic data while addressing threats to national security, personal security and privacy, reputations and civil liberties, the economy, health, and the future of humanity.

4. Current State of Practices

This section identifies many of the cybersecurity, privacy, and risk management practices issued by U.S. Government, industry, and international entities. While cybersecurity and privacy practices are inter-related and support overall risk management practices, this section identifies practices specific to each area. Subsections highlight the NIST Risk Management Framework (RMF), the NIST Cybersecurity Framework, and the NIST Privacy Framework, along with legislation, frameworks, alliances, and other resources that can be leveraged to improve the protection of genomic data. The final subsection identifies guidance, technical, and policy/regulatory gaps that can then be addressed by solutions proposed in the subsequent section.

4.1. Risk Management Practices

Risk management is the process of managing risks to organizational assets and operations, individuals, and other entities (e.g., nations). The NIST RMF [\[37\]](#) provides a well-established method for information security risk management that can apply to any system or organization. Federal risk management related initiatives such as Executive Order (EO) 14028 [\[38\]](#) and the subsequent guidance published by NIST, define methods for protecting the software supply chain. The “Framework for Responsible Sharing of Genomic and Health-Related Data” [\[39\]](#) provides an additional resource from the international community.

4.1.1. U.S. Government Resources

For the U.S. Federal government, the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA 2002) served as the initial driver for cybersecurity risk management programs. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-130, “Managing Federal Information as a Strategic Resource” requires executive agencies to leverage NIST guidance. The NIST RMF and the Federal Risk and Authorization Management Program (FedRAMP) are examples of risk management processes used by federal agencies.

FISMA requires each federal agency to develop, document, and implement an agency-wide program to provide information security for the information and systems that support the operations and assets of the agency, including those provided or managed by another agency, contractor, or other sources. The Federal Information Security Modernization Act (FISMA 2014) [\[40\]](#) includes updates to address evolving cybersecurity concerns, reduce reporting burdens, strengthen continuous monitoring in systems, and reporting incidents.

OMB Circular A-130 requires executive agencies within the federal government to plan for security, ensure that appropriate officials are assigned security responsibility, periodically review the security safeguards in their systems, and authorize system processing prior to operations and periodically, based on risk.

The NIST RMF (defined in NIST SP 800-37 Revision 2) [\[37\]](#) provides a structured, yet flexible, process for managing cybersecurity and privacy risk that includes steps for preparation, system categorization, control selection, control implementation, control assessment, system authorization, and continuous monitoring. Risk management involves more than complying with

regulations or technical controls and should be tailored to each organization’s mission, regulatory environment, and risk tolerance. Table 1. NIST Risk Management Framework Discussion for Genomic Data provides an overview of the RMF and a brief description of its relevance to genomic data.

Table 1. NIST Risk Management Framework Discussion for Genomic Data

RMF Step	Overview	Genomic Data Relevance
Prepare	<p>The organization carries out essential activities to prepare for risk management. This includes identifying key risk management roles, establishing an organization-wide risk management strategy and risk tolerance, assessing organization-wide security and privacy risks, and developing an organization-wide continuous monitoring strategy.</p> <p>At the system level, the organization must understand information types in the system, conduct a system-level risk assessment, identify the relevant requirements—including the applicable federal and state regulatory requirements.</p>	<p>It is important that all the relevant regulatory requirements are considered at a state or national level depending on the subject’s citizenship, where the data were collected, and where the data are being processed.</p> <p>An important feature of human genomic and health data that organizations must prepare for is that the informed consent may have specific restrictions on how data are used and that the informed consent often differs depending on when and under what circumstances the data were collected.</p>
Categorize	<p>Using outputs of the Prepare step, categorize the system and information processed, stored, and transmitted and gauge the potential loss of the Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability (CIA) triad for the information, system, and processes.</p>	<p>Data categorization helps an organization identify the appropriate controls to properly mitigate the risk to an acceptable level.</p> <p>Human health and genomic data may additionally be sub-categorized by the allowed uses of the subject’s informed consent, which may restrict how it is processed.</p>
Select	<p>Controls are selected to manage risk in accordance with the risk management strategy and within the risk tolerance levels.</p>	<p>Specific controls related to genomic data have yet to be identified but could be used as guidance for organizations managing related risks.</p>
Implement, Assess, and Authorize	<p>The system security plans are updated to reflect the implemented state of the controls. Controls are assessed (which include validation and verification) to ensure they are in place, operating as intended, and achieving the desired results.</p> <p>The Authorize step requires a senior official to understand the residual risks and agree that they are acceptable to the organization before the system is put into operation (or continues to operate).</p>	<p>These steps enable the organization to quantify and characterize the risks associated with the current protections implemented (or not implemented) for the genomic data.</p> <p>Organizations would then manage inherent risk or residual risk through plans of action and milestones (POA&Ms) identifying the resources and timelines required to address residual risks.</p>
Continuous Monitoring	<p>Once the system is operational, an organization must ensure the system is operating as intended and within the acceptable risk tolerance of the organization. Subject matter experts with appropriate expertise are necessary at this stage. Periodic evaluation is needed to keep up</p>	<p>Organizations must monitor both the relevant threats and outstanding vulnerabilities to determine the risk posed to the organization. Response and recovery plans must be in place to appropriately address events and incidents as they occur to minimize exposure, protect</p>

RMF Step	Overview	Genomic Data Relevance
	with changes as they happen, including new threats, regulatory changes, and technology changes. Organizations must also consider end-of-life procedures for their systems and data.	genomic data, inform users of breaches, and recover from incidents.

FedRAMP [41] is a risk-based approach, aligned to the NIST RMF, for protecting cloud-based services and systems and includes continuous monitoring and an independent assessment requirement. FedRAMP is governed by the OMB, the General Services Administration FedRAMP Program Management Office (PMO), and a FedRAMP Joint Authorization Board. FedRAMP outlines guidance for securing a cloud-hosted system and FedRAMP authorization may be re-used across multiple government agencies. Federal agencies can use a FedRAMP system as part of their overall solution for implementing FISMA requirements.

4.1.2. U.S. Government Initiatives

President Biden’s administration issued Executive Order (EO) 14028, Improving the Nation’s Cybersecurity [38] on May 12, 2021, to direct federal agencies to enhance cybersecurity risk management practices. In response to the EO, NIST issued guidance on critical software and updated guidance on protecting the software supply chain [42]. Genomic sequencing environments can leverage this guidance to implement supply chain protections that will improve visibility into provenance and related software components. More recently, EO 14081, Executive Order on Advancing Biotechnology and Biomanufacturing Innovation for a Sustainable, Safe, and Secure American Bioeconomy [1] requires identifying cybersecurity risks in biotechnology.

The FDA launched a research and development portal in 2015 that would allow community members to test, pilot, and validate existing and new bioinformatics approaches for processing the vast amount of genomic data that is collected using NGS technology. The initiative, called precisionFDA, provides the genomics community with a secure, cloud-based platform where participants can access and share datasets, analysis pipelines, and bioinformatics tools, to benchmark their approaches and advance regulatory science [43].

NIH continues to play a leading role in genomic research and protection of genomic data. Examples of NIH-led efforts include:

- NIH manages dbGaP, with almost 40,000 requests for access to datasets within this database (2022) that must be shared responsibly [44].
- NIH is leading genomic-related efforts to move from identity-based access to authority-based access. NIH recommends moving to authority-based access, which focuses on what a researcher and the software are authorized to do within a system, rather than the identity of the researcher. In continually monitoring changing threats, regulations, and technology, NIH has determined that identity-based security models have become insufficient to adequately mitigate the risk for their mission. Identity-based security models lack context and have poor federation. The lack of a universal patient identifier in healthcare systems presents significant gaps in authentication and authorization. To

authorize a given user, the system needs to know who is making a request of whom, and if they are authorized to access the data they are requesting. Once a user has been authenticated, there are no further limitations on what the user (or the software used by the user) is authorized to do with the data [45]–[46].

- The NIH has been working with the Global Alliance for Genomic Health (GA4GH) to ensure that their implementation of authority-based access is compatible with the GA4GH Passport for researcher authorization.
- NIH has a significant concern about the confinement problem for genomic data sharing—preventing an authorized user from sharing data with others—and continues to look for solutions to this issue [3][80]. The NIH addresses the confinement problem with contractual controls, as the currently available technical controls have limitations that are not compatible with the NIH mission. However, technical controls that address the confinement problem and have limitations that are more compatible with the NIH mission are being researched.

4.1.3. International Resources and Regulations

The “Framework for Responsible Sharing of Genomic and Health-Related Data” [39] is an international framework specific to genomic data risk management. It addresses international data sharing, collaboration and good governance concerns, and the protection and promotion of the welfare, rights, and interests of individuals from around the world in genomic and health-related data sharing.

In some regions, protection of genomic data falls under comprehensive privacy laws and regulations that may also impact genomic data processing by U.S. entities. For example, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) provides protections for European Union (EU) citizens, including Article 4(13), which includes genetic information as a special category of protected information. Additionally, in the European Economic Area (EEA), organizations must consider the “Schrems II” ruling [47]–[48] that addresses confidentiality and data residency of data provided by citizens in the member states of the EEA. In Asia, India is considering expanding its data protection law in a manner similar to the EU GDPR [49]–[50].

U.S. organizations should be aware of other international region’s privacy-related considerations. As an example, China is compelling Chinese companies to share data they have collected with the government [22]. Further, China and Russia restrict sharing genomic information outside of their nation [51]–[54].

4.2. Cybersecurity Best Practices

Cybersecurity practices are a component of overall risk management. This section identifies federal, international, and industry resources that organizations can use to help identify, prioritize, and implement cybersecurity capabilities. The NIST Cybersecurity Framework outlines categories of capabilities and provides an overall methodology for prioritizing cybersecurity investments. Another used federal resource is the guidance on implementing a zero trust architecture (ZTA). Additional practices introduced in this section include information

sharing and analysis centers, software supply chain management, and the GA4GH Data Security Infrastructure Policy [55].

4.2.1. U.S. Government Resources

The U.S. Government publishes multiple resources that support cybersecurity practices. This section describes 1.) the NIST Cybersecurity Framework, 2.) ZTA guidance, and 3.) Benchmarks or Security Technical Implementation Guides (STIGs), produced by the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA).

The NIST Cybersecurity Framework [56] is a voluntary, comprehensive framework developed by the federal government that is applicable to any organization (federal, academic, private sector, etc.) wanting to improve their cybersecurity risk management. It is very broad, not genomic specific, and can be tailored for real-world deployments within specific industries.

ZTA is an evolving cybersecurity paradigm described in NIST SP 800-207 [45] that identifies target requirements and capabilities that align with genomic data protection goals. ZTA enables secure authorized access to resources individually in situations when many users need access from anywhere, at any time, from any device to support the organization's mission. Data are programmatically stored, transmitted, and processed across different boundaries under the control of different organizations to meet ever-evolving business use cases. In a ZTA, no implicit trust is granted to assets or user accounts solely on their physical or network location. Allowing assets and users to only access the required resources for fulfillment of their role in the organization's mission provides for defense-in-depth.

DISA STIGs [57] and similar benchmarks can define secure configurations for cyber-physical systems with operating systems (such as sequencers) that can be assessed and maintained. These guides provide hardening and defense in depth, greatly improving an organization's security posture as the default settings of operating systems are typically optimized for usability and have many insecure settings not appropriate for securing sensitive data. Security benchmarks support the secure configuration of hardware and software throughout the genomic lifecycle.

4.2.2. International Resources

The **Bioeconomy Information Sharing and Analysis Center (BIO-ISAC)** [58], an international non-profit organization, addresses threats unique to the bioeconomy, sharing threat intelligence among the stakeholder community. BIO-ISAC facilitates the responsible disclosure of detected or suspected vulnerabilities found in sequencers. This collaborative approach to cybersecurity complements individual organizational efforts. BIO-ISAC is an example of an industry stakeholder providing cybersecurity services, such as emergency threat hunting for organizations who are under active attack, to bioeconomy organizations who choose to augment their own resources.

The GA4GH has developed a **Data Security Infrastructure Policy** [59]–[60] that is a “set of recommendations and best practices to enable a secure data sharing and processing ecosystem.” They provide frameworks and standards for responsible genomic data sharing. While the proposed frameworks and standards provide foundational principles for genomic data sharing,

they are high-level guidelines and lack articulation of in-depth and comprehensive security features and solutions that are necessary for a real-world development and deployment of such principles.

4.2.3. Industry Resources

Industry cybersecurity practices including software bill of materials (SBOM), automated vulnerability scanners, and the use of manual expert analysis support the protection of genomic data. These industry practices are becoming more implemented even in the U.S. federal government and should be considered for all systems processing genomic data.

SBOMs are used across industry and now being promoted by the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) [61] as an essential building block in software security and software supply chain risk management. SBOMs contain a nested inventory identifying the components that make up a software package, providing transparency to cybersecurity professionals and users to facilitate effective patch management and mitigation of newly discovered software vulnerabilities.

Vulnerability scanners are automated tools that examine software systems for misconfigurations and software flaws that compromise the cybersecurity of the system. They are highly useful in detecting unintended mistakes in threat mitigation and are an important part of assessing a system for cybersecurity. Additionally, ZTA guidance from OMB M-22-09 requires federal agencies to conduct manual expert analysis of systems by approved external third-party testing capabilities.

4.3. Privacy Best Practices

This section describes the current state of privacy practices related to genomic data including U.S. Government and industry resources along with relevant regulations.

4.3.1. U.S. Government Resources

U.S. Government privacy resources include the NIST Privacy Framework, Federal laws including Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 (GINA) [62], Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) [63] and the Common Rule.

The NIST Privacy Framework [1] is a voluntary framework that helps organizations identify and manage privacy risk within an organization's broader enterprise risk portfolio. Like the NIST Cybersecurity Framework, the NIST Privacy Framework can be used across federal and non-government organizations. While not specific to any use case, it can be tailored to address genomic data privacy requirements for those producing, storing, or processing genomic data.

GINA [62] includes two key provisions that prohibit group insurance providers and employers of more than 15 people from using genetic information to discriminate against individuals.

HIPAA [63] protects patient confidentiality by placing restrictions on sharing protected health information (PHI) by HIPAA-covered entities (i.e., insurance companies and healthcare

providers) [64]. A 2013 amendment modified the HIPAA Privacy Rule to consider genetic information as PHI [64]. Non-covered entities, like employers, law enforcement, life insurance companies, school districts, and state agencies, are not required to comply with HIPAA protections. Importantly, the HIPAA Privacy Rule does not place restrictions on using or disclosing PHI of de-identified data. For defining whether data are sufficiently de-identified for disclosure, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has defined two acceptable methods [64]. One is expert determination § 164.514 (b)(1), which requires applying statistical or scientific principles and is used by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) [2] when handling genomic data. The second is the “Safe Harbor Method” § 164.514 (b)(2), in which data are considered deidentified if 18 types of identifiers are removed and there is “no actual knowledge that the residual information can identify an individual.” However, the second method is inappropriate for genomic data as genomic data are of extremely high dimensionality and even small fragments can re-identify individuals with a high degree of probability with current technology and publicly available information [2].

The Common Rule [65], officially known as the Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, establishes a standard of ethics for government-funded human subject research. A 2017 update required all federally funded human subject research to obtain meaningful informed consent. Study participants must be informed of how their genomic information will be used, who may access it, and what are the potential risks associated with release of PHI [2]. Human subjects participating in clinical studies funded by the NIH are automatically granted a Certificate of Confidentiality that safeguards their PHI. The Certificate of Confidentiality compels investigators and institutions to withhold PHI from civil or criminal proceedings. These certificates aim to promote clinical study participation by assuring a certain level of privacy. Non-federally funded studies, however, are not obligated to provide Certificates of Confidentiality.

4.3.2. International Resources

Global Alliance for Genomics and Health: Data Privacy and Security Policy [60] is a document focused on responsible data sharing of genomic and health-related data. It sets forth some general policies based on the four principles of (1) Respect Individuals, Families, and Communities, (2) Advance Research and Scientific Knowledge, (3) Promote Health, Wellbeing, and the Fair Distribution of Benefits and (4) Foster Trust, Integrity, and Reciprocity. It is an international guideline and does not explicitly consider U.S. privacy regulations.

4.3.3. Industry Resources

Future of Privacy Forum (FPF) Best Practices [59] is an industry supported voluntary set of principles targeted at the DTC genomic testing market and uses a Fair Information Practice Principles (FIPPs)-based framework. It explicitly recognizes that genomic data absent other identifiers can usually be re-identified and, thus, continues to need strong protection provided by technical or contractual controls. The framework lists several important privacy issues and uses the FIPPs principles to address them at a high-level. It lacks specifics on cybersecurity and risk management of genomic data and is limited in focus to DTC genetic testing companies.

4.4. Summary of Gaps in the Protection of Genomic Data

The NCCoE engaged with the public to identify common challenges, what is unique about genomic data, solutions that are available, and gaps faced by those who produce, store and process genomic data. Subject matter experts with experience in bioeconomy, cybersecurity, privacy, sequencing technologies, cloud hosting, and computation of genomic data were contacted. A five-and-a-half-hour virtual workshop was held on January 26, 2022, with nearly 500 stakeholders to understand the threats related to the privacy and security of genomic data and identify gaps in protection. Findings from that workshop were presented at the Healthcare Information and Management Systems Society (HIMSS) Global Health Conference & Exhibition on March 16, 2022, where feedback from attendees was solicited. An additional, second virtual workshop was held on May 18 and 19, 2022, where possible solutions were explored, and additional gaps were identified.

This section summarizes the gaps identified in guidance, technical solutions, and policy/regulations.

4.4.1. Guidance Gaps

Current cybersecurity and privacy risk management guidance does not address the specific and unique requirements of genomic data. Stakeholders suggested that these gaps could be addressed by the following actions:

- Publish voluntary guidance for protecting genomic data through the development of NIST Cybersecurity Framework and NIST Privacy Framework Profiles. NIST published an initial public draft of the Cybersecurity Framework for Genomic Data in June 2023.
- Provide expertise to help life-sciences researchers leverage NIST guidance that supports FISMA and related requirements to improve the cybersecurity and privacy risk management of genetic data.
- Publish cybersecurity benchmarks or STIGs for the secure configuration of commercially available sequencers and the associated data analysis pipelines. This will help address the current gap in visibility into how sequencer operating system and software settings have been configured for system hardening and the ability to assess these configurations after maintenance or updates.

4.4.2. Technical Solution Gaps

- Currently, sequencer manufacturers do not provide SBOMs for their devices. Therefore, security professionals have no visibility into potential vulnerabilities of their software and, thus, cannot adequately advise users of sequencers on how to address discovered software vulnerabilities through patching or other mitigation measures.
- The general problem of data loss prevention (DLP) and data confinement (i.e., authorized users and/or their software sharing unauthorized access to data) is a well-known unsolved problem in cybersecurity. Due to the privacy risks to subjects as well as the high value of many types of genomic data, the confinement problem is of relevance to genomic data.

This problem is most commonly addressed by contractual controls that can be particularly complex when the controls are between multiple organizations. Further, contractual controls typically do not prevent unauthorized data sharing but provide penalties if it is done. These penalties typically cannot redress the privacy loss of patients and data subjects. Technical controls can also prevent or mitigate confinement issues to prevent malicious exfiltration of data. This can be accomplished by defining and managing a logical perimeter within which a particular security policy or security architecture is applied.

- Sequencers are typically connected to a network and the internet. This provides access to the manufacturer for updates and transfer of files to secure storage. There is no guidance on the network addresses and the corresponding network protocols that are required for sequencers to effectively operate. The development of DLP guidance specifically developed for the sector would prevent the unwarranted flow of information and provide data confinement. For example, it would be possible to microsegment sequencers on the network, providing them with only the required resources for their proper functioning in keeping with ZTA cybersecurity principles. This would mitigate the possibilities of adversaries exploiting vulnerabilities in the sequencer's hardware or software for exfiltration of data as well as using the sequencers as entry points that allow lateral movement throughout the enterprise network. Another control is to use current technical solutions regarding data confinement offering protective controls that prevent exfiltration to non-permitted internet protocol (IP) addresses, such as cloud features that can create a secure perimeter.
- The potential loss of patient and sample information, credentials, and other private information can be partially addressed by the requirement of "device reset" functionality to delete critical data and stored credentials from the equipment without affecting the operational state, which is particularly important when decommissioning an instrument. Also, users should be able to reinstall or update software for safely resetting instruments and eliminating stored data.
- Most genetic data sharing and processing occurs in cloud environments, frequently leveraging containers (e.g., Docker or Pods). Many cybersecurity vulnerability scanners are not optimized for scanning containers, resulting in an inability to identify certain vulnerabilities and a high number of false positives.
- In the healthcare of a patient, the nature and size of genomic data present a challenge with incorporating it into EHR workflows. Fast Healthcare Interoperability Resources (FHIR) as a genomic cybersecurity solution provides important security features, such as tracking provenance and consent as well as providing encryption for privacy. However, additional work is needed to scale up for genomic data size files.
- Exploiting variant calling solutions is one example of how third-party tools can be compromised. Most of these tools are open source and may not have been vetted using best security practices or may not have been assessed for data consistency and reliability. Protecting computational technologies used in variant calling requires considering the security of the entire equipment, software, and application chain, as well as the

downstream use of the data generated. Vulnerabilities in any of these components or processes may affect data integrity or compromise connected systems [66].

4.4.3. Policy/Regulatory Landscape

Workshop speakers identified the following gaps in policy and/or regulations:

- While some forms of information are subject to export controls, U.S. federal laws primarily focus on privacy and intellectual property (IP) protection rather than treating genetic data as a national security asset [2]. Few federal restrictions prevent a U.S. company from selling genomic data to parties outside the U.S. Efforts to implement EO 14081 may impose related restrictions in sharing genomic data. At the federal level, data held by DTC genetic testing companies are not subject to HIPAA or privacy and security requirements that apply to health care providers, as consumers send samples directly to the companies without the involvement of a healthcare provider.
- While a comprehensive review of genomic privacy legislation among states is beyond the scope of this report, there have been recent changes to state laws that address genomic data, including data held by DTC genetic testing companies. These laws provide consumers in those states additional rights such as requiring consent for data sharing or granting consumers the ability to access or delete their data [67]–[70].
- Because laws of some countries may prevent the aggregation of a global human genome representing all people groups [49][52], AI methods trained on genomic datasets may be biased with respect to U.S. citizens whose heritage includes portions of the under-represented people groups.
- Multiple peer-reviewed studies [6]–[8][29] have demonstrated that even small parts of genomic data can be re-identified with high probability of success. The NIH and the VA consider the re-identification risk of genomic data and have department-specific policies to prevent this occurrence [2]. Existing de-identification approaches, like the HIPAA safe harbor provision, do not fully circumvent re-identification risk because genomic data alone may be sufficient to re-identify an individual [5]–[8]. Moreover, HIPAA only applies to covered entities and genomic information in the context of PHI.

5. Available Solutions to Address Current Needs

This section describes opportunities to address the gaps identified in Section 4 through technologies, processes, and guidance.

5.1. NIST Cybersecurity Framework Profile for Genomic Data

Genomic data are highly valuable to organizations in the bioeconomy. Organizations need to apply appropriate cybersecurity capabilities for the protection of the data. The NIST Cybersecurity Framework is a voluntary, comprehensive, and applicable framework that organizations can use as part of an overall risk management plan. However, the NIST Cybersecurity Framework is a general framework, and many industries have found it beneficial to have a Cybersecurity Framework Profile based on that industry's mission objectives.

An industry-specific Cybersecurity Framework Profile provides several benefits. A Profile can be used as a standardized approach for preparing a cybersecurity plan appropriate for the security of genomic data; a method to select controls and mitigations appropriate for the high value of genomic data; and can be used for gap analysis for organizations already storing and processing genomic data to examine their cybersecurity posture against and prioritize upgrades to that posture. Thus, a Cybersecurity Framework Profile specifically tailored to the mission objectives of those who handle genomic data would be a valuable addition for securing the bioeconomy. The NCCoE engaged stakeholders from the genomic community to create the Cybersecurity Framework Profile for Genomic Data and published the Initial Public Draft of the Profile in June 2023.

5.1.1. Use Case Description

Organizations that handle genomic data need to protect that data due to both its high value as well as the privacy risk to individuals if the data were exposed. The organization needs to select appropriate controls to reduce the risk to the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the data to an acceptable level. An organization must develop an appropriate cybersecurity plan to accomplish the task in a cost-effective manner so that the mission objectives of the organization can be achieved. After implementing the plan, the organization needs to periodically assess its cybersecurity posture considering new technology and threats. As part of these assessments, the organization considers its current state of cybersecurity versus an appropriate target state to identify any gaps and prioritize their remediation.

5.1.2. Solution Idea

There exist a number of Target Profiles for specific use cases for the NIST Cybersecurity Framework [\[71\]](#); however, none address the bioeconomy, considering its challenges and mission objectives. A NIST Cybersecurity Framework Profile for genomic data would be particularly relevant because of the high value of genomic data and the important risks to the nation, economy and individuals' loss of that data can have. The Profile could highlight controls that address the unique aspects of genomic data and the most important considerations for organizations that process genomic data.

5.1.3. Expected Benefits

A Cybersecurity Framework Profile that is specific to genomic data would assist organizations who aggregate and process genomic data by highlighting gaps in their cybersecurity capabilities. It would also assist organizations in prioritizing and implementing additional capabilities or controls.

5.2. NIST Privacy Framework Profile for Genomic Data

Human subjects who provide their genomic data for research expect that their privacy will be protected by all organizations involved in the research process. Human genomic data can reveal a great deal of personal information, such as physical traits, predisposition to certain health conditions, and biological relationships. Individual privacy may be impacted when an individual is identified, and other protected or sensitive information is uncovered or made available. For instance, identifying an individual in a genomics database for patients with a particular medical condition may impact the privacy of that individual by revealing sensitive health information. The genetic data can serve as an identifier and provide additional information about the contributor. Lastly, aggregated data in large genomic databases can lead to the identification of individuals or their biological relatives [8][72]. Deidentifying genomic data is impossible without destroying some or all of utility of that data [3].

In addition to a broad range of privacy considerations, human subjects provide their data under informed consent, which may further limit the processing of their data to specific uses. Genomic data collected with differing informed consents are often aggregated, but, when this is done, care must be taken that all data are still used within the boundaries specified in the informed consent of each data subject. Organizations that process genomic data need to be able to effectively communicate internally and externally about managing these and other privacy risks.

The NIST Privacy Framework [56], a voluntary tool, helps organizations to prioritize the policies and technical capabilities they need to manage the privacy risks that may arise from data processing, including processing genomic data. Like the Cybersecurity Framework, the Privacy Framework can be applied to, and tailored for, the mission objectives for processing genomic data to manage risks to individuals as well as related risk that can arise to organizations when developing their products, systems, and services (e.g., reputational risk, loss of trust, financial risk). NIST has plans to develop a Privacy Framework Profile for Genomic Data.

5.2.1. Use Case Description

Organizations that process human genomic data need to protect individuals from privacy risk. These organizations also need to process their genomic data within the boundaries allowed by each subject's informed consent and usually must respect and manage multiple different informed consents. They must have a plan for effective technical controls and processes that will reduce the privacy risk to an acceptable level while still accomplishing the mission objective in a timely and cost-effective manner.

5.2.2. Solution Idea

There exist a number of Target Profiles for specific use cases for the NIST Cybersecurity Framework [71]; however, no Community Privacy Framework Profiles have been published. A NIST Privacy Framework Profile would be particularly relevant for genomic data because of the high sensitivity of genomic data and the unique reidentification risks associated with genomic data. The profile could address the unique aspects of genomic data and highlight the most important considerations for aggregators and processors of genomic data.

5.2.3. Expected Benefits

A Privacy Framework Profile that is specific to genomic data would assist organizations who aggregate and process genomic data by highlighting gaps in capabilities intended to protect the privacy of individuals. It would also assist organizations in prioritizing implementation of additional privacy capabilities or controls.

5.3. Automatic Network Micro-Segmentation of Sequencers with MUD

The NCCoE recently developed model implementations of a solution to help secure internet of things (IoT) devices that may have applications for genomic sequencers. NIST released NIST SP 1800-15, Securing Small-Business and Home Internet of Things (IoT) Devices: Mitigating Network-Based Attacks Using Manufacturer Usage Description (MUD) in 2021 [72]. MUD restricts a managed device to communicate with only an “allowlist” of permitted network addresses (internet protocols and ports) specific to each type of device, consistent with ZTA cybersecurity principles.

5.3.1. Use Case Description

Sequencers are expensive devices that are operated by custom software that provides only limited visibility into network connections and configurations. Sequencers must be connected to the internet and intra-network for manufacturer service, user access, and data storage, but the number of communication addresses and protocols they require for proper operation are limited. In these ways, sequencers can be compared to IoT devices [2]. Because of sequencers’ connectivity, they may be an attractive target for data exfiltration, ransomware deployment, malware implantation, and lateral movement within the user’s enterprise network.

5.3.2. Solution Idea

MUD could be applied to sequencers. Since sequencers have a small number of communication patterns, MUD enables a network to limit sequencer communication within the local network and externally only to those resources needed for proper functionality. There is a MUD architecture that implements MUD and contains a MUD Manager that provides micro-segmentation of the device based on the manufacturer-provided allowlist. This micro-segmentation provided by the MUD Manager greatly inhibits adversaries’ ability to access a managed device; and if they do access a device, their ability to move laterally across the rest of

the network is severely restricted by the MUD Manager. Fig. 3 illustrates a potential MUD architecture for a sequencer and its functioning would be analogous to that described in Section 4.1.1 of NIST Special Publication 1800-15 [3].




Fig. 3. Notional MUD architecture for a sequencer

MUD can be applied in partnership with the manufacturer. Existing tools can help either a manufacturer or a third party develop an allowlist implemented using MUD for a device that controls a device’s network traffic. A significant advantage of the MUD solution is that it can also be implemented with legacy devices (whose software cannot be modified) to provide the needed MUD information when connected to the network.

5.3.3. Expected Benefits

A model solution with sequencers could facilitate MUD’s adoption within the bioeconomy and significantly improve security across a large range of stakeholders including commercial, academic, and government organizations.

By increasing security across multiple stakeholders, MUD would reduce the likelihood for ransomware attacking and preventing usage of these valuable assets, as well as possible intellectual property loss or privacy loss from exfiltration of data.

5.4. Security Guidelines for Data Analysis Pipelines

Security guidelines (such as DISA STIGS or configuration baselines) manage and reduce cybersecurity risk by providing consensus-based and auditable configurations and security features for systems. They are a well-established method of providing transparency and alignment between user requirements and manufacturers' product offerings. These guidelines may be used to harden data analysis pipelines and devices (for example, sequencers) to a trusted configuration baseline.

5.4.1. Use Case Description

Data analysis pipelines interact with a combination of open-source, off-the-shelf, and custom software including operating systems. Changes to software or configurations must be carefully validated and verified to ensure that they do not affect the pipelines' operation or introduce cybersecurity or privacy risks. Data analysis pipelines, including sequencers, typically prioritize ease of use and accuracy of results over minimizing cybersecurity and privacy risks. As such, it has been demonstrated that these pipelines and sequencers can be susceptible to adversarial threats [\[73\]](#)–[\[74\]](#).

5.4.2. Solution Idea

Security guidelines for data analysis pipelines (including sequencers) would provide best practice cybersecurity hardening guidance. These customized guidelines could be based off existing STIGs [\[76\]](#) or Center for Internet Security (CIS) Benchmarks [\[76\]](#) and tailored for the unique requirements of sequencers.

These security guidelines might be modeled after NISTIR 8259 [\[77\]](#) for IoT devices that enumerates the capabilities, features, and functionalities that manufacturers of sequencers need to provide so that users can mitigate their cybersecurity risks. Security guidelines could include a requirement for the SBOM detailing all software installed on the sequencer to assist in identifying and mitigating cybersecurity vulnerabilities [\[61\]](#).

5.4.3. Expected Benefits

By establishing these guidelines and demonstrating feasibility, users would be able to include security standards in their purchasing requirements and sequencer manufacturers would have clear guidance on how to achieve the security standards. It would also enable assessing delivered products, enabling a device to be more quickly put into use both at initial delivery and after upgrade or service. This solution enables increased commerce by aligning user cybersecurity needs with manufacturers' cybersecurity offerings. The reduced friction from eliminating differing user expectations and manufacturer offerings would result in fewer purchasing delays and more competition between manufacturers on relevant user cybersecurity needs. It would also allow users to better manage their security risks in accordance with Federal information security requirements.

5.5. Demonstration Project for Genomic Data Risk Management

Because of the high value of genomic data, organizations in the bioeconomy and researchers using genomic data need to apply appropriate risk management. The NIST Risk Management Framework suite of guidance documents is comprehensive and can be applied to genomic data. A demonstration project providing an example of how they can be used along with the resources required for the effort would be beneficial.

A roadmap or demonstration project specifically tailored to the unique needs of aggregating and processing genomic data does not exist. These needs include consent management and reidentification risk. Consent management can be particularly complex in the large aggregations of subject data that are typical in oncology and precision medicine. The genomic data are typically pooled from many studies that may be collected with differing informed consent levels. The informed consent of each subject needs to be tracked and each analysis needs to be cleared for specific informed consents. The reidentification risk from genomic data stems from the characteristic that deidentification cannot be effectively done without sacrificing the utility of the data. If reidentification is successful, the subject data can be used for kinship, phenotype prediction, health information, and other possible future applications that may cause harm to the subject or the subject's kin.

5.5.1. Use Case Description

The target stakeholder would be a small organization, such as a university or start-up, that wants to aggregate and process genomic data. A start-up has important intellectual property that needs to be protected. A university may want to utilize NIH genomic data and must implement NIH cybersecurity and privacy requirements. Both need a solution to manage the risk of aggregating and processing genomic data that can be done in a timely and cost-effective manner.

5.5.2. Solution Idea

The demonstration project will identify controls, aligned to NIST SP 800-53, that are in place in a vendor-proposed solution that align to the unique requirements of handling genomic data. Two solutions exist that map their security implementation to NIST SP 800-53, [Terra.bio](#) and [DNAnexus](#). However, organizations must understand the unique requirements for handling genomic data. This does not alleviate the responsibility of the organization to implement appropriate risk management but can streamline the effort by using existing resources.

5.5.3. Expected Benefits

This demonstration project can identify gaps in vendor-proposed solutions aligned to genomic data handling cybersecurity and privacy requirements. The project could document savings in time, person hours, required expertise, and documentation to help an organization properly plan and budget their risk management effort. The guidance documentation produced from this effort would be specific to genomic data and could assist users by reducing mistakes due to missed requirements or misunderstanding of the requirements.

5.6. Demonstration Project for Analysis of Genomic Data Using Privacy Preserving and Enhancing Technologies

There are several promising technologies that may assist in addressing data subject privacy [2][80]–[79] and the breach of data confinement in genomic data sharing and analysis. Sharing sensitive data typically requires a high degree of trust between data sharing organizations with significant contractual agreements. The process of negotiating and agreeing to the contractual arrangements and necessary controls can greatly slow and, in many cases, prohibit the sharing of data.

Solutions that have been used or proposed for genomic datasets for addressing subject data privacy and preventing the breach of data confinement include:

- A genomic analysis platform brings researchers to a secure location, requiring the use of plaintext and blocking all egress. This is not typically practical and severely limits research because all researchers must come to the secure location.
- A “Secret Store” requires the use of predefined executables with no direct visibility to the data. However, this severely limits analysis options (only previously defined, validated, and verified executables can be used) available to researchers [3].
- All data are stored so that analysis is done in a cloud environment created by a trusted authority, and all activity in that environment is monitored. This is not a complete solution, as researchers can provide visibility and/or their authorization to others. Additionally, this removes the advantage of remote access service which limits authorized users to only what they are authorized to do with the data, as currently available cloud solutions use identity-based authorization.
- Federated Machine Learning (FML) [81], where collaborative learning is done among individual local nodes and shared with a centralized processor to produce an aggregate model, has been shown to be a promising method in precision medicine. It provides the capability to train models on competing or otherwise separate entities to produce an average model that captures the patterns present in the local nodes. However, unless combined with other privacy-enhancing technologies and controls, it can be vulnerable to data reconstruction attacks.²
- Differential privacy can provide privacy guarantees and be combined with FML [82] or used to produce synthetic data [83] for machine learning. Differential private synthetic data add noise to datasets so that an individual’s data cannot be distinguished within the dataset and allows the data to be analyzed and shared. Additionally, care must be taken when sharing data, particularly when combined with other data sets, as there is not yet sufficient research to determine whether combined datasets maintain the privacy guarantee provided by differential privacy. It also allows for periodic updates as the data

² Privacy enhancing technologies or PETs include tools like homomorphic encryption, secure multi-party computation, and differential privacy. This is an evolving area and while some tools show promise, they are not a complete solution on their own and must be deployed with other controls. NIST is one of the organizers of the U.K.-U.S.PETs Prize Challenges which has a goal of “Accelerating the adoption and development of PETs.” Additional information and results are available at: <https://petsprizechallenges.com/>.

evolve because differential private synthetic data can cope with the progress of the underlying dataset seamlessly. Researchers, however, have expressed concerns with the accuracy of synthetic data as there is a tradeoff depending on where the privacy parameter is set. There are significant technological improvements in development to increase the accuracy of the synthetic data, and some analyses are not as sensitive to the accuracy of the synthetic data.

- Much progress has been made in privacy enhancing cryptography (PEC) [85] which addresses both data confinement and subject data privacy. Fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) allows computation on encrypted data and progress has been rapid at addressing its principal drawback of increased computational complexity. Another promising PEC technique is secure multi-party computation (SMPC) where analysis is performed over the data sets of several parties without revealing their input. Finally, there may be a place for zero-knowledge proofs (ZKP) [84]–[86] for validating results of genomic analysis without revealing the solution, which may fully preserve the privacy of the data underpinning the results.

5.6.1. Use Case Description

Large genomic datasets are required in oncology and precision medicine. Multiple dataset aggregation is often required. This typically requires the negotiation of multiple contracts between all the sharing organizations and the complexity of the contracts, since the datasets are extremely confidential, can be prohibitive. If data could be shared without a concern about exposure or exfiltration, the complexity of such contracts would be greatly simplified, and risk greatly reduced.

5.6.2. Solution Idea

Within the field of genomics, a solution that can virtually eliminate the risk of confidentiality or integrity loss of sharing genomic data between organizations and solve the confinement problem is federated multi-party homomorphic encryption [87]. This is a technique that allows for computation on encrypted data aggregated over multiple datasets. Exfiltration of the raw data is prevented as the authorized user is only able to obtain results from the computation which involves multiple datasets and authorized users cannot access the raw data in plaintext.

At this stage in technology development, federated homomorphic encryption is not a general solution. It has been proven useful for several important problems in the analysis of genomic data, particularly in oncology and precision medicine research. In oncology, it has been shown to allow survival analysis that enables the effectiveness of different treatment options based on the genomic information of the patient and/or tumor to be compared [87]. In precision medicine, it allows genome-wide association studies (GWAS) [87] as well as machine learning (ML) training and testing. A demonstration project in the United States would be helpful to determine applicability for the technique to gain wider acceptance in the U.S.

5.6.3. Expected Benefits

This solution can enable more rapid progress in oncology treatment and precision medicine by allowing collaboration between organizations without complex contract negotiations or sharing agreements because the risk of exfiltration of data or privacy violation is virtually eliminated. Additionally, patient and research subjects' privacy would be controlled by technical means, which can be less prone to failure and data breaches compared to contractual controls.

6. Areas for Further Research

Workshop participants and stakeholders identified the following areas for additional research:

- Research on how to improve the ability of vulnerability scanners to identify security issues in containers (e.g., Docker or Pods) would benefit security professionals who maintain systems processing genomic data and optimize the use of their cybersecurity resources.
- Research on how to securely integrate whole genomic data with a patient's EHR while allowing for privacy and interoperability is needed. The FHIR standard provides a framework, but a genomic-specific implementation is needed along with a demonstration project.
- Workshop speakers and stakeholders stated that federated multi-party homomorphic encryption can solve the confinement problem for a class of analyses; however, more work is needed as there are analysis methods not addressed by this solution [2]–[3][82][87]. For the last few years, NIH has funded iDASH (integrating data for analysis, anonymization, and sharing) [80] and held secure genome analysis competition workshops to study specific cybersecurity mechanisms for genomic data systems. The key focus of this annual workshop is to advance cybersecurity technologies that are essential for genomic and biomedical system security and privacy. While such technical advancement is crucial for the security and privacy of genomic data sharing, more holistic and systematic security solutions that may use those technologies are also important for addressing systemic issues found in genomic information systems.

7. Conclusion

This document describes the challenges and concerns associated with handling genomic data, the current state of relevant cybersecurity and privacy risk management practices, gaps in implementing genomic data protections, and potential solutions along with areas for further research. Because of the value of genomic data, the associated challenges and concerns may affect national security, the U.S. economy, intellectual property, individual privacy, and under-protected populations. Existing cybersecurity and privacy risk management practices such as the NIST RMF, Cybersecurity Framework, and Privacy Framework must be tailored to effectively implement appropriate genomic data protections. Additionally, gaps persist in current policy, legislation, technology, and guidance for protecting genomic data.

Solutions identified to address these challenges and gaps include:

- The NCCoE published the Initial Public Draft of the Cybersecurity Framework Profile for Genomic Data that can help organizations identify gaps and prioritize investments in cybersecurity capabilities and controls.
- A NIST Privacy Framework Profile for handling of genomic data could provide clarification on how to manage the privacy risks inherent in the aggregation, storage, and processing of human genomic data.
- The Manufacturer Usage Description specification could improve sequencer security and reduce the likelihood of ransomware attacks as well as intellectual property loss or privacy loss from exfiltration of data.
- Security guidelines or benchmarks for sequencers could provide best practice cybersecurity hardening guidance, require SBOMs to improve supply chain security, and improve cyber resiliency against future threats.
- A demonstration project highlighting the benefits of using RMF guidance for protecting genomic data could illustrate how organizations can leverage appropriate secured cloud-based solutions to reduce the time, person hours, required expertise, and documentation required to implement effective cybersecurity and privacy practices.
- A federated homomorphic encryption demonstration project for analysis of genomic data in precision medicine or oncology could illustrate how these solutions reduce the risk of confidentiality or integrity loss when sharing genomic data between organizations and help address the confinement problem.

Future research areas may include methods for securely integrating whole genomic data with a patient's EHR while allowing for privacy and interoperability; improving the precision of vulnerability scanners for software containers; and technical solutions to solve the containment problem in genomic data for analysis methods not currently addressed by federated multi-party homomorphic encryption.

References

- [1] Executive Order 14081 (2022) Advancing Biotechnology and Biomanufacturing Innovation for a Sustainable, Safe, and Secure American Bioeconomy. (The White House, Washington, D.C.), DCP-202200786, September 12, 2022. <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/DCPD-202200786/pdf/DCPD-202200786.pdf>
- [2] National Institute of Standards and Technology (2020) NIST Privacy Framework: A Tool for Improving Privacy Through Enterprise Risk Management, Version 1.0. (National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD). <https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.CSWP.01162020>
- [3] National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence (2022) *NCCoE Virtual Workshop on the Cybersecurity of Genomic Data*. Available at <https://www.nccoe.nist.gov/get-involved/attend-events/nccoe-virtual-workshop-cybersecurity-genomic-data/post-workshop-materials>
- [4] National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence (2022) *NCCoE Virtual Workshop on Exploring Solutions for the Cybersecurity of Genomic Data*. Available at <https://www.nccoe.nist.gov/get-involved/attend-events/nccoe-virtual-workshop-exploring-solutions-cybersecurity-genomic-data>
- [5] National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence (2023) *Cybersecurity of Genomic Data*. Available at <https://www.nccoe.nist.gov/projects/cybersecurity-genomic-data>
- [6] Gymrek M, McGuire AL, Golan D, Halperin E, Erlich Y (2013) Identifying Personal Genomes by Surname Inference. *Science* 339(6117):321–324. <https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1229566>
- [7] Naveed M, Ayday E, Clayton EW, Fellay J, Gunter CA, Hubaux JP, Malin BA, Wang X (2015) Privacy in the Genomic Era. *ACM Computer Survey* 48(1). <https://doi.org/10.1145/2767007>
- [8] Erlich Y, Narayanan A (2014) Routes for breaching and protecting genetic privacy. *Nature* 515(7541):409–421. <https://doi.org/10.1038/nature13723>
- [9] Erlich Y, Shor T, Pe'er I, Carmi S (2018) Identity inference of genomic data using long-range familial searches. *Science* 362(6415):690–694. <https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aau4832>
- [10] Hutchison CA (2007) DNA sequencing: bench to bedside and beyond. *Nucleic Acids Research* 35(18):6227–6237. <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2094077/>
- [11] National Institutes of Health (2021) *DNA Sequencing Costs: Data*. Available at <https://www.genome.gov/about-genomics/fact-sheets/DNA-Sequencing-Costs-Data>

- [12] National Center for Biotechnology Information (2023) *Genome Reference Consortium*. Available at <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/grc/human>
- [13] Wagner J, Olson ND, Harris L, Khan Z, Farek J, Mahmoud M, Stankovic A, Kovacevic V, Yoo B, Miller N, Rosenfeld J, Ni B, Zarate S, Kirsche M, Aganezov S, Schatz MC, Narzisi G, Byrska-Bishop M, Clarke W, Evani US, Markello C, Shafin K, Zhou X, Sidow A, Bansal V, Ebert P, Marschall T, Lansdorp, Hanlon V, Mattsson CA, Martinez Barrio A, Fiddes IT, Xiao C, Fungtammasan A, Chin CS, Wenger AM, Rowell WJ, Sedlaxeck FJ, Carroll A, Salit M, Zook JM (2022) Benchmarking challenging small variants with linked and long reads. *Cell Genomics* 11(2):100128. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.xgen.2022.100128>
- [14] Chen J, Li X, Zhong H, Meng Y, Du H (2019) Systematic comparison of germline variant calling pipelines cross multiple next-generation sequencers. *Scientific Reports* 9(9345). <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-019-45835-3>
- [15] Chen Z, Yuan Y, Chen Z, Chen J, Lin S, Li X, Du H (2020) Systematic comparison of somatic variant calling performance among different sequencing depth and mutation frequency. *Scientific Reports* 10(3501). <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-020-60559-5>
- [16] Market Research Guru (2022) *Global and United States Direct-to-Consumer (DTC) Genetic Testing Market Report & Forecast 2022-2028*. Available at <https://www.marketresearchguru.com/global-and-united-states-direct-to-consumer-dtc-genetic-testing-market-20993717>
- [17] O'Brien M (2021) Who Has the Largest DNA Database? (2023). *Data Mining DNA*. Available at <https://www.dataminingdna.com/who-has-the-largest-dna-database/>
- [18] Callaghan T (2019) Responsible genetic genealogy. *Science* 366(6462):155. <https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aaz6578>
- [19] Kain R, Kahn S, Thompson D, Lewis D, Barker D, Bustamante C, Cabou C, Casdin A, Garcia F, Paragas J, Patrinos A, Rajagopal A, Terry SF, Van Zeeland A, Yu E, Erlich Y, Barry D (2019) Database shares that transform research subjects into partners. *Nature Biotechnology* 37(10):1112–1115. <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41587-019-0278-9>
- [20] Kozminski K (2017) Biosecurity in the age of Big Data: a conversation with the FBI. *Molecular Biology of the Cell* 26(22):3894–3897. <https://doi.org/10.1091/mbc.E14-01-0027>
- [21] National Academy of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine; Division on Earth and Life Studies; Board on Life Sciences; Board on Chemical Sciences and Technology; Committee on Strategies for Identifying and Addressing Potential Biodefense Vulnerabilities Posed by Synthetic Biology (2018) *Biodefense in the Age of Synthetic Biology* (The National Academies Press, Washington, D.C.). <https://doi.org/10.17226/24890>
- [22] National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine; Division on Earth and Life Studies; Policy and Global Affairs; Health and Medicine Division; Division on Engineering

- and Physical Sciences; Board on Life Sciences; Board on Agriculture and Natural Resources; Board on Science, Technology, and Economic Policy; Board on Health Sciences Policy; Forum on Cyber Resilience; Committee on Safeguarding the Bioeconomy: Finding Strategies for Understanding, Evaluating, and Protecting the Bioeconomy While Sustaining Innovation and Growth (2020) *Safeguarding the Bioeconomy* (The National Academies Press, Washington, D.C.). <https://doi.org/10.17226/25525>
- [23] The National Counterintelligence and Security Center (2021) China's Collection of Genomic and Other Healthcare Data from America: Risks to Privacy and U.S. Economic and National Security. *Safeguarding Our Future*, February 1, 2021. Available at https://www.dni.gov/files/NCSC/documents/SafeguardingOurFuture/NCSC_China_Genomics_Fact_Sheet_2021revision20210203.pdf
- [24] Schumacher GJ, Sawaya S, Nelson D, Hansen AJ (2020) Genetic Information Insecurity as State of the Art. *Frontiers in Bioengineering and Biotechnology* 8(591980). <https://doi.org/10.3389/fbioe.2020.591980>
- [25] Fayans I, Motro Y, Rokach L, Oren Y, Moran-Gilad J (2020) Cyber security threats in the microbial genomics era: implications for public health. *Eurosurveillance* 25(6). <https://doi.org/10.2807/1560-7917.ES.2020.25.6.1900574>
- [26] Knutzen M (2021) Synthetic bioweapons are coming. *Proceedings of the U.S. Naval Institute* 147(6):1420. Available at <https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2021/june/synthetic-bioweapons-are-coming>
- [27] Song L-F, Deng Z-H, Gong Z-Y, Li L-L, Li B-Z (2021) Large-Scale *de novo* Oligonucleotide Synthesis for Whole-Genome Synthesis and Data Storage: Challenges and Opportunities. *Frontiers in Bioengineering and Biotechnology* 9(689797). <https://doi.org/10.3389/fbioe.2021.689797>
- [28] Peccoud P, Gallegos JE, Murch R, Buchholz WG, Ramen S (2018) Cyberbiosecurity: From Naive Trust to Risk Awareness. *Trends in Biotechnology* 3(1):4–7. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tibtech.2017.10.012>
- [29] National Human Genome Research Institute (2023) *Data Sharing Policies and Expectations*. Available at <https://www.genome.gov/about-nhgri/Policies-Guidance/Data-Sharing-Policies-and-Expectations>
- [30] Schwab AP, Luu HS, Wang J, Park JY (2018) Genomic Privacy. *Clinical Chemistry* 64(12):1696-1703. <https://doi.org/10.1373/clinchem.2018.289512>
- [31] Gianfrancesco M, Tamang S, Yazdany J, Schmajuk G (2019) Potential Biases in Machine Learning Algorithms Using Electronic Health Record Data. *JAMA Internal Medicine* 11(178):1544-1547. <https://doi.org/10.1001/jamainternmed.2018.3763>

- [32] Joly Y, Dalpé G, Dupras C, Bévière-boyer B, De Paor A, Dove ES, Granados Moreno P, Ho CWL, Ho C, Ó Cathaoir K, Kato K, Kim H, Song L, Minssen T, Nicolás P, Otlowski M, Prince AER, Nair APS, Van Hoyweghen I, Voigt TH, Yamasaki C, Bombard Y (2020) Establishing the International Genetic Discrimination Observatory. *Nature Genetics* 52:466-468. <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41588-020-0606-5>
- [33] Parikh RB, Teeple S, Navathe AS (2019) Addressing Bias in Artificial Intelligence in Health Care. *JAMA* 24(322):2377-2378. <https://doi.org/10.1001/jama.2019.18058>
- [34] Grother P, Ngen M, Hanaoka K (2019) Face Recognition Vendor Test (FRVT) Part 3: Demographic Effects. (National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD), NIST Internal Report (IR) 8280. <https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.IR.8280>
- [35] IUCN Species Survival Commission (2016) *IUCN SSC Guiding Principles on Creating Proxies of Extinct Species for Conservation Benefit, Version 1.0*. (Gland, Switzerland). Available at <https://portals.iucn.org/library/sites/library/files/documents/Rep-2016-009.pdf>
- [36] Schlebusch CM (2022) Genomics: Testing the limits of de-extinction. *Current Biology* 32(7):R324-R327. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2022.03.023>
- [37] National Human Genome Research Institute (2022) *Eugenics and Scientific Racism*. Available at <https://www.genome.gov/about-genomics/fact-sheets/Eugenics-and-Scientific-Racism>
- [38] NIST Joint Task Force (2018) Risk Management Framework for Information Systems and Organizations: A System Life Cycle Approach for Security and Privacy. (National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD), NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-37, Rev. 2, Includes updates as of December 2018. <https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-37r2>
- [39] Executive Order 14028 (2021) Improving the Nation's Cybersecurity. (The White House, Washington, D.C.), DCP-202100401, May 12, 2021. <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/DCPD-202100401/html/DCPD-202100401.htm>
- [40] Global Alliance for Genomics and Health (2019) *Framework for responsible sharing of genomic and health-related data*. Available at <https://www.ga4gh.org/genomic-data-toolkit/regulatory-ethics-toolkit/framework-for-responsible-sharing-of-genomic-and-health-related-data/>
- [41] Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014, Pub. L. 113-283, 128 Stat. 3073. <https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/PLAW-113publ283>
- [42] U.S. General Services Administration (2011) *Federal Risk and Authorization Management Program (FedRAMP)*. Available at [FedRAMP.gov](https://www.fedramp.gov)
- [43] Boyens J, Smith A, Bartol N, Winkler K, Holbrook A, Fallon M (2022) Cybersecurity Supply Chain Risk Management Practices for Systems and Organizations. (National

- Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD), NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-161, Rev. 1, Includes updates as of May 2022. <https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-161r1>
- [44] U.S. Food and Drug Administration (2015) About precisionFDA. *precisionFDA*. Available at <https://precision.fda.gov/about>
- [45] National Center for Biotechnology Information (2023) *dbGaP Data Summaries*. Available at <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/projects/gap/summaries/cgi-bin/molecularDataPieSummary.cgi>
- [46] Rose S, Borchert O, Mitchell S, Connelly S (2020) Zero Trust Architecture. (National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD), NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-207. <https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-207>
- [47] Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (2022) *CISA Zero Trust Maturity Model*. Available at <https://www.cisa.gov/zero-trust-maturity-model>
- [48] OneTrust (2022) The Definitive Guide to Schrems II. *OneTrust DataGuidance*. Available at <https://www.dataguidance.com/resource/definitive-guide-schrems-ii>
- [49] Rafaelof E, Creemers R, Sacks S, Tai K, Webster G, Neville K (2020) Translation: China's 'Data Security Law (Draft). *New America*. Available at <https://www.newamerica.org/cybersecurity-initiative/digichina/blog/translation-chinas-data-security-law-draft/>
- [50] Dhavate N, Ramakant M (2022) A look at proposed changes to India's (Personal) Data Protection Bill. *IAPP*. Available at <https://iapp.org/news/a/a-look-at-proposed-changes-to-indias-personal-data-protection-bill/>
- [51] India Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (2019) The Personal Data Protection Bill of 2019. (New Delhi, India), Bill No. 373 of 2019. http://164.100.47.4/BillsTexts/LSBillTexts/Asintroduced/373_2019_LS_Eng.pdf
- [52] R. Creemers , Trioli P, Webster G (2018) Translation: Cybersecurity Law of the People's Republic of China (Effective June 1, 2017). *New America*. Available at <https://www.newamerica.org/cybersecurity-initiative/digichina/blog/translation-cybersecurity-law-peoples-republic-china/>
- [53] Cyranoski D (2019) China announces hefty fines for unauthorized collection of DNA. *Nature News*. Available at <https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-019-01868-2>
- [54] InCountry Staff (2021) Russian Data Protection Laws: Essential Guide on Compliance Requirements in Russia. *InCountry*. Available at <https://incountry.com/blog/russian-data-protection-laws-essential-guide-on-compliance-requirements-in-russia/>

- [55] OneTrust (2022) Russia - Data Protection 2022. *OneTrust DataGuidance*. Available at <https://www.dataguidance.com/notes/russia-data-protection-overview>
- [56] Global Alliance for Genomics and Health (2019) *Data Security Infrastructure Policy*. Available at https://github.com/ga4gh/data-security/blob/master/DSIP/DSIP_v4.0.md
- [57] National Institute of Standards and Technology (2018) Cybersecurity Framework, Version 1.1. (National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD). <https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.CSWP.04162018>
- [58] U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) Cyber Exchange Public (2023) *Security Technical Implementation Guides (STIGs)*. Available at <https://public.cyber.mil/stigs/>
- [59] bioisac (2022) *bioisac*. Available at <https://www.isac.bio/>
- [60] Future of Privacy Forum (2018) Privacy Best Practices for Consumer Genetic Testing Services. (Washington, D.C.). Available at <https://fpf.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/Privacy-Best-Practices-for-Consumer-Genetic-Testing-Services-FINAL.pdf>
- [61] Global Alliance for Genomics and Health (2019) Privacy and Security Policy (v2.0). *GA4GH*. Available at https://www.ga4gh.org/document/ga4gh-data-privacy-and-security-policy_final-august-2019/
- [62] Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (2023) *Software Bill of Materials*. Available at <https://www.cisa.gov/sbom>
- [63] Genetic Information Non-discrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-233, 122 Stat. 881. <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PLAW-110publ233/pdf/PLAW-110publ233.pdf>
- [64] Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936. <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PLAW-104publ191/pdf/PLAW-104publ191.pdf>
- [65] U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (2022) Guidance Regarding Methods for De-identification of Protected Health Information in Accordance with the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) Privacy Rule. *HHS Health Information Privacy*. Available at <https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/privacy/special-topics/de-identification/index.html#standard>
- [66] U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (2022) Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects ('Common Rule'). *HHS Office for Human Research Protections*. Available at <https://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/regulations-and-policy/regulations/common-rule/index.html>

- [67] Hudson C, Fracchia C (2019) From Buffer-Overflowing Genomic Tools to Securing Biomedical File Formats. *DEF CON 27 Hacking Conference* (Las Vegas, NV). Available at <https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/1642128>
- [68] Arizona State Legislature (2021) Direct-to-consumer genetic testing company requirements; prohibition, Arizona Revised Statutes 44-8002. Available at <https://www.azleg.gov/viewdocument/?docName=https://www.azleg.gov/ars/44/08002.htm>
- [69] California State Legislature (2021) Senate Bill No. 41, Chapter 596. Available at https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=202120220SB41
- [70] Utah Legislative General Counsel (2021) Genetic Information Privacy Act, S.B. 227. Available at <https://le.utah.gov/~2021/bills/sbillint/SB0227.pdf>
- [71] National Institute of Standards and Technology (2022) Cybersecurity Framework - Examples of Framework Profiles. *NIST Cybersecurity Framework*. Available at <https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework/examples-framework-profiles>
- [72] Homer N, Szelinger S, Redman M, Duggan D, Tembe W, Muehling J, Pearson JV, Stephan DA, Nelson SF, Craig DW (2008) Resolving Individuals Contributing Trace Amounts of DNA to Highly Complex Mixtures Using High-Density SNP Genotyping Microarrays. *PLoS Genetics* 48(8):e1000167. <https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pgen.1000167>
- [73] Dodson D, Polk W, Souppaya M, Barker W, Lear E, Weis B, Fashina Y, Grayeli P, Klosterman J, Mulugeta B, Raguso M, Symington S, Coclin D, Wilson C, Jones T, Singh J, Thakore D, Walker M, Cohen D (2021) Securing Small-Business and Home Internet of Things (IoT) Devices: Mitigating Network-Based Attacks Using Manufacturer Usage Description (MUD). (National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD), NIST Special Publication (SP) 1800-15. <https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.1800-15>
- [74] The MITRE Corporation (2019) *Vulnerability Details: CVE-2017-6526*. Available at <https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-6526/>
- [75] Zorz Z (2019) *Web-based DNA sequencers getting compromised through old, unpatched flaw*. Available at <https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2019/06/17/dnalims-vulnerability-exploitation/>
- [76] U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) Cyber Exchange Public (2023) *STIGs Document Library*. Available at <https://public.cyber.mil/stigs/downloads/>
- [77] Center for Internet Security (2023) *CIS Benchmarks*. Available at <https://www.cisecurity.org/cis-benchmarks/>
- [78] Fagan M, Megas K, Scarfone K, Smith M (2020) Foundational Cybersecurity Activities for IoT Device Manufacturers (National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD), NIST Internal Report (IR) 8259. <https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.IR.8259>

- [79] National Institute of Standards and Technology (2020) *Cyber-Physical Systems/Internet of Things Testbed*. Available: <https://www.nist.gov/programs-projects/cyber-physical-systemsinternet-things-testbed>
- [80] National Institutes of Health (2023) *iDASH Privacy & Security Workshop 2023 – secure genome analysis competition*. Available at <http://www.humangenomeprivacy.org/2023/>
- [81] Shi X, Wu X (2016) An overview of human genetic privacy. *Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences* 1387(1):61–72. <https://doi.org/10.1111/nyas.13211>
- [82] Rieke N, Hancox J, Li W, Milletari F, Roth HR, Albarqouni S, Bakas S, Galtier MN, Landman BA, Maier-Hein K, Ourselin S, Sheller M, Summers R, Trask A, Xu D, Baust M, Cardoso MJ (2020) The future of digital health with federated learning. *npj Digital Medicine* 3(119). <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41746-020-00323-1>
- [83] Aziz MA, Anjum M, Mohammed N, Jiang X (2022) Generalized genomic data sharing for differentially private federated learning. *Journal of Biomedical Informatics* 132. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbi.2022.104113>
- [84] Near J, Darais D (2021) *Differentially Private Synthetic Data*. Available at <https://www.nist.gov/blogs/cybersecurity-insights/differentially-private-synthetic-data>
- [85] National Institute of Standards and Technology (2022) *Privacy-Enhancing Cryptography PEC*. Available at <https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/pec>
- [86] Goldwasser S, Micali S, Rackoff C (1989) The knowledge complexity of interactive proof systems. *Siam Journal of Computing* 18(1): 186–208. <https://doi.org/10.1137/0218012>
- [87] Lesavre L, Varin P, Yaga D (2021) Blockchain Networks: Token Design and Management Overview. (National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD), NIST Internal Report (IR) 8301. <https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.IR.8301>
- [88] Froelicher D, Troncoso-Pastoriza J, Raisaro JL, Cuendet MA, Sousa JS, Cho H, Berger B, Fellay J, Hubaux JP (2021) Truly privacy-preserving federated analytics for precision medicine with multiparty homomorphic encryption. *Nature Communications* 12(5910). <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-021-25972-y>

Appendix A. List of Symbols, Abbreviations, and Acronyms

The following acronyms are used in this publication.

AI

Artificial Intelligence

BIO-ISAC

Bioeconomy Information Sharing and Analysis Center

CIS

Center for Internet Security

CISA

Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency

CRISPR

Clustered Regularly Interspaced Short Palindromic Repeats

CRISPR-Cas

CRISPR-Associated Protein

DbGaP

Database of Genotypes and Phenotypes

DISA

Defense Information Systems Agency

DNA

Deoxyribonucleic acid

DTC

Direct-To-Consumer

EEA

European Economic Area

EHR

Electronic Health Record

EO

Executive Order

FBI

Federal Bureau of Investigation

FedRAMP

Federal Risk and Authorization Management Program

FHE

Fully Homomorphic Encryption

FHIR

Fast Healthcare Interoperability Resources

FIPPs

Fair Information Practice Principles

FISMA 2014

Federal Information Security Modernization Act (2014)

FISMA 2002

Federal Information Security Management Act (2002)

FPF

Future of Privacy Forum

GA4GH

Global Alliance for Genomic Health

GINA

Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (2008)

GWAS

Genome-Wide Association Studies

HIMSS

Healthcare Information and Management Systems Society

HIPAA

Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (1996; amended 2013)

iDASH

Integrating Data for Analysis, Anonymization, and Sharing

IoT

Internet of Things

IP

Intellectual Property

IP

Internet Protocol

MUD

Manufacturer Usage Description

NCBC

National Centers for Biomedical Computing

NCBI

National Center for Biotechnology Information

NCCoE

NIST National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence

NGS

Next-Generation Sequencing

NIST

National Institute of Standards and Technology

NISTIR

NIST Internal Report

OMB

Office of Management and Budget

PEC

Privacy Enhancing Cryptography

PHI

Protected Health Information

PMO

Program Management Office

RMF

Risk Management Framework

RNA

Ribonucleic Acid

SBOM

Software Bill of Materials

SMPC

Secure Multi-Party Computation

SRA

Sequence Read Archive

STIGS

Security Technical Implementation Guides

The Common Rule

Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects

VA

Department of Veterans Affairs

ZKP

Zero-Knowledge Proof

ZTA

Zero Trust Architecture

Appendix B. Workshop Resources

The NCCoE held virtual workshops on the cybersecurity of genomic data that helped shape the content of this report. This appendix includes the workshop agendas, topics, and presenters. Sessions were held on Wednesday, January 26, 2022, Wednesday, May 18, 2022, and Thursday, May 19, 2022. Workshop resources are available on the NCCoE Cybersecurity of Genomic Data website (<https://www.nccoe.nist.gov/projects/cybersecurity-genomic-data>).

Table 2. January 26, 2022 Workshop Agenda, Topics, and Presenters

Agenda	Topic: Presenter(s)
Segment 1: Workshop Overview and Background	Opening Welcome: Natalia Martin (NIST) Logistics: Ron Pulivarti (NIST) NIST Experiences in Genomics, Cybersecurity, and Privacy: Samantha Maragh (NIST), Naomi Lefkovitz (NIST), Ron Pulivarti (NIST) Moderated Q&A: Scott Ross (HudsonAlpha)
Segment 2: Keynotes	Importance of Today’s Workshop—Protection Perspective: Michael J. Orlando (National Counterintelligence and Security Center [NCSC]) Importance of Today’s Workshop—Enabling Perspective: Yaniv Erlich (Eleven Therapeutics) Moderated Q&A: Tommy Morris (University of Alabama in Huntsville)
Segment 3: Challenges from the Field	Research Perspective: Jean-Pierre Hubaux (EPFL/ Global Alliance for Genomics and Health [GA4GH]) Individual’s Perspective: John Verdi (Future of Privacy Forum) Moderated Q&A: Martin Wojtyniak (MITRE)
Segment 4: Challenges Sessions	Session 1 Cybersecurity Challenges Affecting Genomic Sequencing: Charles Fracchia (BioBright), Phillip Whitlow (HudsonAlpha) Session 2 Cybersecurity Challenges for Genomic Software: E. Loren Buhle (DNAnexus) Session 3 Cybersecurity Challenges for Genomic Data Storage: Xiaofeng Wang (Indiana University) Moderated Q&A: Jianqing Liu (University of Alabama in Huntsville) Session 4 Privacy Challenges for Genomic Data: Sumitra Muralidhar (Veterans Affairs Million Veterans Program), Natalie Ram (University of Maryland Carey School of Law) Moderated Q&A: Julie Snyder (MITRE) Session 5 Current and Future Genomic Data Use Challenges: Gail Jarvik (American Society of Human Genetics [ASHG]), Ankit Malhotra (Amazon Web Services [AWS]), Heidi Sofia (NIH National Human Genome Research Institute [NHGRI]) Moderated Q&A: Nick Cochran (HudsonAlpha)
Segment 5: Open Lightning Round	Audience Insights: Li-San Wang (University of Pennsylvania)
Segment 6: Next Steps	Close Out: Ron Pulivarti (NIST)

Table 3. May 18, 2022 Workshop Agenda and Presenters

Agenda	Presenter(s)
Welcome and Workshop Overview	Eric Lin (NIST) Ron Pulivarti (NIST)
Session One: Genomic Sequencer Device Security	Paul Watrobski (NIST) Blaine Mulugeta (MITRE) Charles Fracchia (BIO-ISAC) Philip Whitlow (HudsonAlpha)
Session Two: Security Sensitive Human Data in Support of Genomics Research	Michael Feolo (NIH) Kurt Rodarmer (NIH)
Wrap Up	Ron Pulivarti (NIST)

Table 4. May 19, 2022 Workshop Agenda and Presenters

Agenda	Presenter(s)
Workshop Day 2 Welcome and Day 1 Reflections	Ron Pulivarti (NIST) Robel Worku (Montgomery County Economic Development Corporation) Fred Byers (NIST)
Session Three: Genomic Data Security Through Risk Management	Victoria Yan Pillitteri (NIST) David Bernick (Broad Institute)
Session Four: Genomic Data Security in Electronic Health Records	Devin Absher (HudsonAlpha) Scott Newberry (HudsonAlpha) Abigail Watson (MITRE)
Wrap Up	Ron Pulivarti (NIST)