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Cybersecurity Framework Election Infrastructure Profile

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70

71 **Public comment period: *March 29, 2021 through May 14, 2021***

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75 Email: NISTIR-8310-comments@nist.gov

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77

78

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85 the cost-effective security and privacy of other than national security-related information in federal
86 information systems.

87

Abstract

88 This document is a Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) Profile developed for voting equipment and
89 information systems supporting elections. This Election Infrastructure Profile can be utilized by
90 election administrators and IT professionals managing election infrastructure to reduce the risks
91 associated with these systems. This Profile provides a voluntary, risk-based approach for managing
92 cybersecurity activities and reducing cyber risk to election infrastructure. The Profile is meant to
93 supplement but not replace current cybersecurity standards and industry guidelines that the
94 election administrators are already leveraging.

95

96

Keywords

97 Cybersecurity Framework (CSF); elections; risk management; security controls; voter
98 registration; voting; voting systems.

99

100

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 102 by individuals and organizations involved in both election administration and those involved in
 103 developing and deploying election technology. This includes public and private sectors, whose
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112	Center for Democracy and	Amazon
113	Technology (CDT)	

114
115

116

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 118 Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) Profile, including participants from the Election Infrastructure
 119 Subsector¹ (EIS) Government Coordinating Council (GCC) and the Sector Coordinating Council
 120 (SCC)², as well as other stakeholders.

121

122

Note to Reviewers

123 We look forward to reviewing all of your comments. We'd also appreciate your feedback on the
 124 following questions:

- 125 • Does this profile meet your needs?
- 126 • Are there specific sections more/less helpful?
- 127 • Are there additional election security resources that would be helpful to include?
- 128 • Share any thoughts about the separation of of Mission Objective 1 into 1a and 1b (see
 129 Section 5).

¹ The EIS is a subsector of the Government Facilities Sector.

² For Election Infrastructure charters and membership details, refer to the following Department of Homeland Security weblink:
<https://www.dhs.gov/government-facilities-election-infrastructure-charters-and-membership>, last published 8 May 2019, and
 accessed on 25 September 2019.

130

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131 This public review includes a call for information on essential patent claims (claims whose use
132 would be required for compliance with the guidance or requirements in this Information
133 Technology Laboratory (ITL) draft publication). Such guidance and/or requirements may be
134 directly stated in this ITL Publication or by reference to another publication. This call also
135 includes disclosure, where known, of the existence of pending U.S. or foreign patent applications
136 relating to this ITL draft publication and of any relevant unexpired U.S. or foreign patents.

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149 on its behalf) will include in any documents transferring ownership of patents subject to the
150 assurance, provisions sufficient to ensure that the commitments in the assurance are binding on
151 the transferee, and that the transferee will similarly include appropriate provisions in the event of
152 future transfers with the goal of binding each successor-in-interest.

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157

158

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230

231 **1 Introduction**

232 The NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) is a voluntary risk-based assemblage of industry
233 standards and best practices designed to help organizations manage cybersecurity risks [1]. The
234 Framework, created through collaboration between government and the private sector, uses a
235 common language to address and manage cybersecurity risk in a cost-effective way based on
236 business needs without imposing additional regulatory requirements. Although the CSF presents
237 a variety of mitigations, many sectors and industries have opted to create their own prioritization
238 of the CSF, known as a “CSF profile”. Elections are no different, as government officials
239 charged with the conduct of elections have their own metrics for success, priorities, and threat
240 profile. Election infrastructure may come under cyber attack or be subject to natural disasters,
241 and the appropriate defenses and contingencies should be identified and tailored to the
242 subsector’s needs.

243 **1.1 Purpose**

244 This profile was developed to take a broad look at the entire election infrastructure and to engage
245 with election stakeholders to understand their mission objectives and priorities. With any risk
246 management process or when making cybersecurity decisions, an organization must consider
247 their own specific needs. This profile demonstrates one aspect of how cybersecurity activities
248 can be prioritized based on election-specific mission objectives.

249 This profile can be used in several ways, including the following:

- 250 ▪ To highlight high priority security expectations,
- 251 ▪ To perform a self assessment comparison of current risk management practices, or
- 252 ▪ As a baseline profile or example profile to reference when developing one’s own.

253 **1.2 Scope**

254 In 2017, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) designated election systems as critical
255 infrastructure and established election infrastructure as a subsector of the Government Facilities
256 Sector, one of 16 critical infrastructure sectors, identified in Presidential Decision Directive 21
257 (PDD-21): Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience, whose assets, systems and networks
258 are considered so vital to the nation that their incapacitation or destruction would have a
259 debilitating effect on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any
260 combination thereof [2]. This Profile covers election infrastructure systems that include voting
261 equipment and information systems that support elections and is further defined in Section 2.
262 This CSF Profile is not intended to cover every aspect of information technology (IT) used
263 within elections, nor cover every use case. The Profile is meant to engender risk-based
264 cybersecurity decisions for a certain subset of election infrastructure using specific mission
265 objectives identified by the community. Best practices for cybersecurity provided by
266 organizations charged with responsibilities related to elections such as DHS’s Cybersecurity &

267 Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and Election Assistance Commission (EAC) should still
268 be utilized.

269 **1.3 Audience**

270 The intended audience of this specification includes election officials, manufacturers and
271 developers of voting systems, as well as others in the election community including the general
272 public. Election processes are deceptively complex, thus some background in election
273 administration or technology is useful in understanding the material in this specification.
274 Knowledge of cybersecurity concepts is also helpful.

275 **1.4 Document Structure**

276 The remainder of this document is organized into the following sections and appendices:

- 277 • Section 2 provides an overview of election infrastructure, discussing the types of
278 information systems used for elections and supporting voting activities.
- 279 • Section 3 discusses the main elements of the CSF, what defines a CSF profile, and how it
280 all relates to this Election Infrastructure Profile.
- 281 • Section 4 describes the methodology used to develop the Elections Infrastructure CSF
282 Profile.
- 283 • Section 5 presents the mission objectives, which represent the granular outcomes that
284 support the mission of the Election Infrastructure subsector.
- 285 • Section 6 summarizes the subcategories selected for the CSF profile.
- 286 • Section 7 details specific prioritization for CSF subcategories for the Elections
287 Infrastructure sub-sector.

288 The document also contains the following supporting material:

- 289 • References – a list of references used in the development of this document
- 290 • Appendix A: Acronyms – selected acronyms and abbreviations used in this publication
- 291 • Appendix B: Workshop Attendees – a list of the attendees who registered to attend the
292 election profile workshop
- 293 • Appendix C: Informative References – Cybersecurity Framework informative references

294

2 Overview of Election Infrastructure

As previously stated, the Elections Infrastructure subsector was created in 2017 under the Government Facilities Sector[2]. The following graphic, created by CISA, identifies the components of the election process that are included in the election infrastructure.




Figure 1 – CISA Election Infrastructure and Processes Infographic [3]

2.1 Exploring the Elections Infrastructure Subsector

The Election Infrastructure (EI) Subsector is comprised of individuals and organizations who build, manage and maintain a diverse set of systems, networks, and processes that must function together to conduct elections. Building on the CISA definition of election infrastructure, the following types of systems fall within the definition of Election Infrastructure[4]:

- *Voter registration databases*: Databases storing the list of citizens eligible to vote and often personally identifiable information (PII) that can be used to determine where a voter votes. This PII may also be used to authenticate them to a poll worker. Voter registration databases may have an internet-facing web application allowing voters to register and validate their information online.
- *Voting machines*: Also known as voting systems, these embedded devices enable voters to cast their ballots. These may be touchscreen, optical scan, or some type of hybrid voting system. These devices may or may not be certified by state or federal authorities to a standard such as the Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VVSG)[5].
- *IT infrastructure and systems used to manage elections (such as the counting, auditing and displaying of election results, and post-election reporting to certify and validate results)*: This can include a variety of election-oriented IT systems, such as electronic pollbooks, central count optical scan devices, election management systems, and software used to run audits.
- *Storage facilities for election and voting system infrastructure*: Commonly government facilities, but may also include schools, churches, etc.
- *Polling places, to include early voting locations, and other voting infrastructure*: The physical locations where US citizens cast their vote, including vote centers and ballot drop boxes.

This profile follows CISA's definition of the Election Infrastructure and excludes political action committees, campaigns, and any other non-state or local government election-related groups.

327 2.2 Relationship to the Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VVSG)

328 The VVSG is a collection of requirements allowing voting systems to be tested against the federal
329 government's voting system testing and certification process[5]. The types of requirements within
330 the VVSG range from general election functionality, such as supporting various types of ballot
331 logic and supporting multiple languages, to also including cybersecurity and human factors needs.
332 The 2002 Help America Vote Act (HAVA)[6] mandates that the U.S. Election Assistance
333 Commission (EAC) set and maintain the requirements. The VVSG contains granular requirements
334 that specific implementations of voting systems can be tested against. The scope of the VVSG
335 relates to the portion of the profile that covers *voting machines*, but the Election Infrastructure
336 profile itself covers many other systems as mentioned previously in Section 2.1. The Elections
337 Infrastructure Profile does not supersede the VVSG, as each document fulfills a different need
338 within government and industry.

339

340 **3 Overview of the CSF**

341 The CSF assists organizations in managing and reducing cybersecurity risk as well as fostering
342 risk and cybersecurity management communications amongst both internal and external
343 stakeholders. The CSF consists of three main components: the Core, Implementation Tiers, and
344 Profiles. The Core is a catalog of desired cybersecurity activities and outcomes using common
345 language that is easy to understand. A CSF Profile is an alignment of organizational
346 requirements, objectives, risk appetite, and resources against the desired outcomes of the
347 Framework Core. Profiles are primarily used to identify and prioritize opportunities for
348 improving cybersecurity at an organization. Implementation Tiers guide organizations to
349 consider the appropriate level of rigor for their cybersecurity program and are often used as a
350 communication tool to discuss risk appetite, mission priority, and budget. This document focuses
351 on the use of the Framework Core to develop an Election Infrastructure Profile.

352 **3.1 The Framework Core**

353 The Framework Core presents industry standards, guidelines, and practices in a manner that
354 allows cybersecurity activities and outcomes to be clearly expressed to all levels of an
355 organization, from the executives level to the individuals with operational job roles. The Core
356 identifies Categories and Subcategories for each Function, and matches them with example
357 Informative References such as existing standards, guidelines, and practices for each
358 Subcategory.

359 **3.1.1 Core Functions**

360 The Framework Core consists of five continuous Functions—Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond,
361 Recover. Together, these functions provide a strategic view of an organization’s cybersecurity
362 posture. The five Functions of the Framework Core are defined below[1]:

- 363 • **Identify** – Develop the organizational understanding to manage cybersecurity risk to
364 systems, assets, data, and capabilities. The activities in the Identify Function are
365 foundational for effective use of the Framework. Understanding the business context, the
366 resources that support critical functions and the related cybersecurity risks enables an
367 organization to focus and prioritize its efforts, consistent with its risk management
368 strategy and business needs. Examples of outcome Categories within this Function
369 include: Asset Management; Business Environment; Governance; Risk Assessment; and
370 Risk Management Strategy.
- 371 • **Protect** – Develop and implement the appropriate safeguards to ensure delivery of
372 critical infrastructure services. The activities in the Protect Function support the ability to
373 limit or contain the impact of a potential cybersecurity event. Examples of outcome
374 Categories within this Function include: Access Control; Awareness and Training; Data
375 Security; Information Protection Processes and Procedures; Maintenance; and Protective
376 Technology.

- 377 • **Detect** – Develop and implement the appropriate activities to identify the occurrence of a
378 cybersecurity event. The activities in the Detect Function enable timely discovery of
379 cybersecurity events. Examples of outcome Categories within this Function include:
380 Anomalies and Events; Security Continuous Monitoring; and Detection Processes.

- 381 • **Respond** – Develop and implement the appropriate activities to take action regarding a
382 detected cybersecurity event. The activities in the Respond Function support the ability to
383 contain the impact of a potential cybersecurity event. Examples of outcome Categories
384 within this Function include: Response Planning; Communications; Analysis; Mitigation;
385 and Improvements.

- 386 • **Recover** – Develop and implement the appropriate activities to maintain plans for
387 resilience and to restore any capabilities or services that were impaired due to a
388 cybersecurity event. The activities in the Recover Function support timely recovery to
389 normal operations to reduce the impact from a cybersecurity event. Examples of outcome
390 Categories within this Function include: Recovery Planning; Improvements; and
391 Communications.

392 **3.1.2 Core Categories and Subcategories**

393 The Core identifies Categories and Subcategories for each Function, and matches them with
394 example Informative References such as existing standards, guidelines, and practices for each
395 Subcategory.

396 The Core Categories serve as the basis and context for the development of CSF Profiles and
397 mission objectives. The 23 categories spread across those Functions described above: Identify,
398 Protect, Detect, Respond, Recover.

399 **Table 1 - CSF Functions and Categories**

Function Unique Identifier	Function	Category Unique Identifier	Category
ID	Identify	ID.AM	Asset Management
		ID.BE	Business Environment
		ID.GV	Governance
		ID.RA	Risk Assessment
		ID.RM	Risk Management Strategy
		ID.SC	Supply Chain Risk Management
PR	Protect	PR.AC	Access Control
		PR.AT	Awareness and Training
		PR.DS	Data Security
		PR.IP	Information Protection Processes and Procedures
		PR.MA	Maintenance
		PR.PT	Protective Technology

Function Unique Identifier	Function	Category Unique Identifier	Category
DE	Detect	DE.AE	Anomalies and Events
		DE.CM	Security Continuous Monitoring
		DE.DP	Detection Processes
RS	Respond	RS.RP	Response Planning
		RS.CO	Communications
		RS.AN	Analysis
		RS.MI	Mitigation
		RS.IM	Improvements
RC	Recover	RC.RP	Recovery Planning
		RC.IM	Improvements
		RC.CO	Communications

400 There are 108 Subcategories which support achieving the Categories by providing specific
 401 outcomes through technical and/or management activities. A list of the Subcategories can be
 402 found in Section 7.

403 **3.2 Applying the Cybersecurity Framework**

404 The Elections Infrastructure Profile defines specific practices to address the Framework Core. It is
 405 the next layer of detail for implementing cybersecurity best practices for each category expressed
 406 in the Framework. It is intended to support cybersecurity decisions based on needs expressed by
 407 those charged with the conduct of elections in the US. The Profile can be characterized as the
 408 alignment of standards, guidelines, and practices to the Framework Core in a practical
 409 implementation scenario.

4 Profile Development Methodology

This section discusses the approach used to create the Elections Infrastructure Profile. A description of the workshops held to identify relevant mission objectives is also provided.

4.1 Election Profile Workshop

On August 27-28, 2019, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) conducted a workshop to gather stakeholder input to contribute to the development of a CSF Profile for election infrastructure in the United States. The workshop included participants from the Election Infrastructure Subsector³(EIS) Government Coordinating Council (GCC) and the Sector Coordinating Council (SCC)

[7], as well as other stakeholders. The workshop consisted of sessions with the following activities:

- defining the mission objectives for election infrastructure in the United States as formulated by the workshop participants; mission objectives represent the fundamental, specific outcomes that support the mission of the election infrastructure
- identifying the relative importance of each mission objective with respect to achieving election security, as prioritized by the workshop participants;
- for each mission objective, identifying and ranking the top three CSF categories (out of 23 available) that participants consider most important for accomplishing that objective securely, as well as additional categories considered important for that objective

4.2 Follow-on Working Sessions Profile Development

The final step in the methodology was the development of this Election Infrastructure profile. This Profile provides the results of the workshop and follow-on working sessions with stakeholders and also of post-workshop analysis. The aggregated ranking from the initial workshop enabled post-workshop analysis to define a prioritization of categories considered moderate, moderate-to-possibly-high, and high priority (see Section 6), and were used to facilitate subsequent ranking of the most important cybersecurity subcategories (out of a total of 108) for each mission objective (see Section 7).

437

³ The EIS is a subsector of the Government Facilities Sector

438 **5 Election Infrastructure Mission Objectives**

439 Ten mission objectives, listed below, and their relative priority based on stakeholder rating,
440 emerged from the NIST workshop.

441 **Table 2 - Election Infrastructure Mission Objectives**

<i>Priority</i>	<i>Mission Objective</i>
1	Conduct and Oversee Voting Period Activities [†]
2	Prepare and Maintain Election Systems [†]
3	Process and Maintain Voter Registration [†]
4	Prepare for a Specific Election [†]
5	Perform On-Going Election Administration Functions
6	Conduct Audits
7	Conduct Election “Wrap-Up” Activities
8	Manage Crisis/Strategic Communications
9	Oversee Office Administration
10	Maintain Workforce

442 † Identifies the highest priority, or top, mission objectives.

443 A description of each mission objective follows, including bullet points conveying our
444 preliminary understanding of relevant activities, with rationale for top mission objectives.

445 **1. Conduct and Oversee Voting Period Activities[†].** This mission objective encompasses all
446 activities directly associated with the election *during the time when voters can submit their*
447 *votes*. This mission objective includes all voting period activities required to allow for the
448 following: *remote voting (absentee/military/overseas), in-person early voting, election day*
449 *voting, and provisional ballot voting*. During the working sessions it was decided to bifurcate
450 Mission Objective #1 into two phases.

- 451 ▪ Phase **1A** addresses those activities associated with vote capture, such as early
452 voting, election day voting and absentee voting, and
- 453 ▪ Phase **1B** addresses those activities associated with vote aggregation, tabulation,
454 canvassing, recounting (as necessary), and enumeration through certification and
455 reporting of election results.

456 The discussion revealed that the process and people involved (e.g., voters, pollworkers, or
457 election officials) in each phase created a greater distinction between what happens in
458 Mission Objective 1a versus Mission Objective 1b.

459 A list of activities relevant to this mission objective includes:

- 460 • Open/close polls
- 461 • Voting system setup within the polling place
- 462 • Vote and submit ballots

- 463 • Voter check-in and eligibility determination
- 464 • Send Ballots by mail/electronically
- 465 • Election night reporting
- 466 • Vote aggregation, tabulation, canvassing, recounting (as necessary), and
- 467 enumeration
- 468 • Transmit/send tabulation results to central tabulation center/back office
- 469 • Certification and publication of election results

470 **Rationale:** This mission objective represents ‘game day’ activities, as articulated by
 471 numerous workshop participants, and is intrinsic to our republic and fundamental to a free
 472 and fair election process.

473 **2. Prepare and Maintain Election Systems[†].** This mission objective encompasses all aspects of
 474 preparing and maintaining systems used for elections (with the exception of voter
 475 registration systems and back-end services, such as email, which workshop participants
 476 deemed worthy of coverage in separate mission objectives). This mission objective involves
 477 a holistic approach to the processes and procedures for acquiring, testing and certifying,
 478 configuring, and protecting election systems. The following is a list of some activities
 479 relevant to this mission objective:

- 480 • Procure voting system and supplies (keyboards, monitors, mice, etc.).
- 481 • Test and certify election systems
- 482 • Update election systems
- 483 • Store election systems in a secure location

484 **Rationale:** This mission objective represents essential precursor activities critical to *Conduct*
 485 *and Oversee Voting Period Activities*, Mission Objective 1.

486 **3. Process and Maintain Voter Registration[†].** This mission objective encompasses all aspects
 487 of data and systems associated with voter registration, specifically, processing voter
 488 registration data/information, ensuring the privacy and security of voter information, and
 489 maintaining the systems associated with those processes. This mission objective represents
 490 an ongoing process including election day registration, where allowed. The following is a list
 491 of some activities relevant to this mission objective:

- 492 • Maintain voter registration list/database
- 493 • Maintain voter registration website
- 494 • Process voter registrations
- 495 • Release information to 3rd parties as allowed or required by law

496 **Rationale:** This mission objective represents critical precursor activities vital to ensuring
 497 qualified citizens can properly vote and maintaining the integrity and security of voter
 498 information, upon which hinges the confidence of the electorate in an election outcome.
 499

500 **4. Prepare for a Specific Election[†].** This mission objective encompasses the activities that need
 501 to take place to prepare for a specific election. Every election is different and requires
 502 distinct preparation from the ballot style to the selection of the polling places. The following
 503 is a list of some activities relevant to this mission objective:

- 504 • Establish voting locations (polling places or vote centers)
- 505 • Transport and store equipment, ballots, etc., to voting locations
- 506 • Process candidate filing and contests
- 507 • Prepare voting materials (e.g., ballots)
 - 508 ○ Define ballot design/definition
 - 509 ○ Print ballots
 - 510 ○ Publish sample ballots
- 511 • Maintain geographical data (e.g., addresses, precinct boundaries, precinct
 512 alternatives)

513 **Rationale:** This mission objective represents essential precursor activities critical to *Conduct*
 514 *and Oversee Voting Period Activities* (Mission Objective 1).

515 **5. Perform On-Going Election Administration Functions.** This mission objective encompasses
 516 administrative functions necessary for day-to-day operations *exclusively related to*
 517 *elections*. The following is a list of some activities relevant to this mission objective:

- 518 • Acquisition of election-related tools and applications
- 519 • Staff and acquire support services/contracts
- 520 • Data hygiene
- 521 • Manage chain of custody
- 522 • Monitor and comply with law & policy
- 523 • Preserve election records

524 **6. Conduct Audits.** This mission objective encompasses all audits in every phase of the
 525 process. There are various types of audits that can be categorized under these three high-
 526 level categories: *quality audit*, *security audit*, and *tabulation audit*. The following is a list of
 527 some activities relevant to this mission objective, categorized by audit type:

- 528 • *Security Audits*
 - 529 ○ Security audit of voting systems prior to election day
 - 530 ○ Security audit of voting systems on election day
 - 531 ○ System audit
 - 532 ○ Compliance audit
 - 533 ○ Chain-of-custody audit
- 534 • *Tabulation Audits*
 - 535 ○ Hand-count audit
 - 536 ○ Risk-limiting audit
 - 537 ○ Ballot comparison audit
- 538 • *Quality Audits*
 - 539 ○ Logic & accuracy audit

- 540 ○ Ballot content audit
541 ○ Public test (mock election) – audit prior to initial voting
542 ○ Parallel testing – running an extra voting machine in the polling place to validate
543 results
- 544 **7. Conduct Election “Wrap-Up” Activities.** This mission objective encompasses everything that
545 needs to be done after the certification and publishing of election results. This mission
546 objective covers the tasks necessary to officially close out the election. The following is a list
547 of some activities relevant to this mission objective:
- 548 • Retain and secure election materials
 - 549 • Check poll voting equipment
 - 550 • Pay fee and reimburse polling locations
 - 551 • Bill Districts for services
 - 552 • Communicate post-election lessons learned
- 553 **8. Manage Crisis/Strategic Communications.** This mission objective encompasses the timing,
554 content, and conduct of communications with government and election officials (such as
555 the Governor and Secretary of State), security/law enforcement (e.g., DHS, FBI), the press,
556 and the public during and after events which impact, or appear to impact, the conduct of a
557 free and fair election. The following is a list of some activities relevant to this mission
558 objective:
- 559 • Updating and managing social media accounts
 - 560 • Process FOIA requests
 - 561 • Respond to natural disasters or other unexpected events
 - 562 • Interact with election observers
 - 563 • Report vulnerabilities/cyberattacks
- 564 **9. Oversee Office Administration.** This mission objective encompasses *back office, non-*
565 *election specific, information technology* and general support services necessary for day-to-
566 day operations. These include tools and applications, such as email, support services
567 (whether staffed/acquired internally or contracted) and IT supply chain management. The
568 following represent a list of some activities relevant to this mission objective:
- 569 • Support for email system
 - 570 • Support for other general services
 - 571 • Support for state systems necessary for elections (e.g., Motor Vehicle Administration
572 (MVA) records)
- 573 **10. Maintain Workforce.** This mission objective encompasses functions associated with
574 effectively acquiring, training and leading the personnel essential to the successful conduct
575 of free and fair elections. Elections employ one of the largest temporary workforces in the
576 nation. The following is a list of some activities relevant to this mission objective:
- 577 • Provide training
 - 578 • Familiarize processes and procedures

- 579 • Recruit poll workers for a specific election
- 580 • Pay and reimburse poll workers
- 581 • Protect election/poll workers' sensitive information
- 582 • Mitigate insider threats
- 583

584 **6 Summary Framework Category Prioritization**

585 This section summarizes the relative importance of Cybersecurity Framework categories to
 586 achieving each mission objective. For each mission objective, stakeholders identified the top
 587 category from each of the five functions they considered most important for achieving the
 588 mission objective securely and ranked them in order of importance. The top three category
 589 selections were scored numerically to achieve a priority ranking. Beyond these top three, the
 590 stakeholders also identified the top category from the remaining functions to ensure each MO
 591 was scored with the five CSF categories (one from each function) they considered most
 592 important to achieving the mission objective. This data was used to identify the categories that
 593 were considered moderate, moderate-to-possibly-high, and high priority for each mission
 594 objective.

595 For the purposes of interpreting and sharing these preliminary results, the categories were
 596 weighted, based on the numerical and high scores, and ranked according to the following criteria:

- 597 • **High Priority (H)** – Based on number of votes per category and how close those votes
 598 were to ranking a category as most important (i.e., rank 1) in terms of achieving the
 599 mission objective securely (≥ 3 votes and ≤ 2.0 average rank OR ≥ 5 votes and ≤ 2.5
 600 average rank)
- 601 • **Moderate-Possibly-High (M-H)** - Possibly high priority due to number of votes and
 602 score (≥ 5 votes and ≤ 3.0 average OR ≥ 3 votes and ≤ 2.0 average)
- 603 • **Moderate Priority (M)** – Received one or more votes, indicating a degree of importance
 604 over those that were not selected at all.

605 Note that all categories should be addressed when relevant to an organization and mission
 606 objective, even if they do not appear in the tables below. The intent of this exercise is to
 607 designate High and Moderate Priority categories (and later, subcategories) to help organizations
 608 first focus on the cybersecurity activities that are most critical to each mission objective.
 609 Designating categories as “N/A” in the tables below does not mean they are not important, it
 610 simply means they are not considered to be the most urgent focus for that mission objective
 611 (MO). Mission Objective 1a and 1b received the same weighted scores and so the priority
 612 categories are combined into one table (Table 3).

613 **6.1 Priority Categories by Mission Objective**

614 **Table 3 - Conduct and Oversee Voting Period Activities (MO #1a and #1b)**

CSF Function	High Priority	Moderate-Possibly High Priority	Moderate Priority
IDENTIFY	Asset Management (ID.AM) Governance (ID.GV)	Risk Assessment (ID.RA)	N/A
PROTECT	Awareness and Training (PR.AT)	Access Control (PR.AC) Information Protection Processes & Procedures (PR.IP)	N/A

CSF Function	High Priority	Moderate-Possibly High Priority	Moderate Priority
DETECT	N/A	N/A	N/A
RESPOND	N/A	N/A	N/A
RECOVER	N/A	N/A	N/A

615

616

Table 4 -Prepare and Maintain Election Systems (MO #2)

CSF Function	High Priority	Moderate-Possibly High Priority	Moderate Priority
IDENTIFY	Asset Management (ID.AM)	N/A	N/A
PROTECT	Access Control (PR.AC)	N/A	N/A
DETECT	N/A	Detection Processes (DE.DP)	Security Continuous Monitoring (DE.CM)
RESPOND	N/A	Response Planning (RS.RP) Mitigation (RS.MI)	N/A
RECOVER	N/A	N/A	Recovery Planning (RC.RP)

617

618

Table 5 - Process and Maintain Voter Registration (MO #3)

CSF Function	High Priority	Moderate-Possibly High Priority	Moderate Priority
IDENTIFY	N/A	N/A	N/A
PROTECT	Access Control (PR.AC) Data Security (PR.DS)	N/A	N/A
DETECT	N/A	Anomalies and Events (DE.AE)	N/A
RESPOND	N/A	N/A	Response Planning (RS.RP)
RECOVER	N/A	N/A	Recovery Planning (RC.RP)

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620

Table 6 - Prepare for a Specific Election (MO #4)

CSF Function	High Priority	Moderate-Possibly High Priority	Moderate Priority
IDENTIFY	Asset Management (ID.AM)	Governance (ID.GV)	N/A
PROTECT	N/A	Awareness and Training (PR.AT)	N/A

CSF Function	High Priority	Moderate-Possibly High Priority	Moderate Priority
		Information Protection Processes & Procedures (PR.IP)	
DETECT	N/A	Anomalies and Events (DE.AE)	N/A
RESPOND	N/A	N/A	N/A
RECOVER	N/A	Recovery Planning (RC.RP)	N/A

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622

Table 7 - Perform On-Going Election Administration Functions (MO #5)

CSF Function	High Priority	Moderate-Possibly High Priority	Moderate Priority
IDENTIFY	Business Environment (ID.BE) Governance (ID.GV)	N/A	N/A
PROTECT	N/A	Awareness and Training (PR.AT) Data Security (PR.DS)	N/A
DETECT	N/A	N/A	N/A
RESPOND	N/A	N/A	Response Planning (RS.RP)
RECOVER	N/A	Recovery Planning (RC.RP)	Improvements (RC.IM)

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Table 8 - Conduct Audits (MO #6)

CSF Function	High Priority	Moderate-Possibly High Priority	Moderate Priority
IDENTIFY	N/A	Asset Management (ID.AM)	N/A
PROTECT	N/A	Access Control (PR.AC)	N/A
DETECT	Anomalies and Events (DE.AE)	N/A	N/A
RESPOND	N/A	N/A	N/A
RECOVER	N/A	N/A	N/A

625

626

Table 9 - Conduct Election “Wrap-Up” (Previously “Post-election”) Activities (MO #7)

CSF Function	High Priority	Moderate-Possibly High Priority	Moderate Priority
IDENTIFY	Asset Management (ID.AM) Governance (ID.GV)	N/A	N/A
PROTECT	N/A	Information Protection Processes & Procedures (PR.IP) Protective Technology (PR.PT)	N/A
DETECT	N/A	Anomalies and Events (DE.AE)	N/A
RESPOND	N/A	N/A	N/A
RECOVER	N/A	N/A	Recovery Planning (RC.RP)

627

628

Table 10 - Manage Crisis/Strategic Communications (MO #8)

CSF Function	High Priority	Moderate-Possibly High Priority	Moderate Priority
IDENTIFY	N/A	N/A	Governance (ID.GV)
PROTECT	N/A	N/A	Information Protection Processes & Procedures (PR.IP)
DETECT	N/A	N/A	Anomalies and Events (DE.AE)
RESPOND	Response Planning (RS.RP) Communications (RS.CO)	N/A	N/A
RECOVER	N/A	Communications (RC.CO)	N/A

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630

Table 11 - Oversee Office Administration (MO #9)

CSF Function	High Priority	Moderate-Possibly High Priority	Moderate Priority
IDENTIFY	Asset Management (ID.AM)	Supply Chain Risk Management (ID.SC)	N/A
PROTECT	N/A	Access Control (PR.AC) Awareness and Training (PR.AT)	N/A
DETECT	N/A	Anomalies and Events (DE.AE)	Security Continuous Monitoring (DE.CM)
RESPOND	N/A	N/A	N/A
RECOVER	N/A	N/A	Recovery Planning (RC.RP)

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Table 12 - Maintain Workforce (MO #10)

CSF Function	High Priority	Moderate-Possibly High Priority	Moderate Priority
IDENTIFY	N/A	Asset Management (ID.AM) Business Environment (ID.BE)	N/A
PROTECT	Awareness and Training (PR.AT)	Access Control (PR.AC) Data Security (PR.DS)	N/A
DETECT	N/A	N/A	Anomalies and Events (DE.AE)
RESPOND	N/A	N/A	N/A
RECOVER	N/A	N/A	Recovery Planning (RC.RP)

633

634 **6.2 Summary Table**

635 The following table provides a summary view of CSF category prioritization, derived from
636 stakeholder scoring, to aid in comparing similarities and differences across all mission
637 objectives. Initial observations and items under consideration include the following:

- 638 • Strong emphasis on IDENTIFY and PROTECT exists across all mission objectives.
- 639 • Strong emphasis exists on several categories across several mission objectives, in
640 particular:
 - 641 ○ Asset Management (ID.AM)
 - 642 ○ Governance (ID.GV)
 - 643 ○ Access Control (PR.AC)
 - 644 ○ Awareness and Training (PR.AT)
 - 645 ○ Anomalies and Events (DE.AE)
 - 646 ○ Recovery Planning (RC.RP)

647

Table 13 - Summary Table of Mission Objective Categories

Categories	<i>Mission Objectives</i>										
	1a	1b	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
IDENTIFY											
Asset Management (ID.AM)	H	H	H		H		M-H	H		H	M-H
Business Environment (ID.BE)						H					M-H
Governance (ID.GV)	H	H			M-H	H		H	M		
Risk Assessment (ID.RA)	M-H	M-H									
Risk Management											

Mission Objectives

Categories	1a	1b	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Strategy (ID.RM)											
Supply Chain Risk Management (ID.SC)										M-H	
PROTECT											
Access Control (PR.AC)			H	H			M-H			M-H	M-H
Awareness and Training (PR.AT)	H	H			M-H	M-H				M-H	H
Data Security (PR.DS)				H		M-H					M-H
Information Protection Processes & Procedures (PR.IP)	M-H	M-H			M-H			M-H	M		
Maintenance (PR.MA)											
Protective Technology (PR.PT)								M-H			
DETECT											
Anomalies and Events (DE.AE)				M-H	M-H		H	M-H	M	M-H	M
Security Continuous Monitoring (DE.CM)			M							M	
Detection Processes (DE.DP)			M-H								
RESPOND											
Response Planning (RS.RP)			M-H	M		M			H		
Communications (RS.CO)									H		
Analysis (RS.AN)											
Mitigation (RS.MI)			M-H								
Improvements (RS.IM)											
RECOVER											
Recovery Planning (RC.RP)			M	M	M-H	M-H		M		M	M
Improvements (RC.IM)						M					
Communications (RC.CO)									M-H		

7 Priority Subcategories by Mission Objective

650 This profile summary of priority subcategories in the charts below can be used in several ways,
651 including the following:

- 652 ▪ Highlighting high priority security expectations,
- 653 ▪ Performing a self assessment comparison of current risk management practices, or
- 654 ▪ As a baseline profile or example profile to reference when developing one’s own.

655 This section provides an example of how an election stakeholder may prioritize their approach to
656 addressing the Subcategories. Each State or election jurisdiction may have different priorities
657 and when making cybersecurity decisions they may adjust the priorities to meet their unique
658 needs.

659 The initial Category rankings informed the level of priority given to the sub-categories
660 (outcomes-based activities). For each mission objective, only subcategories of those categories
661 that had been identified as moderate, moderate-to-possibly-high, or high priority were considered
662 for elevation above average criticality. The following “dot” charts indicate the results. Note that
663 all subcategories contain at least one dot, indicating that all subcategories are relevant to mission
664 objective security. The presence of multiple dots is meant to indicate subcategories that merit
665 more urgent focus, with three dots considered the most urgent and two dots considered less so.
666 Each of these subcategories were ranked to determine whether it was considered to be of high
667 (●●●), moderate (●●), or average (●) urgency for achieving the mission objective securely. To
668 assist with addressing the subcategories, Appendix C— lists informative references aligned with
669 each subcategory.

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Table 14 - Asset Management (ID.AM) Subcategories

Function	Category	Subcategory	Mission Objectives										
			1A	1B	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
IDENTIFY (ID)	Asset Management (ID.AM): The data, personnel, devices, systems, and facilities that enable the organization to achieve business purposes are identified and managed consistent with their relative importance to business objectives and the organization's risk strategy.	ID.AM-1: Physical devices and systems within the organization are inventoried	●●●	●●●	●●●	●	●●●	●	●●●	●●●	●	●	●●
		ID.AM-2: Software platforms and applications within the organization are inventoried	●●	●●	●●●	●	●●●	●	●●●	●●●	●	●●●	●
		ID.AM-3: Organizational communication and data flows are mapped	●●●	●●●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
		ID.AM-4: External information systems are catalogued	●●●	●●●	●	●	●	●	●●●	●	●	●●●	●
		ID.AM-5: Resources (e.g., hardware, devices, data, time, personnel, and software) are prioritized based on their classification, criticality, and business value	●●●	●●●	●●●	●	●●	●	●	●●●	●	●	●●●
		ID.AM-6: Cybersecurity roles and responsibilities for the entire workforce and third-party stakeholders (e.g., suppliers, customers, partners) are established	●●	●●	●●●	●	●●	●	●●	●●	●●	●	●●

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Table 15 - Business Environment (ID.BE) Subcategories

Function	Category	Subcategory	Mission Objectives										
			1A	1B	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
IDENTIFY (ID)	Business Environment (ID.BE): The organization's mission, objectives, stakeholders, and activities are understood and prioritized; this information is used to inform cybersecurity roles, responsibilities, and risk management decisions.	ID.BE-1: The organization's role in the supply chain is identified and communicated	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•
		ID.BE-2: The organization's place in critical infrastructure and its industry sector is identified and communicated	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•
		ID.BE-3: Priorities for organizational mission, objectives, and activities are established and communicated	•	•	•	•	•	••	•	•	•	•	•••
		ID.BE-4: Dependencies and critical functions for delivery of critical services are established	•	•	•	•	•	•••	•	•	•	•	••
		ID.BE-5: Resilience requirements to support delivery of critical services are established for all operating states (e.g. under duress/attack, during recovery, normal operations)	•	•	•	•	•	•••	•	•	•	•	•••

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Table 16 - Governance (ID.GV) Subcategories

Function	Category	Subcategory	Mission Objectives										
			1A	1B	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
IDENTIFY (ID)	Governance (ID.GV): The policies, procedures, and processes to manage and monitor the organization's regulatory, legal, risk, environmental, and operational requirements are understood and inform the management of cybersecurity risk.	ID.GV-1: Organizational information cybersecurity policy is established and communicated	•	•	•	•	••	••	•	••	•	•	•
		ID.GV-2: Cybersecurity roles & responsibilities are coordinated and aligned with internal roles and external partners	•	•	•	•	•••	••	••	••	•	•	•
		ID.GV-3: Legal and regulatory requirements regarding cybersecurity, including privacy and civil liberties obligations, are understood and managed	•••	•••	•	•	•••	•••	•••	•••	•	•	•
		ID.GV-4: Governance and risk management processes address cybersecurity risks	•	•	•	•	•	•	•••	••	•	•	•

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Table 17 - Risk Assessment (ID.RA) Subcategories

Function	Category	Subcategory	Mission Objectives												
			1A	1B	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10		
IDENTIFY (ID)	Risk Assessment (ID.RA): The organization understands the cybersecurity risk to organizational operations (including mission, functions, image, or reputation), organizational assets, and individuals.	ID.RA-1: Asset vulnerabilities are identified and documented	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•••	•	•	
		ID.RA-2: Cyber threat intelligence is received from information sharing forums and sources	•••	•••	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	••	•	•	
		ID.RA-3: Threats, both internal and external, are identified and documented	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•
		ID.RA-4: Potential business impacts and likelihoods are identified	••	••	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•••	•	•	
		ID.RA-5: Threats, vulnerabilities, likelihoods, and impacts are used to determine risk	•••	•••	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•
		ID.RA-6: Risk responses are identified and prioritized	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•

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Table 18 - Risk Management Strategy (ID.RM) Subcategories

Function	Category	Subcategory	Mission Objectives											
			1A	1B	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
IDENTIFY (ID)	Risk Management Strategy (ID.RM): The organization's priorities, constraints, risk tolerances, and assumptions are established and used to support operational risk decisions.	ID.RM-1: Risk management processes are established, managed, and agreed to by organizational stakeholders	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	
		ID.RM-2: Organizational risk tolerance is determined and clearly expressed	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•
		ID.RM-3: The organization's determination of risk tolerance is informed by its role in critical infrastructure and sector specific risk analysis	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•

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Table 19 - Supply Chain Risk Management (ID.SC) Subcategories

Function	Category	Subcategory	Mission Objectives											
			1A	1B	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
IDENTIFY (ID)	Supply Chain Risk Management (ID.SC): The organization’s priorities, constraints, risk tolerances, and assumptions are established and used to support risk decisions associated with managing supply chain risk. The organization has established and implemented the processes to identify, assess and	ID.SC-1: Cyber supply chain risk management processes are identified, established, assessed, managed, and agreed to by organizational stakeholders	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	••	•	
		ID.SC-2: Suppliers and third party partners of information systems, components, and services are identified, prioritized, and assessed using a cyber supply chain risk assessment process	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	••	•
		ID.SC-3: Contracts with suppliers and third-party partners are used to implement appropriate measures designed to meet the objectives of an organization’s cybersecurity program and Cyber Supply Chain Risk Management Plan.	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•••	•
		ID.SC-4: Suppliers and third-party partners are routinely assessed using audits, test results, or other forms of evaluations to confirm they are meeting their contractual obligations.	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	••	•

	manage supply chain risks.	ID.SC-5: Response and recovery planning and testing are conducted with suppliers and third-party providers	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•••	•
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Table 20 - Access Control (PR.AC) Subcategories

Function	Category	Subcategory	Mission Objectives											
			1A	1B	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
PROTECT (PR)	Access Control (PR.AC): Access to assets and associated facilities is limited to authorized users, processes, or devices, and to authorized activities and transactions.	PR.AC-1: Identities and credentials are issued, managed, verified, revoked, and audited for authorized devices users, and processes	••	••	•••	••	•	•	•	•	•	•	••	•••
		PR.AC-2: Physical access to assets is managed and protected	•••	•••	•••	•••	•	•	•	•	•	•	•••	••
		PR.AC-3: Remote access is managed	••	•••	•••	•••	•	•	•	•	•	•	•••	••
		PR.AC-4: Access permissions and authorizations are managed, incorporating the principles of least privilege and separation of duties	••	••	•••	•••	•	•	•	•	•	•	•••	•••
		PR.AC-5: Network integrity is protected (e.g., network segregation, network segmentation)	••	•••	••	•••	•	•	•	•	•	•	••	•
		PR.AC-6: Identities are proofed and bound to credentials and asserted in interactions	•	•	•••	••	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•

Function	Category	Subcategory	Mission Objectives										
			1A	1B	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
		PR.AC-7: Users, devices, and other assets are authenticated (e.g., single-factor, multi-factor) commensurate with the risk of the transaction (e.g., individuals' security and privacy risks and other organizational risks)	•••	•••	•••	•••	•	•	•	•	•	•	•••

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Table 21 - Awareness and Training (PR.AT) Subcategories

Function	Category	Subcategory	Mission Objectives										
			1A	1B	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
PROTECT (PR)	Awareness and Training (PR.AT): The organization's personnel and partners are provided cybersecurity awareness education and are adequately trained to perform their information security-related duties and responsibilities consistent with related policies, procedures, and agreements.	PR.AT-1: All users are informed and trained	••	••	•	•	•	••	•	•	•	•••	•••
		PR.AT-2: Privileged users understand roles and responsibilities	•••	•••	•	•	•••	•••	•	•	•	•••	•••
		PR.AT-3: Third-party stakeholders (e.g., suppliers, customers, partners) understand roles and responsibilities	•	•••	•	•	••	••	•	•	•	••	••
		PR.AT-4: Senior executives understand roles and responsibilities	•	•	•	•	••	•	•	•	•	•	•
		PR.AT-5: Physical and information security personnel understand roles and responsibilities	•••	•••	•	•	•••	•••	•	•	•	•	•

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Table 22 - Data Security (PR.DS) Subcategories

Function	Category	Subcategory	Mission Objectives										
			1A	1B	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
PROTECT (PR)	Data Security (PR.DS): Information and records (data) are managed consistent with the organization's risk strategy to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information.	PR.DS-1: Data-at-rest is protected	•	•	•	•••	•	•••	••	•	•	•	••
		PR.DS-2: Data-in-transit is protected	•	•	•	•••	•	•••	••	•	•	•	••
		PR.DS-3: Assets are formally managed throughout removal, transfers, and disposition	•	•	•	•	•	•••	•••	•	•	•	•••
		PR.DS-4: Adequate capacity to ensure availability is maintained	•	•	•	•••	•	•	••	•	•	•	••
		PR.DS-5: Protections against data leaks are implemented	•	•	•	••	•	••	•	•	•	•	•••
		PR.DS-6: Integrity checking mechanisms are used to verify software, firmware, and information integrity	•	•	•	•••	•	••	•••	•	•	•	•
		PR.DS-7: The development and testing environment(s) are separate from the production environment	•	•	•	••	•	•	•	•	•	•	•
		PR.DS-8: Integrity checking mechanisms are used to verify hardware integrity	•	•	•	••	•	•	•••	•	•	•	•

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Table 23 - Information Protection Processes and Procedures (PR.IP) Subcategories

Function	Category	Subcategory	Mission Objectives										
			1A	1B	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
PROTECT (PR)	Information Protection Processes and Procedures (PR.IP): Security policies (that address purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment, and coordination among organizational entities), processes, and procedures are maintained and used to manage protection of information systems and assets.	PR.IP-1: A baseline configuration of information technology/industrial control systems is created and maintained incorporating security principles (e.g., concept of least functionality)	•	•	•	•	•••	•	•	••	•	•	•
		PR.IP-2: A System Development Life Cycle to manage systems is implemented	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•
		PR.IP-3: Configuration change control processes are in place	••	••	•	•	••	•	•	•	•	•	•
		PR.IP-4: Backups of information are conducted, maintained, and tested	••	••	•	•	•••	•	•	•••	•	•	•
		PR.IP-5: Policy and regulations regarding the physical operating environment for organizational assets are met	•••	•••	•	•	•••	•	•	••	•	•	•
		PR.IP-6: Data is destroyed according to policy	•••	•••	•	•	•	•	•	••	•	•	•
		PR.IP-7: Protection processes are improved	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•

	<p>PR.IP-8: Effectiveness of protection technologies is shared</p>	•	•	•	•	••	•	•	•	•••	•	•
	<p>PR.IP-9: Response plans (Incident Response and Business Continuity) and recovery plans (Incident Recovery and Disaster Recovery) are in place and managed</p>	•••	•••	•	•	•	•	•	••	•••	•	•
	<p>PR.IP-10: Response and recovery plans are tested</p>	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•••	•	•
	<p>PR.IP-11: Cybersecurity is included in human resources practices (e.g., deprovisioning, personnel screening)</p>	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	••	•	•	•
	<p>PR.IP-12: A vulnerability management plan is developed and implemented</p>	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	••	•	•

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Table 24 - Maintenance (PR.MA) Subcategories

Function	Category	Subcategory	Mission Objectives											
			1A	1B	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
PROTECT (PR)	Maintenance (PR.MA): Maintenance and repairs of industrial control and information system components is performed consistent with policies and procedures.	PR.MA-1: Maintenance and repair of organizational assets is performed and logged in a timely manner, with approved and controlled tools	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•
		PR.MA-2: Remote maintenance of organizational assets is approved, logged, and performed in a manner that prevents unauthorized access	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•

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Table 25 - Protective Technology (PR.PT) Subcategories

Function	Category	Subcategory	Mission Objectives												
			1A	1B	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10		
PROTECT (PR)	Protective Technology (PR.PT): Technical security solutions are managed to ensure the security and resilience of systems and assets, consistent with related policies, procedures, and agreements.	PR.PT-1: Audit/log records are determined, documented, implemented, and reviewed in accordance with policy	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	••	•	•	•	
		PR.PT-2: Removable media is protected and its use restricted according to policy	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	••	•	•	•	
		PR.PT-3: The principles of least functionality is incorporated by configuring systems to provide only essential capabilities	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•
		PR.PT-4: Communications and control networks are protected	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•
		PR.PT-5: Mechanisms (e.g., failsafe, load balancing, hot swap) are implemented to achieve resilience requirements in normal and adverse situations	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•

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Table 26 - Anomalies and Events (DE.AE) Subcategories

Function	Category	Subcategory	Mission Objectives										
			1A	1B	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
DETECT (DE)	Anomalies and Events (DE.AE): Anomalous activity is detected in a timely manner and the potential impact of events is understood.	DE.AE-1: A baseline of network operations and expected data flows for users and systems is established and managed	•	•	•	••	•••	•	•	•	•	•••	•
		DE.AE-2: Detected events are analyzed to understand attack targets and methods	•	•	•	•••	•••	•	••	•••	•	•	•
		DE.AE-3: Event data are collected and correlated from multiple sources and sensors	•	•	•	•	•	•	•••	••	•	••	•
		DE.AE-4: Impact of events is determined	•	•	•	•••	•	•	•••	••	•••	••	•
		DE.AE-5: Incident alert thresholds are established	•	•	•	•••	•	•	•••	••	••	•••	•

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Table 27 - Security Continuous Monitoring (DE.CM) Subcategories

Function	Category	Subcategory	Mission Objectives										
			1A	1B	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
DETECT (DE)	Security Continuous Monitoring (DE.CM): The information system and assets are monitored at discrete intervals to identify cybersecurity events and verify the effectiveness of protective measures.	DE.CM-1: The network is monitored to detect potential cybersecurity events	•	•	•	•••	•	•	•	•	•	•••	•
		DE.CM-2: The physical environment is monitored to detect potential cybersecurity events	•	•	•	•••	•	•	•	•	•	••	•
		DE.CM-3: Personnel activity is monitored to detect potential cybersecurity events	•	•	•	•••	•	•	•	•	•	•	•
		DE.CM-4: Malicious code is detected	•	•	•	•••	•	•	•	•	•	•••	•
		DE.CM-5: Unauthorized mobile code is detected	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•
		DE.CM-6: External service provider activity is monitored to detect potential cybersecurity events	•	•	•	•••	•	•	•	•	•	•	•
		DE.CM-7: Monitoring for unauthorized personnel, connections, devices, and software is performed	•	•	•	•••	•	•	•	•	•	•••	•
		DE.CM-8: Vulnerability scans are performed	•	•	•	•••	•	•	•	•	•	•••	•

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Table 28 - Detection Processes (DE.DP) Subcategories

Function	Category	Subcategory	Mission Objectives											
			1A	1B	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
DETECT (DE)	Detection Processes (DE.DP): Detection processes and procedures are maintained and tested to ensure timely and adequate awareness of anomalous events.	DE.DP-1: Roles and responsibilities for detection are well defined to ensure accountability	•	•	••	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•
		DE.DP-2: Detection activities comply with all applicable requirements	•	•	•••	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•
		DE.DP-3: Detection processes are tested	•	•	•••	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•
		DE.DP-4: Event detection information is communicated	•	•	••	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•
		DE.DP-5: Detection processes are continuously improved	•	•	••	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•

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Table 29 - Response Planning (RS.RP) Subcategories

Function	Category	Subcategory	Mission Objectives										
			1A	1B	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
RESPOND (RS)	Response Planning (RS.RP): Response processes and procedures are executed and maintained, to ensure timely response to detected cybersecurity events.	RS.RP-1: Response plan is executed during or after an event	•	•	•	•••	•	•••	•	•	•••	•	•

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Table 30 - Communications (RS.CO) Subcategories

Function	Category	Subcategory	Mission Objectives												
			1A	1B	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10		
RESPOND (RS)	Communications (RS.CO): Response activities are coordinated with internal and external stakeholders, as appropriate, to include external support from law enforcement agencies.	RS.CO-1: Personnel know their roles and order of operations when a response is needed	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•••	•	•	
		RS.CO-2: Incidents are reported consistent with established criteria	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•
		RS.CO-3: Information is shared consistent with response plans	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	••	•	•
		RS.CO-4: Coordination with stakeholders occurs consistent with response plans	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•••	•	•
		RS.CO-5: Voluntary information sharing occurs with external stakeholders to achieve broader cybersecurity situational awareness	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	••	•	•

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Table 31 - Analysis (RS.AN) Subcategories

Function	Category	Subcategory	Mission Objectives											
			1A	1B	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
RESPOND (RS)	Analysis (RS.AN): Analysis is conducted to ensure adequate response and support recovery activities.	RS.AN-1: Notifications from detection systems are investigated	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•
		RS.AN-2: The impact of the incident is understood	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•
		RS.AN-3: Forensics are performed	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•
		RS.AN-4: Incidents are categorized consistent with response plans	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•
		RS.AN-5: Processes are established to receive, analyze and respond to vulnerabilities disclosed to the organization from internal and external sources (e.g. internal testing, security bulletins, or security researchers)	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•

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Table 32 - Mitigation (RS.MI) Subcategories

Function	Category	Subcategory	Mission Objectives											
			1A	1B	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
RESPOND (RS)	Mitigation (RS.MI): Activities are performed to prevent expansion of an event, mitigate its effects, and eradicate the incident.	RS.MI-1: Incidents are contained	•	•	•••	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•
		RS.MI-2: Incidents are mitigated	•	•	•••	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•
		RS.MI-3: Newly identified vulnerabilities are mitigated or documented as accepted risks	•	•	•••	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•

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Table 33 - Improvements (RS.IM) Subcategories

Function	Category	Subcategory	Mission Objectives											
			1A	1B	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
RESPOND (RS)	Improvements (RS.IM): Organizational response activities are improved by incorporating lessons learned from current and previous detection/response activities.	RS.IM-1: Response plans incorporate lessons learned	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•
		RS.IM-2: Response strategies are updated	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•

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Table 34 - Recovery Planning (RC.RP) Subcategories

Function	Category	Subcategory	Mission Objectives										
			1A	1B	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
RECOVER (RC)	Recovery Planning (RC.RP): Recovery processes and procedures are executed and maintained to ensure timely restoration of systems or assets affected by cybersecurity events.	RC.RP-1: Recovery plan is executed during or after cybersecurity incident	●●●	●●●	●●	●●●	●●●	●●●	●●●	●●●	●	●●●	●●●

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Table 35 - Improvements (RC.IM) Subcategories

Function	Category	Subcategory	Mission Objectives										
			1A	1B	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
RECOVER (RC)	Improvements (RC.IM): Recovery planning and processes are improved by incorporating lessons learned into future activities.	RC.IM-1: Recovery plans incorporate lessons learned	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•
		RC.IM-2: Recovery strategies are updated	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•

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Table 36 - Communications (RC.CO) Subcategories

Function	Category	Subcategory	Mission Objectives												
			1A	1B	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10		
RECOVER (RC)	Communications (RC.CO): Restoration activities are coordinated with internal and external parties, such as coordinating centers, Internet Service Providers, owners of attacking systems, victims, other CSIRTs, and vendors.	RC.CO-1: Public relations are managed	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	••	•	•	
		RC.CO-2: Reputation after an event is repaired	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•
		RC.CO-3: Recovery activities are communicated to internal and external stakeholders and executive and management teams	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	••••	•	•

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733 **References**

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749 [membership](https://www.cisa.gov/government-facilities-election-infrastructure-charters-and-membership)
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751 **Appendix A—Acronyms**

752 Selected acronyms and abbreviations used in this paper are defined below.

753	AC	Access Control
754	AE	Anomalies and Events
755	AM	Asset Management
756	AN	Analysis
757	AT	Awareness and Training
758	BE	Business Environment
759	CM	Security Continuous Monitoring
760	CO	Communications
761	CSF	Cybersecurity Framework
762	DE	Detect
763	DHS	Department of Homeland Security
764	DP	Detection Processes
765	DS	Data Security
766	EI	Election Infrastructure
767	EIS	Election Infrastructure Subsector
768	FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
769	GCC	Government Coordinating Council
770	GV	Governance
771	ID	Identity
772	IM	Improvements
773	IP	Information Protection Processes and Procedures
774	IT	Information Technology
775	MA	Maintenance
776	MI	Mitigation
777	MO	Mission Objective
778	MVA	Motor Vehicle Administration
779	NIST	National Institute of Standards and Technology
780	PDD	Presidential Decision Directive
781	PII	Personally Identifiable Information

782	PR	Protect
783	PT	Protective Technology
784	RA	Risk Assessment
785	RC	Recover
786	RP	Recovery Planning
787	RP	Response Planning
788	RM	Risk Management Strategy
789	RS	Respond
790	SaaS	Software-as-a-Service
791	SC	Supply Chain Risk Management
792	SCC	Sector Coordinating Council
793	SSP	Sector Specific Plan
794	VVSG	Voluntary Voting System Guidelines

795 **Appendix B—Workshop Attendees**

796 This is an alphabetically-ordered list of attendees that registered to attend the Election Infrastructure Profile Workshop that was held
 797 on August 27th and 28th, 2019.

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No.	Last Name	First Name	Organization
1	Adkins	Christina Worrell	Texas Secretary of State
2	Aumayr	Paul	EAC
3	Bowers	Jessica	EAC
4	Cohen	Amy Lauren	National Association of State Election Directors
5	Davenport	Daniel	Virginia Department of Elections
6	Figueroa	Juan	DHS
7	Forson	Lindsey Marie	National Association of Secretaries of State
8	Franklin	Josh	Center for Internet Security
9	Frye	Felicia	MITRE
10	Gookin	Eric	Office of the Secretary of State of Iowa
11	Hancock	Brian	Unisyn Voting Solutions
12	Harris	Jonathan Michael	VR Systems Inc
13	Hirsch	Bernie	MicroVote
14	King	Jonathan Bradley	Agency Office of the Secretary of State of Indiana Election Division
15	Lichtenheld	Peter James	Hart InterCivic
16	Lowan	Daniel	MITRE
17	Macias	Ryan Stephen	Lafayette Group – on behalf of CISA
18	Martin-Rozumitowicz	Beata	IFES

No.	Last Name	First Name	Organization
19	Merrick	Joel	Office of the Secretary of State of Iowa
20	Munro	George Alexander	Bpro, Inc.
21	Newby	Brian	EAC
22	Nichols	David	Virginia Department of Elections
23	Patrick	Tammy Lynn	Democracy Fund
24	Peterson	Jesse Russell Antone	SLI compliance
25	Reynolds	Leslie D.	National Association of Secretaries of State
26	Sames	Christina A	The MITRE Corporation
27	Sawhey	Nimit	Voatz
28	Smith	James E.	DHS/CISA/EI SSA
29	Snyder	Julie, Nethery	NIST NCCoE/MITRE
30	South	Michael	Amazon Web Services
31	Suver	James Richard	Runbeck Election Services, Inc.
32	Tatum	Cliff	EAC
33	Turner	Maurice Rafael	Center for Democracy and Technology
34	Twumasi-Ankrah	Afua Amoanima	Clear Ballot
35	Ward	Paul	Mitre
36	Wlaschin	Chris	ES&S

800 **Appendix C—Informative References**

801 Below is a replicated list of the informative references from the Cybersecurity Framework document, *Framework for Improving*
 802 *Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity*[1]. This list can be used as supporting material when considering how to address or meet the
 803 subcategory activities.

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Function	Category	Subcategory	Informative References
<p style="text-align: center;">IDENTIFY (ID)</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Asset Management (ID.AM)</p>	<p>ID.AM-1: Physical devices and systems within the organization are inventoried</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> · CIS CSC 1 · COBIT 5 BAI09.01, BAI09.02 · ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.2.3.4 · ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 7.8 · ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.8.1.1, A.8.1.2 · NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 CM-8, PM-5
		<p>ID.AM-2: Software platforms and applications within the organization are inventoried</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> · CIS CSC 2 · COBIT 5 BAI09.01, BAI09.02, BAI09.05 · ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.2.3.4 · ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 7.8 · ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.8.1.1, A.8.1.2, A.12.5.1 · NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 CM-8, PM-5
		<p>ID.AM-3: Organizational communication and data flows are mapped</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> · CIS CSC 12 · COBIT 5 DSS05.02 · ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.2.3.4 · ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.13.2.1, A.13.2.2 · NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 AC-4, CA-3, CA-9, PL-8
		<p>ID.AM-4: External information systems are catalogued</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> · CIS CSC 12 · COBIT 5 APO02.02, APO10.04, DSS01.02

Function	Category	Subcategory	Informative References
Function			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.11.2.6 • NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 AC-20, SA-9
		ID.AM-5: Resources (e.g., hardware, devices, data, time, personnel, and software) are prioritized based on their classification, criticality, and business value	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CIS CSC 13, 14 • COBIT 5 APO03.03, APO03.04, APO12.01, BAI04.02, BAI09.02 • ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.2.3.6 • ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.8.2.1 • NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 CP-2, RA-2, SA-14, SC-6
		ID.AM-6: Cybersecurity roles and responsibilities for the entire workforce and third-party stakeholders (e.g., suppliers, customers, partners) are established	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CIS CSC 17, 19 • COBIT 5 APO01.02, APO07.06, APO13.01, DSS06.03 • ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.2.3.3 • ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.6.1.1 • NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 CP-2, PS-7, PM-11
	Business Environment (ID.BE)	ID.BE-1: The organization’s role in the supply chain is identified and communicated	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • COBIT 5 APO08.01, APO08.04, APO08.05, APO10.03, APO10.04, APO10.05 • ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.15.1.1, A.15.1.2, A.15.1.3, A.15.2.1, A.15.2.2 • NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 CP-2, SA-12
		ID.BE-2: The organization’s place in critical infrastructure and its industry sector is identified and communicated	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • COBIT 5 APO02.06, APO03.01 • ISO/IEC 27001:2013 Clause 4.1 • NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 PM-8
		ID.BE-3: Priorities for organizational mission, objectives, and activities are established and communicated	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • COBIT 5 APO02.01, APO02.06, APO03.01 • ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.2.2.1, 4.2.3.6 • NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 PM-11, SA-14
		ID.BE-4: Dependencies and critical functions for delivery of critical services are established	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • COBIT 5 APO10.01, BAI04.02, BAI09.02 • ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.11.2.2, A.11.2.3, A.12.1.3 • NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 CP-8, PE-9, PE-11, PM-8, SA-14

Function	Category	Subcategory	Informative References
		ID.BE-5: Resilience requirements to support delivery of critical services are established for all operating states (e.g. under duress/attack, during recovery, normal operations)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • COBIT 5 BAI03.02, DSS04.02 • ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.11.1.4, A.17.1.1, A.17.1.2, A.17.2.1 • NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 CP-2, CP-11, SA-13, SA-14
	Governance (ID.GV)	ID.GV-1: Organizational cybersecurity policy is established and communicated	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CIS CSC 19 • COBIT 5 APO01.03, APO13.01, EDM01.01, EDM01.02 • ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.2.6 • ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.5.1.1 • NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 -1 controls from all security control families
		ID.GV-2: Cybersecurity roles and responsibilities are coordinated and aligned with internal roles and external partners	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CIS CSC 19 • COBIT 5 APO01.02, APO10.03, APO13.02, DSS05.04 • ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.2.3.3 • ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.6.1.1, A.7.2.1, A.15.1.1 • NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 PS-7, PM-1, PM-2
		ID.GV-3: Legal and regulatory requirements regarding cybersecurity, including privacy and civil liberties obligations, are understood and managed	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CIS CSC 19 • COBIT 5 BAI02.01, MEA03.01, MEA03.04 • ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.4.3.7 • ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.18.1.1, A.18.1.2, A.18.1.3, A.18.1.4, A.18.1.5 • NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 -1 controls from all security control families
		ID.GV-4: Governance and risk management processes address cybersecurity risks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • COBIT 5 EDM03.02, APO12.02, APO12.05, DSS04.02 • ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.2.3.1, 4.2.3.3, 4.2.3.8, 4.2.3.9, 4.2.3.11, 4.3.2.4.3, 4.3.2.6.3 • ISO/IEC 27001:2013 Clause 6 • NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 SA-2, PM-3, PM-7, PM-9, PM-10, PM-11
	Risk Assessment	ID.RA-1: Asset vulnerabilities are identified and	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CIS CSC 4

Function	Category	Subcategory	Informative References
	(ID.RA)	documented	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> · COBIT 5 APO12.01, APO12.02, APO12.03, APO12.04, DSS05.01, DSS05.02 · ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.2.3, 4.2.3.7, 4.2.3.9, 4.2.3.12 · ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.12.6.1, A.18.2.3 · NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 CA-2, CA-7, CA-8, RA-3, RA-5, SA-5, SA-11, SI-2, SI-4, SI-5
		ID.RA-2: Cyber threat intelligence is received from information sharing forums and sources	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> · CIS CSC 4 · COBIT 5 BAI08.01 · ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.2.3, 4.2.3.9, 4.2.3.12 · ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.6.1.4 · NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 SI-5, PM-15, PM-16
		ID.RA-3: Threats, both internal and external, are identified and documented	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> · CIS CSC 4 · COBIT 5 APO12.01, APO12.02, APO12.03, APO12.04 · ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.2.3, 4.2.3.9, 4.2.3.12 · ISO/IEC 27001:2013 Clause 6.1.2 · NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 RA-3, SI-5, PM-12, PM-16
		ID.RA-4: Potential business impacts and likelihoods are identified	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> · CIS CSC 4 · COBIT 5 DSS04.02 · ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.2.3, 4.2.3.9, 4.2.3.12 · ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.16.1.6, Clause 6.1.2 · NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 RA-2, RA-3, SA-14, PM-9, PM-11
		ID.RA-5: Threats, vulnerabilities, likelihoods, and impacts are used to determine risk	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> · CIS CSC 4 · COBIT 5 APO12.02 · ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.12.6.1 · NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 RA-2, RA-3, PM-16
		ID.RA-6: Risk responses are identified and prioritized	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> · CIS CSC 4 · COBIT 5 APO12.05, APO13.02

Function	Category	Subcategory	Informative References
Function			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ISO/IEC 27001:2013 Clause 6.1.3 • NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 PM-4, PM-9
	Risk Management Strategy (ID.RM)	ID.RM-1: Risk management processes are established, managed, and agreed to by organizational stakeholders	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CIS CSC 4 • COBIT 5 APO12.04, APO12.05, APO13.02, BAI02.03, BAI04.02 • ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.4.2 • ISO/IEC 27001:2013 Clause 6.1.3, Clause 8.3, Clause 9.3 • NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 PM-9
		ID.RM-2: Organizational risk tolerance is determined and clearly expressed	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • COBIT 5 APO12.06 • ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.2.6.5 • ISO/IEC 27001:2013 Clause 6.1.3, Clause 8.3 • NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 PM-9
		ID.RM-3: The organization’s determination of risk tolerance is informed by its role in critical infrastructure and sector specific risk analysis	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • COBIT 5 APO12.02 • ISO/IEC 27001:2013 Clause 6.1.3, Clause 8.3 • NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 SA-14, PM-8, PM-9, PM-11
	Supply Chain Risk Management (ID.SC)	ID.SC-1: Cyber supply chain risk management processes are identified, established, assessed, managed, and agreed to by organizational stakeholders	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CIS CSC 4 • COBIT 5 APO10.01, APO10.04, APO12.04, APO12.05, APO13.02, BAI01.03, BAI02.03, BAI04.02 • ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.4.2 • ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.15.1.1, A.15.1.2, A.15.1.3, A.15.2.1, A.15.2.2 • NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 SA-9, SA-12, PM-9
		ID.SC-2: Suppliers and third party partners of information systems, components, and services are identified, prioritized, and assessed using a cyber supply chain risk assessment process	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • COBIT 5 APO10.01, APO10.02, APO10.04, APO10.05, APO12.01, APO12.02, APO12.03, APO12.04, APO12.05, APO12.06, APO13.02, BAI02.03 • ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.2.3.1, 4.2.3.2, 4.2.3.3, 4.2.3.4, 4.2.3.6, 4.2.3.8, 4.2.3.9, 4.2.3.10, 4.2.3.12, 4.2.3.13, 4.2.3.14 • ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.15.2.1, A.15.2.2

Function	Category	Subcategory	Informative References
			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 RA-2, RA-3, SA-12, SA-14, SA-15, PM-9
		<p>ID.SC-3: Contracts with suppliers and third-party partners are used to implement appropriate measures designed to meet the objectives of an organization’s cybersecurity program and Cyber Supply Chain Risk Management Plan.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • COBIT 5 APO10.01, APO10.02, APO10.03, APO10.04, APO10.05 • ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.2.6.4, 4.3.2.6.7 • ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.15.1.1, A.15.1.2, A.15.1.3 • NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 SA-9, SA-11, SA-12, PM-9
		<p>ID.SC-4: Suppliers and third-party partners are routinely assessed using audits, test results, or other forms of evaluations to confirm they are meeting their contractual obligations.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • COBIT 5 APO10.01, APO10.03, APO10.04, APO10.05, MEA01.01, MEA01.02, MEA01.03, MEA01.04, MEA01.05 • ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.2.6.7 • ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 6.1 • ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.15.2.1, A.15.2.2 • NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 AU-2, AU-6, AU-12, AU-16, PS-7, SA-9, SA-12
		<p>ID.SC-5: Response and recovery planning and testing are conducted with suppliers and third-party providers</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CIS CSC 19, 20 • COBIT 5 DSS04.04 • ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.2.5.7, 4.3.4.5.11 • ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 2.8, SR 3.3, SR.6.1, SR 7.3, SR 7.4 • ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.17.1.3 • NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 CP-2, CP-4, IR-3, IR-4, IR-6, IR-8, IR-9
<p>PROTECT (PR)</p>	<p>Identity Management, Authentication and Access Control (PR.AC)</p>	<p>PR.AC-1: Identities and credentials are issued, managed, verified, revoked, and audited for authorized devices, users and processes</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CIS CSC 1, 5, 15, 16 • COBIT 5 DSS05.04, DSS06.03 • ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.3.5.1 • ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 1.1, SR 1.2, SR 1.3, SR 1.4, SR 1.5, SR 1.7, SR 1.8, SR 1.9 • ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.9.2.1, A.9.2.2, A.9.2.3, A.9.2.4, A.9.2.6, A.9.3.1, A.9.4.2, A.9.4.3 • NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 AC-1, AC-2, IA-1, IA-2, IA-3, IA-4, IA-5, IA-6, IA-7, IA-8, IA-9, IA-10, IA-11

Function	Category	Subcategory	Informative References
		<p>PR.AC-2: Physical access to assets is managed and protected</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> · COBIT 5 DSS01.04, DSS05.05 · ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.3.3.2, 4.3.3.3.8 · ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.11.1.1, A.11.1.2, A.11.1.3, A.11.1.4, A.11.1.5, A.11.1.6, A.11.2.1, A.11.2.3, A.11.2.5, A.11.2.6, A.11.2.7, A.11.2.8 · NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 PE-2, PE-3, PE-4, PE-5, PE-6, PE-8
		<p>PR.AC-3: Remote access is managed</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> · CIS CSC 12 · COBIT 5 APO13.01, DSS01.04, DSS05.03 · ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.3.6.6 · ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 1.13, SR 2.6 · ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.6.2.1, A.6.2.2, A.11.2.6, A.13.1.1, A.13.2.1 · NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 AC-1, AC-17, AC-19, AC-20, SC-15
		<p>PR.AC-4: Access permissions and authorizations are managed, incorporating the principles of least privilege and separation of duties</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> · CIS CSC 3, 5, 12, 14, 15, 16, 18 · COBIT 5 DSS05.04 · ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.3.7.3 · ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 2.1 · ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.6.1.2, A.9.1.2, A.9.2.3, A.9.4.1, A.9.4.4, A.9.4.5 · NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 AC-1, AC-2, AC-3, AC-5, AC-6, AC-14, AC-16, AC-24
		<p>PR.AC-5: Network integrity is protected (e.g., network segregation, network segmentation)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> · CIS CSC 9, 14, 15, 18 · COBIT 5 DSS01.05, DSS05.02 · ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.3.4 · ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 3.1, SR 3.8 · ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.13.1.1, A.13.1.3, A.13.2.1, A.14.1.2, A.14.1.3 · NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 AC-4, AC-10, SC-7

Function	Category	Subcategory	Informative References
Awareness and Training (PR.AT)		<p>PR.AC-6: Identities are proofed and bound to credentials and asserted in interactions</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> · CIS CSC, 16 · COBIT 5 DSS05.04, DSS05.05, DSS05.07, DSS06.03 · ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.3.2.2, 4.3.3.5.2, 4.3.3.7.2, 4.3.3.7.4 · ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 1.1, SR 1.2, SR 1.4, SR 1.5, SR 1.9, SR 2.1 · ISO/IEC 27001:2013, A.7.1.1, A.9.2.1 · NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 AC-1, AC-2, AC-3, AC-16, AC-19, AC-24, IA-1, IA-2, IA-4, IA-5, IA-8, PE-2, PS-3
		<p>PR.AC-7: Users, devices, and other assets are authenticated (e.g., single-factor, multi-factor) commensurate with the risk of the transaction (e.g., individuals' security and privacy risks and other organizational risks)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> · CIS CSC 1, 12, 15, 16 · COBIT 5 DSS05.04, DSS05.10, DSS06.10 · ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.3.6.1, 4.3.3.6.2, 4.3.3.6.3, 4.3.3.6.4, 4.3.3.6.5, 4.3.3.6.6, 4.3.3.6.7, 4.3.3.6.8, 4.3.3.6.9 · ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 1.1, SR 1.2, SR 1.5, SR 1.7, SR 1.8, SR 1.9, SR 1.10 · ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.9.2.1, A.9.2.4, A.9.3.1, A.9.4.2, A.9.4.3, A.18.1.4 · NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 AC-7, AC-8, AC-9, AC-11, AC-12, AC-14, IA-1, IA-2, IA-3, IA-4, IA-5, IA-8, IA-9, IA-10, IA-11
	Awareness and Training (PR.AT)	<p>PR.AT-1: All users are informed and trained</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> · CIS CSC 17, 18 · COBIT 5 APO07.03, BAI05.07 · ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.2.4.2 · ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.7.2.2, A.12.2.1 · NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 AT-2, PM-13
		<p>PR.AT-2: Privileged users understand their roles and responsibilities</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> · CIS CSC 5, 17, 18 · COBIT 5 APO07.02, DSS05.04, DSS06.03 · ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.2.4.2, 4.3.2.4.3 · ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.6.1.1, A.7.2.2 · NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 AT-3, PM-13

Function	Category	Subcategory	Informative References
Physical Security		PR.AT-3: Third-party stakeholders (e.g., suppliers, customers, partners) understand their roles and responsibilities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> · CIS CSC 17 · COBIT 5 APO07.03, APO07.06, APO10.04, APO10.05 · ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.2.4.2 · ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.6.1.1, A.7.2.1, A.7.2.2 · NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 PS-7, SA-9, SA-16
		PR.AT-4: Senior executives understand their roles and responsibilities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> · CIS CSC 17, 19 · COBIT 5 EDM01.01, APO01.02, APO07.03 · ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.2.4.2 · ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.6.1.1, A.7.2.2 · NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 AT-3, PM-13
		PR.AT-5: Physical and cybersecurity personnel understand their roles and responsibilities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> · CIS CSC 17 · COBIT 5 APO07.03 · ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.2.4.2 · ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.6.1.1, A.7.2.2 · NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 AT-3, IR-2, PM-13
	Data Security (PR.DS)	PR.DS-1: Data-at-rest is protected	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> · CIS CSC 13, 14 · COBIT 5 APO01.06, BAI02.01, BAI06.01, DSS04.07, DSS05.03, DSS06.06 · ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 3.4, SR 4.1 · ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.8.2.3 · NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 MP-8, SC-12, SC-28
	PR.DS-2: Data-in-transit is protected	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> · CIS CSC 13, 14 · COBIT 5 APO01.06, DSS05.02, DSS06.06 · ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 3.1, SR 3.8, SR 4.1, SR 4.2 · ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.8.2.3, A.13.1.1, A.13.2.1, A.13.2.3, A.14.1.2, A.14.1.3 · NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 SC-8, SC-11, SC-12 	

Function	Category	Subcategory	Informative References
		<p>PR.DS-3: Assets are formally managed throughout removal, transfers, and disposition</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> · CIS CSC 1 · COBIT 5 BAI09.03 · ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.3.3.9, 4.3.4.4.1 · ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 4.2 · ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.8.2.3, A.8.3.1, A.8.3.2, A.8.3.3, A.11.2.5, A.11.2.7 · NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 CM-8, MP-6, PE-16
		<p>PR.DS-4: Adequate capacity to ensure availability is maintained</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> · CIS CSC 1, 2, 13 · COBIT 5 APO13.01, BAI04.04 · ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 7.1, SR 7.2 · ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.12.1.3, A.17.2.1 · NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 AU-4, CP-2, SC-5
		<p>PR.DS-5: Protections against data leaks are implemented</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> · CIS CSC 13 · COBIT 5 APO01.06, DSS05.04, DSS05.07, DSS06.02 · ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 5.2 · ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.6.1.2, A.7.1.1, A.7.1.2, A.7.3.1, A.8.2.2, A.8.2.3, A.9.1.1, A.9.1.2, A.9.2.3, A.9.4.1, A.9.4.4, A.9.4.5, A.10.1.1, A.11.1.4, A.11.1.5, A.11.2.1, A.13.1.1, A.13.1.3, A.13.2.1, A.13.2.3, A.13.2.4, A.14.1.2, A.14.1.3 · NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 AC-4, AC-5, AC-6, PE-19, PS-3, PS-6, SC-7, SC-8, SC-13, SC-31, SI-4
		<p>PR.DS-6: Integrity checking mechanisms are used to verify software, firmware, and information integrity</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> · CIS CSC 2, 3 · COBIT 5 APO01.06, BAI06.01, DSS06.02 · ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 3.1, SR 3.3, SR 3.4, SR 3.8 · ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.12.2.1, A.12.5.1, A.14.1.2, A.14.1.3, A.14.2.4 · NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 SC-16, SI-7
		<p>PR.DS-7: The development and testing environment(s) are separate from the production</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> · CIS CSC 18, 20 · COBIT 5 BAI03.08, BAI07.04

Function	Category	Subcategory	Informative References
Information Protection Processes and Procedures (PR.IP)		environment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.12.1.4 • NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 CM-2
		<p>PR.DS-8: Integrity checking mechanisms are used to verify hardware integrity</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • COBIT 5 BAI03.05 • ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.4.4.4 • ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.11.2.4 • NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 SA-10, SI-7
	Information Protection Processes and Procedures (PR.IP)	<p>PR.IP-1: A baseline configuration of information technology/industrial control systems is created and maintained incorporating security principles (e.g. concept of least functionality)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CIS CSC 3, 9, 11 • COBIT 5 BAI10.01, BAI10.02, BAI10.03, BAI10.05 • ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.4.3.2, 4.3.4.3.3 • ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 7.6 • ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.12.1.2, A.12.5.1, A.12.6.2, A.14.2.2, A.14.2.3, A.14.2.4 • NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 CM-2, CM-3, CM-4, CM-5, CM-6, CM-7, CM-9, SA-10
		<p>PR.IP-2: A System Development Life Cycle to manage systems is implemented</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CIS CSC 18 • COBIT 5 APO13.01, BAI03.01, BAI03.02, BAI03.03 • ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.4.3.3 • ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.6.1.5, A.14.1.1, A.14.2.1, A.14.2.5 • NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 PL-8, SA-3, SA-4, SA-8, SA-10, SA-11, SA-12, SA-15, SA-17, SI-12, SI-13, SI-14, SI-16, SI-17
		<p>PR.IP-3: Configuration change control processes are in place</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CIS CSC 3, 11 • COBIT 5 BAI01.06, BAI06.01 • ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.4.3.2, 4.3.4.3.3 • ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 7.6 • ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.12.1.2, A.12.5.1, A.12.6.2, A.14.2.2, A.14.2.3, A.14.2.4 • NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 CM-3, CM-4, SA-10

Function	Category	Subcategory	Informative References
		<p>PR.IP-4: Backups of information are conducted, maintained, and tested</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CIS CSC 10 • COBIT 5 APO13.01, DSS01.01, DSS04.07 • ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.4.3.9 • ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 7.3, SR 7.4 • ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.12.3.1, A.17.1.2, A.17.1.3, A.18.1.3 • NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 CP-4, CP-6, CP-9
		<p>PR.IP-5: Policy and regulations regarding the physical operating environment for organizational assets are met</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • COBIT 5 DSS01.04, DSS05.05 • ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.3.3.1 4.3.3.3.2, 4.3.3.3.3, 4.3.3.3.5, 4.3.3.3.6 • ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.11.1.4, A.11.2.1, A.11.2.2, A.11.2.3 • NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 PE-10, PE-12, PE-13, PE-14, PE-15, PE-18
		<p>PR.IP-6: Data is destroyed according to policy</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • COBIT 5 BAI09.03, DSS05.06 • ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.4.4.4 • ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 4.2 • ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.8.2.3, A.8.3.1, A.8.3.2, A.11.2.7 • NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 MP-6
		<p>PR.IP-7: Protection processes are improved</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • COBIT 5 APO11.06, APO12.06, DSS04.05 • ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.4.3.1, 4.4.3.2, 4.4.3.3, 4.4.3.4, 4.4.3.5, 4.4.3.6, 4.4.3.7, 4.4.3.8 • ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.16.1.6, Clause 9, Clause 10 • NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 CA-2, CA-7, CP-2, IR-8, PL-2, PM-6
		<p>PR.IP-8: Effectiveness of protection technologies is shared</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • COBIT 5 BAI08.04, DSS03.04 • ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.16.1.6 • NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 AC-21, CA-7, SI-4
		<p>PR.IP-9: Response plans (Incident Response and</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CIS CSC 19

Function	Category	Subcategory	Informative References
<p>Function</p>		<p>Business Continuity) and recovery plans (Incident Recovery and Disaster Recovery) are in place and managed</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • COBIT 5 APO12.06, DSS04.03 • ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.2.5.3, 4.3.4.5.1 • ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.16.1.1, A.17.1.1, A.17.1.2, A.17.1.3 • NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 CP-2, CP-7, CP-12, CP-13, IR-7, IR-8, IR-9, PE-17
		<p>PR.IP-10: Response and recovery plans are tested</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CIS CSC 19, 20 • COBIT 5 DSS04.04 • ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.2.5.7, 4.3.4.5.11 • ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 3.3 • ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.17.1.3 • NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 CP-4, IR-3, PM-14
		<p>PR.IP-11: Cybersecurity is included in human resources practices (e.g., deprovisioning, personnel screening)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CIS CSC 5, 16 • COBIT 5 APO07.01, APO07.02, APO07.03, APO07.04, APO07.05 • ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.3.2.1, 4.3.3.2.2, 4.3.3.2.3 • ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.7.1.1, A.7.1.2, A.7.2.1, A.7.2.2, A.7.2.3, A.7.3.1, A.8.1.4 • NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 PS-1, PS-2, PS-3, PS-4, PS-5, PS-6, PS-7, PS-8, SA-21
		<p>PR.IP-12: A vulnerability management plan is developed and implemented</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CIS CSC 4, 18, 20 • COBIT 5 BAI03.10, DSS05.01, DSS05.02 • ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.12.6.1, A.14.2.3, A.16.1.3, A.18.2.2, A.18.2.3 • NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 RA-3, RA-5, SI-2
	<p>Maintenance (PR.MA)</p>	<p>PR.MA-1: Maintenance and repair of organizational assets are performed and logged, with approved and controlled tools</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • COBIT 5 BAI03.10, BAI09.02, BAI09.03, DSS01.05 • ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.3.3.7 • ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.11.1.2, A.11.2.4, A.11.2.5, A.11.2.6 • NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 MA-2, MA-3, MA-5, MA-6

Function	Category	Subcategory	Informative References
Protective Technology (PR.PT)		<p>PR.MA-2: Remote maintenance of organizational assets is approved, logged, and performed in a manner that prevents unauthorized access</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> · CIS CSC 3, 5 · COBIT 5 DSS05.04 · ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.3.6.5, 4.3.3.6.6, 4.3.3.6.7, 4.3.3.6.8 · ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.11.2.4, A.15.1.1, A.15.2.1 · NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 MA-4
		<p>PR.PT-1: Audit/log records are determined, documented, implemented, and reviewed in accordance with policy</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> · CIS CSC 1, 3, 5, 6, 14, 15, 16 · COBIT 5 APO11.04, BAI03.05, DSS05.04, DSS05.07, MEA02.01 · ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.3.3.9, 4.3.3.5.8, 4.3.4.4.7, 4.4.2.1, 4.4.2.2, 4.4.2.4 · ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 2.8, SR 2.9, SR 2.10, SR 2.11, SR 2.12 · ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.12.4.1, A.12.4.2, A.12.4.3, A.12.4.4, A.12.7.1 · NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 AU Family
		<p>PR.PT-2: Removable media is protected and its use restricted according to policy</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> · CIS CSC 8, 13 · COBIT 5 APO13.01, DSS05.02, DSS05.06 · ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 2.3 · ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.8.2.1, A.8.2.2, A.8.2.3, A.8.3.1, A.8.3.3, A.11.2.9 · NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 MP-2, MP-3, MP-4, MP-5, MP-7, MP-8
		<p>PR.PT-3: The principle of least functionality is incorporated by configuring systems to provide only essential capabilities</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> · CIS CSC 3, 11, 14 · COBIT 5 DSS05.02, DSS05.05, DSS06.06 · ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.3.5.1, 4.3.3.5.2, 4.3.3.5.3, 4.3.3.5.4, 4.3.3.5.5, 4.3.3.5.6, 4.3.3.5.7, 4.3.3.5.8, 4.3.3.6.1, 4.3.3.6.2, 4.3.3.6.3, 4.3.3.6.4, 4.3.3.6.5, 4.3.3.6.6, 4.3.3.6.7, 4.3.3.6.8, 4.3.3.6.9, 4.3.3.7.1, 4.3.3.7.2, 4.3.3.7.3, 4.3.3.7.4 · ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 1.1, SR 1.2, SR 1.3, SR 1.4, SR 1.5, SR 1.6, SR 1.7, SR 1.8, SR 1.9, SR 1.10, SR 1.11, SR 1.12, SR 1.13, SR 2.1, SR 2.2, SR 2.3, SR 2.4, SR 2.5, SR 2.6,

Function	Category	Subcategory	Informative References
			SR 2.7 · ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.9.1.2 · NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 AC-3, CM-7
		PR.PT-4: Communications and control networks are protected	· CIS CSC 8, 12, 15 · COBIT 5 DSS05.02, APO13.01 · ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 3.1, SR 3.5, SR 3.8, SR 4.1, SR 4.3, SR 5.1, SR 5.2, SR 5.3, SR 7.1, SR 7.6 · ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.13.1.1, A.13.2.1, A.14.1.3 · NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 AC-4, AC-17, AC-18, CP-8, SC-7, SC-19, SC-20, SC-21, SC-22, SC-23, SC-24, SC-25, SC-29, SC-32, SC-36, SC-37, SC-38, SC-39, SC-40, SC-41, SC-43
		PR.PT-5: Mechanisms (e.g., failsafe, load balancing, hot swap) are implemented to achieve resilience requirements in normal and adverse situations	· COBIT 5 BAI04.01, BAI04.02, BAI04.03, BAI04.04, BAI04.05, DSS01.05 · ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.2.5.2 · ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 7.1, SR 7.2 · ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.17.1.2, A.17.2.1 · NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 CP-7, CP-8, CP-11, CP-13, PL-8, SA-14, SC-6
DETECT (DE)	Anomalies and Events (DE.AE)	DE.AE-1: A baseline of network operations and expected data flows for users and systems is established and managed	· CIS CSC 1, 4, 6, 12, 13, 15, 16 · COBIT 5 DSS03.01 · ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.4.3.3 · ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.12.1.1, A.12.1.2, A.13.1.1, A.13.1.2 · NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 AC-4, CA-3, CM-2, SI-4
		DE.AE-2: Detected events are analyzed to understand attack targets and methods	· CIS CSC 3, 6, 13, 15 · COBIT 5 DSS05.07 · ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.4.5.6, 4.3.4.5.7, 4.3.4.5.8 · ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 2.8, SR 2.9, SR 2.10, SR 2.11, SR 2.12, SR 3.9, SR 6.1, SR 6.2

Function	Category	Subcategory	Informative References
			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> · ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.12.4.1, A.16.1.1, A.16.1.4 · NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 AU-6, CA-7, IR-4, SI-4
		DE.AE-3: Event data are collected and correlated from multiple sources and sensors	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> · CIS CSC 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16 · COBIT 5 BAI08.02 · ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 6.1 · ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.12.4.1, A.16.1.7 · NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 AU-6, CA-7, IR-4, IR-5, IR-8, SI-4
		DE.AE-4: Impact of events is determined	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> · CIS CSC 4, 6 · COBIT 5 APO12.06, DSS03.01 · ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.16.1.4 · NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 CP-2, IR-4, RA-3, SI-4
		DE.AE-5: Incident alert thresholds are established	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> · CIS CSC 6, 19 · COBIT 5 APO12.06, DSS03.01 · ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.2.3.10 · ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.16.1.4 · NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 IR-4, IR-5, IR-8
		DE.CM-1: The network is monitored to detect potential cybersecurity events	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> · CIS CSC 1, 7, 8, 12, 13, 15, 16 · COBIT 5 DSS01.03, DSS03.05, DSS05.07 · ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 6.2 · NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 AC-2, AU-12, CA-7, CM-3, SC-5, SC-7, SI-4
	Security Continuous Monitoring (DE.CM)	DE.CM-2: The physical environment is monitored to detect potential cybersecurity events	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> · COBIT 5 DSS01.04, DSS01.05 · ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.3.3.8 · ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.11.1.1, A.11.1.2 · NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 CA-7, PE-3, PE-6, PE-20
		DE.CM-3: Personnel activity is monitored to detect	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> · CIS CSC 5, 7, 14, 16

Function	Category	Subcategory	Informative References
		potential cybersecurity events	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> · COBIT 5 DSS05.07 · ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 6.2 · ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.12.4.1, A.12.4.3 · NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 AC-2, AU-12, AU-13, CA-7, CM-10, CM-11
		DE.CM-4: Malicious code is detected	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> · CIS CSC 4, 7, 8, 12 · COBIT 5 DSS05.01 · ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.4.3.8 · ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 3.2 · ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.12.2.1 · NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 SI-3, SI-8
		DE.CM-5: Unauthorized mobile code is detected	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> · CIS CSC 7, 8 · COBIT 5 DSS05.01 · ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 2.4 · ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.12.5.1, A.12.6.2 · NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 SC-18, SI-4, SC-44
		DE.CM-6: External service provider activity is monitored to detect potential cybersecurity events	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> · COBIT 5 APO07.06, APO10.05 · ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.14.2.7, A.15.2.1 · NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 CA-7, PS-7, SA-4, SA-9, SI-4
		DE.CM-7: Monitoring for unauthorized personnel, connections, devices, and software is performed	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> · CIS CSC 1, 2, 3, 5, 9, 12, 13, 15, 16 · COBIT 5 DSS05.02, DSS05.05 · ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.12.4.1, A.14.2.7, A.15.2.1 · NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 AU-12, CA-7, CM-3, CM-8, PE-3, PE-6, PE-20, SI-4
		DE.CM-8: Vulnerability scans are performed	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> · CIS CSC 4, 20 · COBIT 5 BAI03.10, DSS05.01 · ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.2.3.1, 4.2.3.7

Function	Category	Subcategory	Informative References	
			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.12.6.1 • NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 RA-5 	
			<p>DE.DP-1: Roles and responsibilities for detection are well defined to ensure accountability</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CIS CSC 19 • COBIT 5 APO01.02, DSS05.01, DSS06.03 • ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.4.3.1 • ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.6.1.1, A.7.2.2 • NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 CA-2, CA-7, PM-14
			<p>DE.DP-2: Detection activities comply with all applicable requirements</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • COBIT 5 DSS06.01, MEA03.03, MEA03.04 • ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.4.3.2 • ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.18.1.4, A.18.2.2, A.18.2.3 • NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 AC-25, CA-2, CA-7, SA-18, SI-4, PM-14
			<p>DE.DP-3: Detection processes are tested</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • COBIT 5 APO13.02, DSS05.02 • ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.4.3.2 • ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 3.3 • ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.14.2.8 • NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 CA-2, CA-7, PE-3, SI-3, SI-4, PM-14
			<p>DE.DP-4: Event detection information is communicated</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CIS CSC 19 • COBIT 5 APO08.04, APO12.06, DSS02.05 • ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.4.5.9 • ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 6.1 • ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.16.1.2, A.16.1.3 • NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 AU-6, CA-2, CA-7, RA-5, SI-4
			<p>DE.DP-5: Detection processes are continuously improved</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • COBIT 5 APO11.06, APO12.06, DSS04.05 • ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.4.3.4 • ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.16.1.6

Function	Category	Subcategory	Informative References
			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> · NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4, CA-2, CA-7, PL-2, RA-5, SI-4, PM-14
RESPOND (RS)	Response Planning (RS.RP)	RS.RP-1: Response plan is executed during or after an incident	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> · CIS CSC 19 · COBIT 5 APO12.06, BAI01.10 · ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.4.5.1 · ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.16.1.5 · NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 CP-2, CP-10, IR-4, IR-8
	Communications (RS.CO)	RS.CO-1: Personnel know their roles and order of operations when a response is needed	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> · CIS CSC 19 · COBIT 5 EDM03.02, APO01.02, APO12.03 · ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.4.5.2, 4.3.4.5.3, 4.3.4.5.4 · ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.6.1.1, A.7.2.2, A.16.1.1 · NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 CP-2, CP-3, IR-3, IR-8
		RS.CO-2: Incidents are reported consistent with established criteria	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> · CIS CSC 19 · COBIT 5 DSS01.03 · ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.4.5.5 · ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.6.1.3, A.16.1.2 · NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 AU-6, IR-6, IR-8
		RS.CO-3: Information is shared consistent with response plans	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> · CIS CSC 19 · COBIT 5 DSS03.04 · ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.4.5.2 · ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.16.1.2, Clause 7.4, Clause 16.1.2 · NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 CA-2, CA-7, CP-2, IR-4, IR-8, PE-6, RA-5, SI-4
		RS.CO-4: Coordination with stakeholders occurs consistent with response plans	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> · CIS CSC 19 · COBIT 5 DSS03.04 · ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.4.5.5 · ISO/IEC 27001:2013 Clause 7.4

Function	Category	Subcategory	Informative References
			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 CP-2, IR-4, IR-8
		<p>RS.CO-5: Voluntary information sharing occurs with external stakeholders to achieve broader cybersecurity situational awareness</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CIS CSC 19 • COBIT 5 BAI08.04 • ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.6.1.4 • NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 SI-5, PM-15
	Analysis (RS.AN)	<p>RS.AN-1: Notifications from detection systems are investigated</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CIS CSC 4, 6, 8, 19 • COBIT 5 DSS02.04, DSS02.07 • ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.4.5.6, 4.3.4.5.7, 4.3.4.5.8 • ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 6.1 • ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.12.4.1, A.12.4.3, A.16.1.5 • NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 AU-6, CA-7, IR-4, IR-5, PE-6, SI-4
		<p>RS.AN-2: The impact of the incident is understood</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • COBIT 5 DSS02.02 • ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.4.5.6, 4.3.4.5.7, 4.3.4.5.8 • ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.16.1.4, A.16.1.6 • NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 CP-2, IR-4
		<p>RS.AN-3: Forensics are performed</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • COBIT 5 APO12.06, DSS03.02, DSS05.07 • ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 2.8, SR 2.9, SR 2.10, SR 2.11, SR 2.12, SR 3.9, SR 6.1 • ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.16.1.7 • NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 AU-7, IR-4
		<p>RS.AN-4: Incidents are categorized consistent with response plans</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CIS CSC 19 • COBIT 5 DSS02.02 • ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.4.5.6 • ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.16.1.4 • NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 CP-2, IR-4, IR-5, IR-8
		<p>RS.AN-5: Processes are established to receive,</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CIS CSC 4, 19

Function	Category	Subcategory	Informative References
RECOVER		analyze and respond to vulnerabilities disclosed to the organization from internal and external sources (e.g. internal testing, security bulletins, or security researchers)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • COBIT 5 EDM03.02, DSS05.07 • NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 SI-5, PM-15
	Mitigation (RS.MI)	RS.MI-1: Incidents are contained	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CIS CSC 19 • COBIT 5 APO12.06 • ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.4.5.6 • ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 5.1, SR 5.2, SR 5.4 • ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.12.2.1, A.16.1.5 • NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 IR-4
		RS.MI-2: Incidents are mitigated	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CIS CSC 4, 19 • COBIT 5 APO12.06 • ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.4.5.6, 4.3.4.5.10 • ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.12.2.1, A.16.1.5 • NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 IR-4
		RS.MI-3: Newly identified vulnerabilities are mitigated or documented as accepted risks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CIS CSC 4 • COBIT 5 APO12.06 • ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.12.6.1 • NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 CA-7, RA-3, RA-5
	Improvements (RS.IM)	RS.IM-1: Response plans incorporate lessons learned	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • COBIT 5 BAI01.13 • ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.4.5.10, 4.4.3.4 • ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.16.1.6, Clause 10 • NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 CP-2, IR-4, IR-8
		RS.IM-2: Response strategies are updated	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • COBIT 5 BAI01.13, DSS04.08 • ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.16.1.6, Clause 10 • NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 CP-2, IR-4, IR-8
		Recovery	RC.RP-1: Recovery plan is executed during or after

Function	Category	Subcategory	Informative References
(RC)	Planning (RC.RP)	a cybersecurity incident	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • COBIT 5 APO12.06, DSS02.05, DSS03.04 • ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.16.1.5 • NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 CP-10, IR-4, IR-8
	Improvements (RC.IM)	RC.IM-1: Recovery plans incorporate lessons learned	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • COBIT 5 APO12.06, BAI05.07, DSS04.08 • ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.4.3.4 • ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.16.1.6, Clause 10 • NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 CP-2, IR-4, IR-8
		RC.IM-2: Recovery strategies are updated	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • COBIT 5 APO12.06, BAI07.08 • ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.16.1.6, Clause 10 • NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 CP-2, IR-4, IR-8
	Communications (RC.CO)	RC.CO-1: Public relations are managed	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • COBIT 5 EDM03.02 • ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.6.1.4, Clause 7.4
		RC.CO-2: Reputation is repaired after an incident	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • COBIT 5 MEA03.02 • ISO/IEC 27001:2013 Clause 7.4
		RC.CO-3: Recovery activities are communicated to internal and external stakeholders as well as executive and management teams	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • COBIT 5 APO12.06 • ISO/IEC 27001:2013 Clause 7.4 • NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 CP-2, IR-4

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