

**NIST Internal Report
NIST IR 8477 ipd**

Mapping Relationships Between Documentary Standards, Regulations, Frameworks, and Guidelines

Developing Cybersecurity and Privacy Concept Mappings

Initial Public Draft

Karen Scarfone
Murugiah Souppaya
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August 2023



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Scarfone K, Souppaya M, Fagan M (2023) Mapping Relationships Between Documentary Standards, Regulations, Frameworks, and Guidelines: Developing Cybersecurity and Privacy Concept Mappings. (National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD), NIST Internal Report (IR) NIST IR 8477 ipd.
<https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.IR.8477.ipd>

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Public Comment Period

August 17, 2023 - October 6, 2023

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1 **Abstract**

2 This document describes an approach that NIST would use and other parties could use for
3 mapping the elements of documentary standards, regulations, frameworks, and guidelines to
4 NIST publications, such as CSF Subcategories or SP 800-53r5 controls. NIST intends for this
5 approach to be used for future mappings involving NIST cybersecurity and privacy publications
6 that will be submitted via the NIST National Online Informative References (OLIR) process for
7 hosting on NIST’s online Cybersecurity and Privacy Reference Tool (CPRT). By following this
8 approach, NIST and others in the cybersecurity and privacy standards community can jointly
9 establish a single *concept system* over time that links cybersecurity and privacy concepts from
10 many sources into a cohesive, consistent set of relationship mappings within the NIST CPRT.
11 The approach is informed by concept system and terminology standards, as well as experience
12 with what information the cybersecurity and privacy community would find most valuable.

13 **Keywords**

14 concept mapping; crosswalk; cybersecurity; mapping; privacy; relationship; terminology science.

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17 Technology (NIST) promotes the U.S. economy and public welfare by providing technical
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19 methods, reference data, proof of concept implementations, and technical analyses to advance
20 the development and productive use of information technology. ITL’s responsibilities include the
21 development of management, administrative, technical, and physical standards and guidelines for
22 the cost-effective security and privacy of other than national security-related information in
23 federal information systems.

24 **Audience**

25 The primary audience is subject-matter experts (SMEs) for a documentary standard, regulation,
26 framework, guideline, or other content who want to map between concepts in their content and
27 concepts in NIST publications. SMEs may own the content being mapped to NIST publications.
28 This document may also be of interest to SMEs who choose to follow this same approach for
29 interoperability and compatibility reasons when mapping between two non-NIST publications. A
30 secondary audience for this document includes the users who will leverage the mappings to
31 support various use cases.

32 **Acknowledgments**

33 The authors thank everyone who contributed to this publication by applying the approach to their
34 mapping scenarios and providing feedback on the approach.

35 **Call for Patent Claims**

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58 The assurance shall also indicate that it is intended to be binding on successors-in-interest
59 regardless of whether such provisions are included in the relevant transfer documents.

60 Such statements should be addressed to: mapping@nist.gov

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87 **Executive Summary**

88 Understanding how the elements of diverse cybersecurity and privacy standards, regulations,
89 frameworks, guidelines, and other content are related to each other is an ongoing challenge for
90 people at nearly every organization. It can be time-consuming and difficult to answer questions
91 like:

- 92 • How does conforming to one standard help the organization conform to another standard?
93 What parts of the second standard does the first standard fail to address?
- 94 • Where can we find more information on how to satisfy a particular requirement in a
95 guideline? What types of technologies can we use, and what types of skills do the
96 implementers need to have?
- 97 • If we want to conform to a particular standard, what types of cybersecurity capabilities do
98 our technology product and service providers need to support?
- 99 • If we perform a particular security assessment methodology, what requirements will be
100 sufficiently validated across our compliance portfolio?
- 101 • What recommendations substantially changed from a guideline’s previous version to its
102 current version?
- 103 • What security and privacy controls must be in place before we adopt a new technology?

104 This document explains NIST’s proposed approach for identifying and documenting the
105 relationships between concepts in cybersecurity and privacy, such as how the concepts of a NIST
106 or third-party standard or guideline relate to the concepts of a foundational NIST publication like
107 the Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) or NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-53. There are many
108 possible *concept types*, including controls, requirements, recommendations, outcomes,
109 technologies, functions, processes, techniques, roles, and skills. NIST intends to use this
110 approach for mapping relationships involving NIST cybersecurity and privacy publications that
111 will be submitted via NIST’s National Online Informative References (OLIR) Program for
112 hosting in NIST’s online Cybersecurity and Privacy Reference Tool (CPRT). This will include
113 mapping the equivalent of CSF 1.1’s Informative References in support of CSF 2.0. Third parties
114 choosing to contribute mappings to OLIR for CPRT hosting would also need to use the approach
115 in the future.

116 By following this approach, NIST and others in the cybersecurity and privacy standards
117 community can jointly establish a single *concept system* over time that links cybersecurity and
118 privacy concepts from many sources into a cohesive, consistent set of relationship mappings
119 within the NIST CPRT. The mappings can then be used by different audiences to better describe
120 the interrelated aspects of the global cybersecurity and privacy corpus.

121 **1. Introduction**

122 A *concept* is a “unit of knowledge created by a unique combination of characteristics”
123 [ISO1087]. In cybersecurity and privacy, there are many *concept types*, including controls,
124 requirements, recommendations, outcomes, technologies, functions, processes, techniques, roles,
125 and skills. The term *mapping* indicates that one concept is related to another concept.

126 Many existing mappings do not characterize their relationships. In other words, they do not
127 indicate how the two concepts are related. For example, a mapping can say that a cybersecurity
128 standard’s Identity Governance control “is related to” NIST SP 800-53’s control AC-2, Account
129 Management. However, this mapping does not indicate whether the two controls are equivalent,
130 whether one helps achieve the other, whether one is a prerequisite for or component of the other,
131 or whether they overlap.

132 Mapping is often conducted as an abstract exercise (e.g., “map A to B”) without explicitly
133 determining, documenting, or communicating the mapping’s purpose, use cases, scope, audience,
134 or other assumptions. As a result, people who use the mapping must guess at its meaning and
135 context. These kinds of mappings save people a little time by pointing them to potentially
136 relevant information. Users of these mappings still need to read and comprehend the concepts in
137 both documents within the documents’ respective contexts to understand the nature of the
138 relationship.

139 This highlights another issue: the lack of consistency and transparency in the assumptions and
140 mapping approaches followed by the subject-matter experts (SMEs) who create the mappings.
141 Mappings are less valuable and harder to use and maintain without clearly indicating why two
142 concepts were mapped and what that mapping signifies. There is also the chance SMEs will
143 utilize their own perspectives and concepts while mapping without documenting them, and the
144 perspectives and understanding of the concepts may be significantly different for future users of
145 the mapping. This is especially true in emerging disciplines like cybersecurity and privacy,
146 where concepts and concept types are abundant, change over time, and are not always well-
147 documented. Additionally, terms like “mapping” and “crosswalk” are widely used but not
148 consistently defined. Without consistent terminology and definitions, information sharing is
149 difficult and can be prone to miscommunications and loss of nuance.

150 **1.1. Purpose and Scope**

151 This document explains the basics of cybersecurity and privacy concept mapping, including
152 defining foundational terminology. It also presents the technical elements of NIST’s proposed
153 approach for creating human-consumable mappings that involve NIST cybersecurity and privacy
154 publications. NIST intends for this approach to be used by both NIST and third parties for
155 mapping relationships involving NIST cybersecurity and privacy publications that will be
156 submitted via NIST’s [National Online Informative References \(OLIR\) Program](#) for hosting in
157 NIST’s online [Cybersecurity and Privacy Reference Tool \(CPRT\)](#). The elements of NIST’s
158 approach are meant to supplement — not replace — organizations’ existing mapping
159 methodologies.

160 Examples throughout this document come from other NIST publications. This is not intended to
161 imply that only NIST publications can be sources of concepts for mappings. The mapping

162 approach should work for any type of information, particularly cybersecurity or privacy content,
163 regardless of source.

164 Mapping for prose concepts (i.e., ideas in the form of ordinary written language), such as
165 requirements in documentary standards, is fundamentally different than mapping for specific
166 technology elements, such as individual software configuration settings that can be
167 unambiguously documented and implemented by machines. Mapping prose concepts necessitates
168 human interpretation and understanding of the concepts and their sources, as does using the
169 resulting mappings. The current scope of this document is the creation of human-consumable
170 mappings for prose concepts. Lower-level concepts that can be expressed without prose are out
171 of scope at this time.

172 Details about how to organize, format, and submit mapping data for potential inclusion in NIST
173 repositories and NIST's processes for reviewing and posting submitted mappings are out of
174 scope for this document. See Section 1.2 for more information.

175 **1.2. Related Work**

176 The CPRT offers a consistent format for accessing digitized reference data for various NIST
177 cybersecurity and privacy standards, guidelines, and frameworks in a unified data format. These
178 datasets make it easier for users to identify, locate, compare, and customize content in and across
179 NIST resources without needing to review hundreds of pages of narrative within the
180 publications. The reference data is exportable in different data formats, including a JSON
181 machine-readable format. As the tool evolves, users will be able to draw upon multiple NIST
182 resources to answer specific cybersecurity and privacy questions and build their own guidance.

183 NIST encourages SMEs on third-party standards, guidance, and other cybersecurity and privacy
184 content to submit mappings to NIST publications to the National OLIR Program. NIST will
185 make mappings available through the CPRT interface in human-consumable, machine-readable
186 formats. Future CPRT updates will enable convenient, rapid updates to mappings.

187 **1.3. Publication Structure**

188 The rest of this publication contains the following sections and appendices:

- 189 • Section 2 provides an overview of the proposed approach for concept mapping.
- 190 • Section 3 discusses the need to identify and document use cases for each mapping.
- 191 • Section 4 describes several concept relationship styles for mapping and suggests suitable
192 situations for each style.
- 193 • Section 5 offers tips for evaluating concept pairs and documenting relationships.
- 194 • Section 6 briefly discusses next steps for readers.
- 195 • The References section lists the references cited throughout this publication.
- 196 • Appendix A provides a glossary of selected terms used in this publication.

197 2. Concept Mapping Approach Overview

198 The proposed approach to cybersecurity and privacy concept mapping draws from the field of
199 terminology science. As described in ISO 1087:2019, *Terminology work and terminology*
200 *science – Vocabulary*, terminology science is “concerned with the systematic collection,
201 description, processing and presentation of concepts and their designations” [ISO1087].
202 Terminology science is typically used to identify concepts within a particular domain, such as
203 cybersecurity or privacy, and to define those concepts and their relationships to each other within
204 a single, cohesive concept system. ISO 1087 defines a *concept system* as a “set of concepts
205 structured in one or more related domains according to the concept relations among its concepts”
206 [ISO1087]. As ISO 704:2022, *Terminology work – Principles and methods* states, “Concepts do
207 not exist as isolated units of knowledge but always in relation to each other” [ISO704].

208 In the case of cybersecurity and privacy mapping, the concepts are already defined in *concept*
209 *sources*, including documentary standards, regulations, frameworks, and guidelines. In some
210 cases, concepts may be directly known (i.e., terminology), but they are more often reflected in
211 the requirements, recommendations, outcomes, controls, technologies, and architectures in
212 standards, guidance, and other sources. These concept definitions are analogous to the definitions
213 in the ISO 1087 and ISO 704 standards. The task in mapping is to define the relationships
214 between existing concepts that are defined in different sources with the goal of illuminating the
215 concept systems in them and the relationships that exist between them. Using a consistent
216 approach and terminology for creating mappings could establish a single concept system for
217 cybersecurity and privacy concepts from many sources.

218 This approach has adapted numerous concept relationship types from ISO 704 and reiterates that
219 standard’s assertion that concept definitions should be supplemented by gathering context,
220 examples, and other related information. This effort will improve understanding of each concept
221 and involve the *concept source owners* in developing, reviewing, maintaining, and supporting
222 respective mappings when feasible. In concept systems, the definition of a concept is not all-
223 encompassing. It provides enough information to distinguish the concept from others but does
224 not include every detail regarding the concept [ISO704].

225 NIST proposes that SMEs add these steps to their existing processes for creating mappings that
226 involve NIST content:

- 227 • Identify and document use cases for the mapping (Section 3).
- 228 • Choose a concept relationship style (Section 4).
- 229 • Evaluate concept pairs, and document their relationships (Section 5).

230 Each of these will be discussed in more detail. Note that these steps do not encompass a
231 complete mapping development life cycle, as described in NIST IR 8278Ar1 [IR8278A]. The
232 steps enhance rather than replace what SMEs have already been doing.

233 3. Identify and Document Use Cases for the Mapping

234 Most mappings involve two sources, such as a NIST publication and a third-party publication. In
235 the NIST OLIR and CPRT contexts, the NIST publication is called the *focal document*, and the
236 second publication is called the *reference document*. Some mappings involve only one version of
237 one source; in other words, they map concepts within the source to other concepts within the
238 exact same source (i.e., the focal document and the reference document are the same). NIST
239 anticipates creating and publishing these *one-source mappings* for appropriate publications.

240 After choosing the sources you want to map, document your assumptions in one or more use
241 cases *before* mapping. Each use case provides context for the mapping and improves its usability
242 and transparency. Five assumptions that are typically important to document are:

- 243 1. **The intended users of the mapping.** Include the skills and knowledge that the mapping
244 users are expected to have. A mapping can be used by tools and technologies as well.
- 245 2. **Why someone would want to use this mapping.** This gets to the core of why you want
246 to create the mapping. For example, you may want to help people understand how
247 complying with standard A can help them to comply with standard B or point people
248 from the skills defined in standard A to the corresponding items in standard B for which
249 those skills are necessary.
- 250 3. **The types of concepts to be mapped.** As mentioned in Section 1, there are many types
251 of cybersecurity and privacy concepts. Each source often has multiple types of concepts
252 (e.g., outcomes, implementations, requirements/recommendations, principles,
253 technologies, techniques/methodologies, roles). There are some factors to consider and
254 document when selecting concept types:
 - 255 ○ **Relevance:** Generally, you want to select the concept type from each source that is
256 most relevant to the use case. Combining multiple concept types from each source
257 into a single mapping may be more confusing than defining multiple use cases and
258 having a separate mapping for each one.
 - 259 ○ **Level of granularity:** Many sources have concepts defined at multiple levels of
260 granularity. For example, NIST SP 800-53r5 (Revision 5) [SP800-53] defines 20
261 control families. Each of those families contains multiple controls, and some controls
262 also contain control enhancements. Mapping a technology's cybersecurity functions
263 to the 20 control families would be faster and easier than mapping them to the
264 individual controls or control enhancements but generally not as valuable to mapping
265 users. However, mapping at the lowest level is not always practical. For example, if a
266 document defines 10 high-level concepts, 100 mid-level concepts, and 1,000 low-
267 level concepts, mapping for all 1,000 low-level concepts may take far more time than
268 is practical. It may also provide a level of detail that your intended mapping users
269 neither need nor want. Just because you can map at the lowest level does not mean
270 you should.
 - 271 ○ **Conceptual relationship between sources:** Sources and the concept types they
272 contain may have different target audiences or speak to different conceptual layers
273 within the concept system. For example, workforce skills from the [Workforce
274 Framework for Cybersecurity \(NICE Framework\)](#) or device capabilities from the [IoT
275 Device Cybersecurity Baselines](#) may be related to organizational activities

276 documented in other sources, such as industry guidance that recommends
277 cybersecurity controls for systems. In this case, the cybersecurity controls are a
278 concept type that would be defined for one conceptual layer (e.g., IT/system
279 cybersecurity), while the workforce skills or device capabilities would be concept
280 types from related, but distinct conceptual layers (i.e., cybersecurity education and
281 workforce development and system component cybersecurity development,
282 respectively). Therefore, it is important to establish and document assumptions about
283 how the two sources are conceptually related overall before attempting to define more
284 specific relationships.

- 285 4. **The direction of the mapping.** A mapping could indicate how a concept in source A
286 maps to a concept in source B, vice versa, or both.
- 287 5. **How exhaustive the mapping will be.** An exhaustive mapping will not be necessary in
288 most cases, such as mapping between concept systems in different domains (e.g., NICE
289 Framework roles to Secure Software Development Framework [SSDF] categories) or at
290 different levels of abstraction (e.g., CSF to SP 800-53 controls). Mapping indirect or
291 tenuous relationships would create so many mappings that they would lose their value.
292 Instead, capture the strongest direct relationships between concepts. This helps keep the
293 mapping clear and in line with the stated use case, targets the needs of the audience, and
294 helps them prioritize their work.

295 You could document a use case by writing a brief sentence that combines these assumptions. For
296 example:

- 297 • CISOs, risk officers, and assessors need to determine how meeting the requirements of
298 standard A will help satisfy the recommendations of standard B.
- 299 • Technology project managers need to know which types of technologies and human
300 knowledge, skills, or abilities defined in guidance A are most helpful for performing
301 tasks in document B.
- 302 • Cloud administrators need additional information on how to implement the processes in
303 guidance A within cloud environment B.
- 304 • The organization’s cybersecurity professionals who evaluate the capabilities of
305 technology products and services need to know which device capabilities defined in
306 guidance A support the organization’s cybersecurity capabilities implemented from
307 guidance B.
- 308 • Users of standard A need to know which of its clauses have substantially changed from
309 version 9 to version 10.

310 You could also document your assumptions for each use case as four columns in a spreadsheet or
311 table or through a markup language (e.g., JSON, XML). **Table 1** illustrates an example of this.

312 **Table 1.** Notional documentation of assumptions

Target Audience	Source A Concepts	Source B Concepts	Reason and Exhaustiveness
CISOs	Requirements of standard A	Recommendations of standard B	Which source A concepts are most helpful for satisfying source B concepts

313 **4. Choose a Concept Relationship Style**

314 Once the use case is documented, choose a *relationship style*, which is an explicitly defined
315 convention for characterizing relationships for a use case. Think about which concept
316 relationship style is appropriate for your mapping, and consider your documented assumptions.
317 A predefined style increases interoperability among mappings and allows a broader group of
318 users to efficiently and effectively use them to meet a more expansive set of needs. If predefined
319 styles do not adequately describe the relationships you intend to capture in your mapping, create
320 a style that better characterizes the relationships between the two sets of concepts.

321 This section describes NIST’s definitions for relationship styles and offers suggestions for which
322 style is typically best for various situations. The styles described in this section are listed in
323 **Table 2** along with a notional example of each style. The styles are generally listed in order from
324 the most subjective to the most objective.

325 **Table 2.** Concept relationship styles

Concept Relationship Style	Typical Situations	Notional Example
Concept crosswalk (Section 4.1)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Pointing to additional information on a topic Documenting diverse concept types at a consistent level Having few resources available to do the mapping 	CSF 1.1 subcategory ID.RA-1 SP 800-53r5 control CA-2
Supportive relationship mapping (Section 4.2)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Characterizing relationships between similar concept types Characterizing relationships between different but strongly related concept types 	ZTA project capability Certificate Authority Relationship type: Supports Relationship property: Example of CSF 1.1 subcategory PR.AC-1
Set theory relationship mapping (Section 4.3)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Indicating commonality between two similar sets of concepts, like two versions of the same standard 	CSF 1.1 subcategory PR.AC-1 Rationale: Semantic Relationship type: Equal Privacy Framework 1.0 subcategory PR.AC-P1
Structural relationship mapping (Section 4.4)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Indicating the inherent hierarchical structure of concepts within a single source or duplicated in two sources 	CSF 1.1 category PO.1 Relationship type: Parent-child CSF 1.1 subcategory PO.1.1

326 Section 4.5 discusses when a custom style might be appropriate as an alternative to one of these
327 predefined styles. Section 4.6 discusses the use of mappings with different relationship styles.

Multiple concept relationship styles can be used to document relationships between two concept sources or even when documenting relationships within one source. For example, consider the NIST CSF. You could use parent-child (i.e., structural) relationships to define the structure of the CSF and use a supportive relationship to indicate when achieving one subcategory helps supports achieving other subcategories. You could then create concept crosswalks between the CSF’s subcategories and other sources, effectively pointing people to additional sources of information on each subcategory. These three types of mappings can all be combined into one concept system, which provides a richer and more useful explanation of how the concepts are related than any of the mappings could provide on its own.

328

329 **4.1. Concept Crosswalk**

330 **Definition:** A *concept crosswalk* indicates that a relationship exists between two concepts
331 without any additional characterization of that relation. In other words, a relationship statement
332 in a concept crosswalk only indicates that concept A and concept B are related and captures no
333 additional information about the relationship between the two concepts. Therefore, it's
334 particularly important to document the use case for a concept crosswalk because the use case is
335 the only source of contextual information about the intention and meaning of each relationship.

336 **Primary Uses:** Crosswalks are generally well-suited to the following situations:

- 337 • Pointing to additional information on a topic (e.g., for more information on how to
338 implement concept A, see clause 10 in source B), which has historically been called an
339 *informative reference*
- 340 • Documenting a set of mappings at a consistent level even though several types of
341 concepts are being mapped and the relative strength of their relationships varies
342 significantly
- 343 • Mapping two sources with different and weakly related concept types

344 Mappers may also choose to create a crosswalk for exploratory or preparatory purposes as the
345 initial draft of a mapping that will eventually follow a more detailed relationship style. This may
346 be helpful, for example, if a working group wants to first reach consensus on which relationships
347 to characterize before making that characterization.

348 **Examples:**

- 349 • SP 800-53r5 cross-references [SP800-53]
- 350 • Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) 1.1 informative references [CSF11]
- 351 • SSDF informative references [SP800-218]
- 352 • Various crosswalks in the repository for the NIST OLIR Program. **Figure 1** shows a
353 screenshot from an [SP 800-53r5 to CSF crosswalk](#) with the CSF as the focal document
354 and SP 800-53r5 as the reference document.

Focal Document Element	Focal Document Element Description	Reference Document Element	Reference Document Element Description
ID.RA-1	Asset vulnerabilities are identified and documented	CA-2	a. Select the appropriate assessor or assessment team for the type of assessment to be conducted; b. Develop a control assessment plan that describes the scope of the assessment including: 1. Controls and control enhancements under assessment; 2. Assessment procedures to be used to determine control effectiveness; and 3. Assessment environment, assessment team, and assessment roles and responsibilities; c. Ensure the control assessment plan is reviewed and approved by the authorizing official or designated representative prior to conducting the assessment; d. Assess the controls in the system and its environment of operation [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] to determine the extent to which the controls are implemented correctly, operating as intended, and producing the desired outcome with respect to meeting established security and privacy requirements; e. Produce a control assessment report that document the results of the assessment; and f. Provide the results of the control assessment to [Assignment: organization-defined individuals or roles].
ID.RA-1	Asset vulnerabilities are identified and documented	CA-5	a. Develop a plan of action and milestones for the system to document the planned remediation actions of the organization to correct weaknesses or deficiencies noted during the assessment of the controls and to reduce or eliminate known vulnerabilities in the system; and b. Update existing plan of action and milestones [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] based on the findings from control assessments, independent audits or reviews, and continuous monitoring activities.
ID.RA-1	Asset vulnerabilities are identified and documented	CA-7	Develop a system-level continuous monitoring strategy and implement continuous monitoring in accordance with the organization-level continuous monitoring strategy that includes: a. Establishing the following system-level metrics to be monitored: [Assignment: organization-defined system-level metrics]; b. Establishing [Assignment: organization-defined frequencies] for monitoring and [Assignment: organization-defined frequencies] for assessment of control effectiveness; c. Ongoing control assessments in accordance with the continuous monitoring strategy; d. Ongoing monitoring of system and organization-defined metrics in accordance with the continuous monitoring strategy; e. Correlation and analysis of information generated by control assessments and monitoring; f. Response actions to address results of the analysis of control assessment and monitoring information; and g. Reporting the security and privacy status of the system to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] [Assignment: organization-defined frequency].

355

356

Fig. 1. Concept crosswalk example between SP 800-53r5 and the NIST CSF

357 4.2. Supportive Relationship Mapping

358 **Definition:** *Supportive relationship mapping* indicates how a *supporting concept* can or does
 359 help achieve a *supported concept*. There are several types of supportive relationships:

- 360 • *Supports:* Concept A supports concept B when A can be applied alone or in combination
 361 with one or more other concepts to achieve B in whole or in part.
- 362 • *Is supported by:* Concept A is supported by concept B when B can be applied alone or in
 363 combination with one or more other concepts to achieve A in whole or in part.
- 364 • *Identical:* Concept A and concept B are identical. They use exactly the same wording.
- 365 • *Equivalent:* Concept A and concept B are equivalent. They have the same meaning but
 366 different wording.
- 367 • *Contrary:* Concept A and concept B each have one or more elements that contradict one
 368 or more elements of the other concept. The contradictions may be opposites but do not
 369 have to be. This is based on the contrary concept type in Section 6.5.4 of [ISO704].
- 370 • *No relationship:* Concept A and concept B are not related or are not sufficiently related to
 371 merit another supportive relationship type.

372 The *supports* and *is supported by* relationships are more than simply cause and effect. They can
 373 also indicate whether or not the supporting concept is necessary for achieving the supported

374 concept. One of the following *supportive relationship properties* can optionally be assigned to
375 each *supports* and *is supported by* relationship:

- 376 • *Example of*: The supporting concept C is one way (an example) of achieving the
377 supported concept D in whole or in part. However, the supported concept D could also be
378 achieved without applying the supporting concept C. In other words, one can accomplish
379 D without C. This is based on the generic relationship type in Section 5.5.4.2 of
380 [ISO704].
- 381 • *Integral to*: The supporting concept C is integral to and a component of the supported
382 concept. The supporting concept must be applied as part of achieving the supported
383 concept. In other words, one cannot accomplish D without C. This is based on the
384 partitive relationship type in Section 5.5.4.3 of [ISO704].
- 385 • *Precedes*: The supporting concept C precedes the supported concept D when concept C
386 must be achieved before applying the supported concept D. In other words, concept C is a
387 prerequisite for concept D. The supporting concept itself is not part of the supported
388 concept. This is based on the sequential relation type in Section 5.5.5 of [ISO704].

389 There are no supportive relationship properties for *identical*, *equivalent*, and *contrary*
390 relationships.

The supportive relationship types and properties indicate the relative relationships between pairs of concepts within the context of a specified use case. The relationship types and properties are unlikely to have exactly the same meaning in different mappings because each use case will be different and the resulting mapping will be unique, taking into account mappers' assumptions and viewpoints. While relationship types and properties have the same basic meaning across mappings, be careful not to assume that the way concept A supports concept B is the same as the way concept B supports concept C. Always refer to the use case documentation described in Section 3 to understand the context and assumptions for each mapping.

391
392 **Primary Uses:** The supportive relationship mapping style is generally well-suited to the
393 following situations:

- 394 • The sources have similar concept types. Examples include the following:
 - 395 ○ A controls community mapping security controls in their control catalog to controls in
396 the SP 800-53r5 catalog
 - 397 ○ NIST authors mapping a set of procedures for assessing of security and privacy
398 controls employed within systems and organizations to an assessment methodology
399 performed within an effective risk management framework, with both the procedures
400 and methodology defined in SP 800-53A
- 401 • The sources have different but strongly related concept types. Examples include the
402 following:
 - 403 ○ A standards developer mapping cybersecurity requirements in one of their standards
404 to NIST CSF subcategories (outcomes)

- 405 ○ An industry working group mapping implementation recommendations in their
- 406 DevSecOps guidelines to implementation examples from the NIST SSDF
- 407 ○ A community mapping the capabilities of security principles and architectures, like
- 408 zero trust, to the technology functional components provided by a NIST NCCoE
- 409 project build
- 410 ○ A software vendor mapping recommended configuration settings for their software to
- 411 technology function components in an NCCoE project build
- 412 ○ A guidance developer mapping elements from their guidance to the NICE Framework
- 413 Competency Areas that support them
- 414 ○ A cryptographic module software developer mapping evidence from test results for
- 415 their module to corresponding requirements in FIPS 140-3

416 **Examples:**

- 417 • [NIST SP 1800-36 Volume E](#), Section 4.1, Table 4-1 contains a mapping between
- 418 functions from the NIST NCCoE’s Trusted IoT Device Onboarding project reference
- 419 design and NIST CSF subcategories to show how the reference design’s functions help
- 420 support the CSF subcategories and vice versa. **Table 3** shows an excerpt from that
- 421 mapping.

422 **Table 3.** Supportive relationship mapping examples from SP 1800-36 Vol. E

Logical Component	Component’s Function	Function’s Relationships to CSF Subcategories (and Relationship Properties)	Relationship Explanation
Certificate Authority (CA)	Issues and signs certificates as needed.	Supports (example of) PR.AC-1: Identities and credentials are issued, managed, verified, revoked, and audited for authorized devices, users, and processes	The fact that a credential is signed by a trusted CA provides a mechanism that may be used for enabling the credential to be verified and revoked.
		Supports (integral to) PR.AC-6: Identities are proofed and bound to credentials and asserted in interactions	If the device credential is an X.509 certificate (e.g., an IDevID) that is signed by a CA, this certificate binds the device’s credential to the device’s identity.
Application-Layer Onboarding Service	After the device connects to the network, this component interacts with the device using...	Is Supported by (precedes) ID.AM-2: Software platforms and applications within the organization are inventoried	In some application-layer onboarding mechanisms, the IoT device must be prepared for application-layer onboarding during the factory provisioning process. In these cases, the...

- 423
- 424 • [NIST SP 1800-35 Volume E](#), Section 3.5, Table 3-12 contains a mapping between zero
- 425 trust architecture functions from the NIST NCCoE’s ZTA project reference design and
- 426 SP 800-53 controls. Because hundreds of NIST SP 800-53 controls can help support ZTA
- 427 functions, mapping was only performed on existing SP 800-53 controls. **Table 4** shows
- 428 an excerpt from that table.

429

Table 4. Supportive relationship mapping examples from SP 1800-35 Vol. E

ZTA Project Component	ZTA Project Function	Function’s Relationships to SP 800-53 Controls (and Relationship Properties)	Relationship Explanation
Identity Governance	Provides policy-based, centralized, automated processes to manage user identity and access control functions (e.g., ensuring segregation of duties, role management, logging, auditing, access reviews, analytics, and reporting) to ensure compliance with requirements and regulations.	Supports (integral to) AC-2: Account Management	The Identity Governance function includes account management such as authorized users of the system, access authorizations (i.e., privileges), and assignment of organization-defined attributes.
		Supports (integral to) AC-3: Access Enforcement	The Identity Governance function enforces approved authorizations for logical access to information and system resources by identified users in accordance with applicable access control policies.
		Supports (precedes) AC-4: Information Flow Enforcement	The Identity Governance function is a necessary component of the identity component of access authorizations on which information flow enforcement depends.
		Supports (integral to) AC-5: Separation of Duties	The Identity Governance component can manage access permissions and authorizations in a way that incorporates the separation of duties principle.

430 **4.3. Set Theory Relationship Mapping**

431 **Definition:** The *set theory relationship mapping* style is derived from the branch of mathematics
 432 known as set theory. Each mapping done with this style includes both a rationale for the mapping
 433 and a relationship type.

434 There are three options for the *rationale*, which is a high-level context within which the two
 435 concepts are related:

- 436 1. *Syntactic:* How similar is the **wording** that expresses the two concepts? This is a word-
 437 for-word analysis of the relationship, not an interpretation of the language.
- 438 2. *Semantic:* How similar are the **meanings** of the two concepts? This involves some
 439 interpretation of each concept’s language.
- 440 3. *Functional:* How similar are the **results** of executing the two concepts? This involves
 441 understanding what will happen if the two concepts are implemented, performed, or
 442 otherwise executed.

443 There are five relationship types for documenting the logical similarity of two concepts:

- 444 1. *Subset of*: Concept A is a subset of concept B. In other words, concept B contains
445 everything that concept A does and more.
- 446 2. *Intersects with*: Concept A and concept B have some overlap, but each includes content
447 that the other does not.
- 448 3. *Equal*: Concept A and concept B are the same, although not necessarily identical.
- 449 4. *Superset of*: Concept A is a superset of concept B. In other words, concept A contains
450 everything that concept B does and more.
- 451 5. *No relationship*: Concept A and concept B are unrelated; their content does not overlap.

452 The relation type and the rationale must be used together. For example, consider CSF 1.1’s
453 PR.AC-1, “Identities and credentials are issued, managed, verified, revoked, and audited for
454 authorized devices, users and processes” [CSF11] and the [Privacy Framework’s](#) PR.AC-P1,
455 “Identities and credentials are issued, managed, verified, revoked, and audited for authorized
456 individuals, processes, and devices.” These two concepts have identical wording except for
457 “users” versus “individuals” and the order of the last few words. With a rationale of *syntactic*,
458 the relationship type would be *intersects with* because the two overlap, but each includes content
459 that the other does not. However, with a rationale of *semantic*, the relationship type would be
460 *equal* if “users” and “individuals” have the same meaning in their respective sources, *subset* if
461 “users” was a subset of “individuals,” and so on.

462 More than one rationale may apply to a pair of concepts. The SME who performs the mapping
463 also chooses the rationale that they deem most useful. The expert can also do multiple mappings
464 for the concept pair, each using a different rationale.

465 The set theory relationship mapping style has been supported by NIST OLIR since its launch,
466 and it is also leveraged by the NIST [Open Security Controls Assessment Language \(OSCAL\)](#) to
467 support automated cybersecurity control assessment.

468 **Primary Uses:** The set theory relationship mapping style is generally well-suited to the
469 following situations:

- 470 • Indicating how much commonality two similar sets of concepts have, such as how
471 requirements in a new version of a standard compare to their counterparts in a previous
472 version or how requirements in one standard compare to a second standard based on the
473 first one
- 474 • Mapping two sets of concepts when the pairs of concepts are mostly the same as each
475 other or supersets or subsets of each other (when there are relatively few relationships of
476 type *intersects with*)

477 **Examples:** Examples of set theory relationship mapping are available from the OLIR repository.

- 478 • NIST has mapped the Functions, Categories, and Subcategories of the NIST
479 Cybersecurity Framework version 1.1 (focal document) to the Functions, Categories, and
480 Subcategories of its Privacy Framework version 1.0 (reference document). The Privacy
481 Framework is based on the Cybersecurity Framework, so the set theory relationship
482 mapping indicates where the two frameworks have identical concepts, as well as how

483 their corresponding concepts differ at a high level. **Table 5** shows an example from the
484 [full mapping](#).

485 **Table 5.** Set theory relationship mapping example from OLIR repository

CSF 1.1 Element	CSF 1.1 Element Description	Rationale	Relationship	Privacy Framework Element	Privacy Framework Element Description
PR	Develop and implement appropriate safeguards to ensure delivery of critical services.	Syntactic	Intersects with	PR-P	Develop and implement appropriate data processing safeguards.
PR.AC	Access to physical and logical assets and associated facilities is limited to authorized users, processes, and devices, and is managed consistent with the assessed risk of unauthorized access to authorized activities and transactions.	Functional	Intersects with	PR.AC-P	Access to data and devices is limited to authorized individuals, processes, and devices, and is managed consistent with the assessed risk of unauthorized access.
PR.AC-1	Identities and credentials are issued, managed, verified, revoked, and audited for authorized devices, users, and processes	Semantic	Equal to	PR.AC-P1	Identities and credentials are issued, managed, verified, revoked, and audited for authorized individuals, processes, and devices.
PR.AC-2	Physical access to assets is managed and protected	Functional	Superset of	PR.AC-P2	Physical access to data and devices is managed.

486 4.4. Structural Relationship Mapping

487 **Definition:** The *structural relationship mapping* style captures an inherent hierarchical structure
488 of concepts, usually defined within a single source. For example, the CSF defines several
489 Functions. Each Function is composed of Categories, and each Category is composed of
490 Subcategories. This structure is a hierarchy of a *parent-child* relationship and, thus, a form of
491 mapping. Structural relationships are not as informative as the ones used in the supportive,
492 extended, or set theory styles. A parent-child relationship implies that the child concept is part of
493 the parent concept, but it does not specify whether the child concept is required or optional in
494 order to achieve the parent concept.

495 Structural relationships are fully objective because they are only based on a source’s intrinsic
496 structure. Even though subjectivity was likely involved in the structure’s creation, the scope of
497 the mapping is the final structure, and that is objective. However, structural relationships provide
498 no insights as to how concepts relate to each other independent of the structure. A second
499 mapping using a different concept relationship style can supplement a structural relationship
500 mapping.

501 Structural relationships may already be defined in data models and other forms.

502 **Primary Uses:** The structural relationship mapping style is generally well-suited to the
503 following situations:

- Indicating the parent-child structure of the elements of a framework, standard, regulation, or other content defined in a formal hierarchy (within one or more sources)

Examples: Examples of structural relationship mapping are available from:

- The [NIST CPRT](#) makes the structure of CSF 1.1, SSDF 1.1, SP 800-53r5, and other NIST frameworks and baselines available in downloadable Excel and JSON formats. The parent-child relationships are implied but not explicitly stated as of this writing.
- **Table 6** contains a notional example of how a set of parent-child relationships can capture the structure of a standard, framework, or other hierarchical content. Each row in the table has the relationship *parent-child*.

Table 6. Notional example of parent-child relationships

Concept A (Parent)	Concept B (Child)
Prepare the Organization (PO): Organizations should ensure that their people, processes, and technology are prepared to perform...	Define Security Requirements for Software Development (PO.1): Ensure that security requirements for software development are known...
Define Security Requirements for Software Development (PO.1): Ensure that security requirements for software development are known...	PO.1.1: Identify and document all security requirements for the organization’s software development infrastructures and processes...
Define Security Requirements for Software Development (PO.1): Ensure that security requirements for software development are known...	PO.1.2: Identify and document all security requirements for organization-developed software to meet...
Define Security Requirements for Software Development (PO.1): Ensure that security requirements for software development are known...	PO.1.3: Communicate requirements to all third parties who will provide commercial software components to the organization...
Prepare the Organization (PO): Organizations should ensure that their people, processes, and technology are prepared to perform...	Implement Roles and Responsibilities (PO.2): Ensure that everyone inside and outside of the organization involved in the SDLC is prepared...
Implement Roles and Responsibilities (PO.2): Ensure that everyone inside and outside of the organization involved in the SDLC is prepared...	PO.2.1: Create new roles and alter responsibilities for existing roles as needed to encompass all parts of the SDLC. Periodically review and maintain the defined roles and responsibilities, updating them as needed.

4.5. Custom

This approach does not attempt to capture every conceivable style or type of relationship. For example, the approach does not provide a way for someone studying the cybersecurity risks of a particular technology (e.g., mobile, semiconductors) to map the components of that technology to NIST-catalogued threats and countermeasures.

Using more relationship styles and types can make it difficult or impossible to link concepts together in a consistent way in a single concept system. Additional relationship types can also make it more challenging and time-consuming for SMEs because distinctions between relationship styles and types may be subtle, so selecting the appropriate one will require more thought and evaluation.

NIST welcomes suggestions for relationship types and properties to add to existing styles. NIST also recognizes that there may be cases in which none of the existing styles are suitable and a

526 new custom style is needed. NIST encourages SMEs considering the development of a custom
527 style to first contact NIST to discuss the situation, learn what other style changes or additions
528 may be in progress, and determine a recommended course of action.

529 In the future, NIST will release details of how a SME would document a custom style so that
530 mapping users will understand it and be able to convert it to other styles if appropriate.

531 **4.6. Using Mappings With Different Relationship Styles**

532 Different relationship styles are best suited for particular situations. Rather than trying to force
533 the use of one relationship style for all mappings, this approach enables the use of multiple
534 relationship styles while also ensuring a level of interoperability for all mappings that use any of
535 those styles. This enables mapping users to choose to either have all mappings within a single
536 concept system downgraded to the lowest common denominator in terms of relationship styles or
537 have a concept system using multiple relationship styles.

538 Interoperability is also important because the SMEs who perform mappings may decide that they
539 want to switch relationship styles because of time constraints involving the style they originally
540 chose. For example, concept crosswalks are the most basic relationship style because they
541 provide the least information. Mappings in all other relationship styles can be trivially
542 downgraded to concept crosswalks by omitting all of their relationship types and properties,
543 leaving just concept pairs.

544 Most set theory relationships can be automatically converted to their supportive relationship
545 counterparts, as depicted in **Table 7**. However, *intersects with* relationships cannot be
546 automatically converted because they only indicate overlap between the concepts, not the nature
547 of that overlap. An *intersects with* relationship can either be automatically converted to a concept
548 crosswalk or manually reevaluated by an SME in order to remap it as a supportive relationship.

549 **Table 7.** Converting set theory relationships to supportive relationships

Set Theory Relationship	Supportive Relationship
subset of	supports (integral to)
equal	equivalent
superset of	is supported by (integral to)
intersects with	N/A

550 When converting mappings in a way that attempts to preserve relationship meaning (e.g., using
551 the conversions stated in Table 7), it is important to consider the assumptions and other context
552 captured related to the mapping being converted. The context in which a mapping was performed
553 may impact exactly how relations should be interpreted, which can in turn impact how one
554 relation should be converted to another.

555 **5. Evaluate Concept Pairs and Document Their Relationships**

556 After documenting the use cases for the mapping and choosing the relationship style, the
557 identification of relationships that constitute the mapping can commence. It is recommended that
558 a SME start a new mapping by documenting a representative sample of the mapping in an ad hoc
559 format of their choice, like a spreadsheet or document. There are two major objectives for this
560 sample: 1) identify issues with the use cases or relationship style choice that may necessitate
561 changes, and 2) have other SMEs review the sample and the use case documentation, and
562 provide feedback on them to help improve the quality of the mapping. Having a sample reviewed
563 is a recommended practice because it helps reduce the impact of individual bias and the
564 likelihood of inconsistent mapping.

565 When mapping, the SME should document the rationale for each relation. This provides valuable
566 context and justification that other SMEs can use to evaluate the mappings and that mapping
567 users can utilize to better understand each mapping.

568 Here are a few mapping tips for SMEs based on feedback from beta testers of the NIST
569 approach:

- 570 • If you are planning to map in only one direction (from A to B), it may still be valuable to
571 examine the concept pairs in the opposite direction. Sometimes that will identify
572 previously unknown relationships.
- 573 • A mapping between two sources is likely to use a subset of the relationship types for a
574 style. If you narrowly define your use case, such as only indicating absolute
575 requirements, you might only use one relationship type.
- 576 • You may want to take a phased approach to mapping. For example, you may initially
577 want to map only one or two particular relationship types within a style. In the future, you
578 can always revisit your mapping and add more relationship types to it.
- 579 • Filling in the blanks in the relationship statements may make the mapping process less
580 abstract. For example, instead of saying “X is one way of doing or achieving Y,” you
581 might say, “Project function X is one way (an example) of doing or achieving SP 800-53
582 control Y.”
- 583 • Mapping can highlight ambiguities with wording, differences in granularity, duplication
584 of concepts, and other issues within either of the sources being mapped. Be sure to
585 capture and share these observations because they can significantly improve the next
586 version of the affected sources.

587 **6. Next Steps**

588 Whether you want to create mappings or use mappings, NIST welcomes feedback on the
589 proposed approach. After receiving public comments, NIST will test potential revisions before
590 fully including them as mapping relationship styles within the [OLIR Program](#) and [CPRT](#). OLIR
591 accepts mapping submissions that involve NIST cybersecurity and privacy content in accordance
592 with the OLIR Program requirements available through the [OLIR Program website](#). Once a
593 mapping submission is reviewed and published, the CPRT interface will make the mapping data
594 available in human-consumable, machine-readable formats. Future OLIR updates will enable
595 mapping creators to maintain and update their mappings.

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627 **Appendix A. Glossary**

628 **concept**

629 A “unit of knowledge created by a unique combination of characteristics.” [ISO1087]

630 **concept crosswalk**

631 A concept relationship style that identifies that a relationship exists between two concepts without any additional
632 characterization of that relationship.

633 **concept mapping**

634 An indication that one concept is related to another concept.

635 **concept relationship style**

636 An explicitly defined convention for characterizing relationships for a use case.

637 **concept source**

638 A document or other resource that contains definitions of concepts.

639 **concept system**

640 A “set of concepts structured in one or more related domains according to the concept relations among its concepts.”
641 [ISO1087]

642 **concept type**

643 A category of concepts found within a particular domain.

644 *Note:* In the domain of cybersecurity and privacy, concept types include controls, requirements,
645 recommendations, outcomes, technologies, functions, processes, techniques, roles, and skills.

646 **mapping**

647 *See concept mapping.*

648 **one-source mapping**

649 A mapping between concepts within a single concept source.

650 **relationship style**

651 *See concept relationship style.*

652 **set theory relationship mapping**

653 A concept relationship style that documents the logical similarity of two concepts based on the branch of
654 mathematics known as set theory.

655 *Note:* Set theory relation types include subset of, intersects with, equivalent, and superset of.

656 **structural relationship mapping**

657 A concept relationship style that captures an inherent hierarchical structure of concepts.

658 *Note:* Structural relationship types are parent-child.

659 **supportive relationship mapping**

660 A concept relationship style that identifies how one concept can or does help achieve another concept.

661 *Note:* Supportive relationship types include supports, is supported by, identical, equivalent, and contrary.